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I. INTRODUCTION
The quest for human dignity in modern society is a noble but elusive goal.
Difficult to define,' difficult to realize, personally or socially, dignity nevertheless
remains a defining trait of human character, and a preeminent ideal of western society.
From the perspective of an individual, dignity might be thought of as the ability
to pursue one's rights, claims, or interests in daily life so that one can fully realize
talents, ambitions, or abilities as one would like. That is one path to satisfaction, social
recognition, and stature-certainly attributes of dignity. This might be thought of as
'In western thought, the most definitive elaboration of the concept of human dignity is in the work of
Immanuel Kant, especially his seminal FOUNDATIONS OF THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS 39 (L.W. Beck
trans., 2d ed. 1959) ("Act so that you treat humanity, whether in your own person or in that of another,
always as an end and never as a means only."). Recently, there has been a renaissance in the influence of
Kantian thought as a counterweight to utilitarianism. This is most pronounced in the work of John Rawls.
See, e.g., JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971); John Rawls, Political Liberalism (1993).
There are other conceptions of dignity too. Consider, for example, the work of RONALD DWORKIN,
TAKINGRIGHr SEIOUSLY (1977) (developing theory of human rights as part of dignity) and LAW'S EMPIRE
(1986) (examining how judges determine legal rights); or ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE AND TOPIA
(1974) (arguing from natural law tradition of John Locke).
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self-realization, although that is not the only conception of dignity. What matters here
is that each person should be free to develop his own personality to the fullest, subject
only to restrictions arising from others' pursuit of the same.2
Of course, there must be some limit to individual freedom if society is to function
in a reasonably orderly manner. Thus, from the standpoint of society, individual
aspiration must be measured against the demand for order, peace, and social harmony.
This balance between the aspiration of individual freedom and the demands of
organized society has been a central quest of modern constitutional law.3
Today this balance is harder than ever to achieve. Social demands have
escalated, placing elevated pressures on the integrity of human personhood. The rise
of the administrative state, for example, has led to omnipresent government and its
potential to suffocate personal freedom.4 Technology now develops so rapidly and
pervasively that it risks overwhelming individuality. For example, computers can
gather, store, and transmit information so capably that they can access, and even
mimic, human functions 5 Gene technology, artificial insemination, and the ability to
prolong and, indeed, end life pose troubling existential questions. How are we coping
in this world, both in isolation and in comparison to others?
This Article takes up these themes by exploring the concept of human dignity as
reflected in the legal order of two comparable modem western societies: Germany and
America. Germany and America are good choices for this comparison because both
share similar European intellectual and cultural influences; both are highly developed,
2It is fundamentally a Kantian thought that all moral agents should develop their talents to the
maximum extent compatible with the freedom of others. Note, for example, Kants influence in RAWLS, A
THEORY OFJUsrICE, supra note 1, at 60: "[Elach person is to have an equal right to the most extensive basic
liberty compatible with a similar liberty for others." Anthony Sampson similarly voiced these thoughts:
"'What matters... is that each man should be free to develop his own personality to the full; and the only
duties which should restrict this freedom are those which are necessary to enable everyone else to do the
sam .' ANTHONY SAMPSON, THE CHANGINGANATOMY OF BRITAIN 160 (1982) (quoting Lord Tom Denning,
Master of the Rolls). For Kant, the concepts of freedom, development of moral personality, reverence of the
moral law, and treating people as the final end are interlinked.
3See, e.g., Poe v. UlIman, 367 U.S. 497, 542 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting) ("Due process has not
been reduced to any formula; its content cannot be determined by reference to any code. The best that can
be said is that through the course of this Court's decisions it has represented the balance which our Nation,
built upon postulates of respect for the liberty of the individual, has struck between that liberty and the
demands of organized society.").
'Whilethe administrative state in America can be traced to 1887-with the institution of the Interstate
Commerce Commission, the first significant administrative agency-the predominant rise of the
administrative state occurred during the era of the New Deal and continues today. In Europe, the roots of the
administrative state lie in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. In Germany, the modem administrative
state arose from Frederick the Great, who thought of himself as "the first servant of the state." Edward L
Ebefle, Comparative Public Law: A Time That Has Arrived, in FRSTSClRIs r FOR BERNHARD GRossFI.D 7,
7 n.13 (Werner Ebke ed., forthcoming 1998). In France, Napoleon formed the administrative state through,
among other things, a professional civil service. See id.
5Se4 eg., Paul Schwartz, The Computer in German and American Constitutional Law: Towrds an
American Right of Informational Self-Determination, 37 AM. J. COMP. L. 675, 676-77 (1989) (detailing
extensive gathering and use of personal information by computers). Consider also the developments in
artificial intelligence, such as IBM's recent construction of a computer, Deep Blue, that can capably challenge
the world champion in a game of chess. See Bruce Weber, A Mean Chess-Playing Computer Tears at the
Meaning of Thought, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 19, 1996, at Al. Indeed, Deep Blue can win. See Drew McDermott,
Yes, Computers Can Think, N.Y. TIMES, May 14, 1997, at A21.
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advanced industrial societies coping with change and technological revolution; and
both value individual freedom in the context of a stable society.
Human dignity is, of course, an elusive concept. For our purposes, we will
concentrate on the content given the term by the constitutional law of both countries.
In particular, we will explore how persons are free to develop their own personalities.
One might choose, for example, to be let alone as master of his realm. Or, one might
engage vigorously in the affairs of the day. In Germany, these matters are covered in
the right to the free unfolding of personality. In America, this falls under the rubric of
privacy rights, including the zone of personal autonomy that emanates therefrom. It
makes sense to focus on the constitutional law of these countries because recording in
a constitution a culture's highest values is a defining attribute of western society.
Certainly this is the case with America and Germany. In Germany, the Basic Law, as
interpreted by the Constitutional Court, guides and organizes society. In America, the
Supreme Court has long secured the role of declaring out of the fabric of the
Constitution certain fundamental values for the social order.
By exploring this concept of human dignity in each constitutional order, insight
can be derived as to the quality of the human condition, the reach of individual
freedom, and the make up of the social order. The particular traits, activities, or
essences valued by each country reveal something important about human personality
as it relates to society. Likewise, the limitations on freedom articulated in German and
American law are instructive of the social structure each country seeks to create. In
short, the balance struck between individual freedom and the social order colors the
legal culture.
It makes particular sense to focus on these concepts from a cross-cultural
perspective. First, it is important to realize that there are other visions of humanity
beyond our own visage that may be ennobling, enriching, or both. Second, it is
worthwhile to explore the similarities and differences in constitutional vision and
doctrine-both in themselves and as a basis for assessing the transplantation of legal
norms. Third, this comparison may yield a set of higher principles of constitutional
order or a sounder public law philosophy. Fourth, the foreign legal regime may serve
as an alternative standard by which to measure the work of the native court. Fifth, in
an increasingly interdependent world, realization of mutual cultural influences may
prove beneficial.6 Sixth, through study of other cultures, we learn, by comparison,
something important about ourselves.7
To accomplish these goals, some grounding in German constitutional law-parti-
cularly its protection of human dignity-is first necessary so that we can see how
German law contrasts with American. This is the subject of Part UI. Part III provides
an overview of human dignity as developed in German personality and American
privacy rights. There are two components to German personality law. Freedom of
OThese points are noted in Edward J. Eberle, Public Discourse in Contemporary Germany, 47 CASE
W. RES. L. REV. 797, 804 (1997) [hereinafter Eberle, Public Discourse].
7This may be the main mission of comparative law: "For only by making comparisons can we
distinguish ourselves from others and discover who we are, in order to become all that we are meant to be."
THOMAS MANN, JOSEPH IN EGYPT (1938), translated in Dedication, DAVID P. CURRIE, THE CONSTITMrrON
OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY (1994).
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action, elaborated on in Part IV, is outward in focus, including protection of activities
like freedom to travel, or to pursue a sport or occupation. German law also guarantees
a personal sphere that is inward in orientation. As discussed in Part V, this protection
of the personal sphere entails a number of strands, such as privacy, informational self-
determination, and control over one's portrayal in society. Parts IV and V are
presented against the backdrop of American law in order to discover points of
divergence and convergence in the two legal cultures. Part VI explores how both
countries approach constitutional issues central to identity, self-determination, and
autonomy. This area provides the greatest overlap between German and American law.
German law has evolved to protect a search for biological parenthood, sexual identity,
and rights to one's name, among other matters. In American law, self-determination
has encompassed control over procreation, conception, marriage, and child rearing,
to name a few. Part VII discusses the recent convergence in German and American
abortion law in the context of these themes. All of this leads to a more comprehensive
assessment in Part VIE of the countries' contrasting views of human dignity and the
comparative strength of their constitutional visions.
II. THE GERMAN CONSTITUTIONAL ORDER AND ITS PROTECTION
oF HUMA DiGNITY AND PERsoNALI
A The German Constitutional Order
The adoption of the Basic Law in 1949, following the debacle of World War II,
signaled a new constitutional order in Germany. Seeking distance from the horrors of
Naziism, the Basic Law made a sharp break from this immediate past, instead drawing
deeply upon German tradition to found the legal order on moral and rational idealism,
particularly that of Kant.' Thus, the Basic Law is a value-oriented constitution that
obligates the state to realize a set of objectively ordered principles, rooted in justice
and equality, that are designed to restore the centrality of humanity to the social order,
and thereby secure a stable democratic society on this basis. These values are not to
be sacrificed for the exigencies of the day, as had been the case in Nazi Germany.9 The
Rechtsstaat principle, for example, obligates society to adhere to a rule of law,
requiring that legal measures have a legal basis and discernible content, provide fair
notice, and be necessary and proportional to the ends they seek to accomplish
(Proportionality Principle)."0 The principle of the Social State (Sozialstaatsprinzip)
$See INcO VON MUENCH, GRUNDESEIHz, KOMMENTAR, Vol. 1, 72-73 (2d ed. 1981); DONALD P.
KOMMERS, THE CONSrrruIONAL JURISPRUDENCE OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY 47 (1989)
[haeinafter CONSrIXrMONAL JURISPRUDBNCE]; Peter Badura, Generalpravention und Warde des Menschen,
19 JURISTENZEITUNG 337, 339-40 (1964).
9See George P. Fletcher, Human Dignity as a Constitutional Value, 22 U.W. ONT. L. .RBv. 171,
178-79 (1984).
l0The concept of the Rechtsstaat has deep roots in German constitutional theory. Kant is generally
considered the formulator of the concept. Its intellectual roots are complex, bound with the idea of a state
governed by the rule of law and the idea that state power should be applied rationally, consistent with this
autonomous system of law. Despite its similarity with the English concept of the rule of law, the two are not
the same. For elaboration of the notion of Rechtsstaat in German legal history, see William Ewald,
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obligates the state to take necessary social welfare measures so that all citizens will
have a dignified existence." The concept of a "militant democracy" (streitbare
Demokratie) obligates the state to resist any threats to the basic democratic order,
thereby assuring that democracy flourishes. 2
Crucial also to the German social order is commitment to human rights. Many
fundamental values are enumerated in the Basic Law's catalogue of rights, including
protections of free conscience, faith and creed, free expression, equality, and
occupational freedom. The Basic Law is far more specific and comprehensive in its
listing of basic freedoms, enumerating at least twenty specific individual liberties, as
compared to the relatively sparse enumeration of liberties in the American Constitu-
tion. 3
There are differences in the countries' conceptions of basic rights. Fundamental
to the German constitutional scheme is the principle of objective and subjective rights,
or positive and negative liberties. The objective or positive dimension of rights
obligates the government to create the proper conditions so that rights might be
realized.14 This bestows duties on the state, calling for state activism. For example, the
concept of human dignity protected in Article 1 obligates the state to provide a basic
minimal existence for citizens.'" This objective dimension to basic rights is tied to the
value-ordered nature of the German constitutional scheme, obligating the government
to realize in society the set of objective values embodied in the Basic Law. "This
value-system, which centers upon human dignity and the free unfolding of the human
personality within the social community, must be looked upon as a fundamental
constitutional decision affecting all areas of law, public and private."' 6
By interpreting basic rights as establishing an "objective" ordering of values,
centered around human dignity, the Constitutional Court transformed those values into
Comparative Jurisprudence (I): What Was It Like to Try a Rat?, 143 U. PA. L. REv. 1889,2046-55 (1995).
See also KOMMERS, CONSTITUrIONAL JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 8, at 42-43. Today the notion of the
Rechtsstaat is anchored in Article 20(3), which provides: "Legislation shall be subject to the constitutional
order-, the executive and thejudiciary shall be bound by law and justice." Art. 20(3) Grundgesetz [hereinafter
GG]; see also infra note 135 and accompanying text.
"See Art. 20(l) GG. For elaboration of the concept of the Social State, see CONSTrF1rI7ONAL
JURISPRUDENCE , supra note 8, at 41-42. For the intellectual origins of the Social State, see Ewald, supra note
10, at 2055-61.
'See, e.g., liass Case, 30 Entscheidungen des Bundesverfassungsgerichts [hereinafter BVerfGE] 1,
19-20 (1970), translated in CONSTIrUTIONAL JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 8, at 230 ("Constitutional
provisions must not be interpreted in isolation but rather in a manner consistent with the Basic Law's
fundamental principles and its system of values .... In the context of this case it is especially significant that
the Constitution ... has decided in favor of [a] 'militant democracy' that does not submit to abuse of basic
rights or an attack on the liberal order of the state. Enemies of the Constitution must not be allowed to
endanger, impair, or destroy the existence of the state while claiming protection of rights granted by the Basic
Law.").
'
3These differences should be expected, as the German charter was drafted in 1949 and the American
Bill of Rights was drafted in 1791.
" The concept of an 'objective' ordering of values... [is] a central concept in German constitutional
doctrine' Peter E. Quint, Free Speech and Private Law in German Constitutional Theory, 48 MD. L. REV.
247,261 (1989).
lsThis provides the foundation for the social welfare principle, anchored in Article 20(1), that
distinguishes Germany.
'
6Lath, 7 BVerfGE 198, 205 (1958).
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principles so important that they must exist "objectivel'--as an independent force,
separate from their specific manifestation in a concrete legal relationship. So
conceived, objective rights form part of the legal order, the ordre public, thereby
taking their place among the governing principles of German society. 7 In this way, the
Basic Law acts as a blueprint for society, setting forth the values to be realized,
requiring a close fit between its text and society.
By contrast, there is no such objective aspect to the American Constitution. The
American Constitution simply provides the outline for government, concentrating on
limiting official power. Our Constitution lacks any positive element that requires
affirmative government action to enforce our rights. 8
The second aspect of German basic rights is their subjective or negative
dimension. This means that rights play a defensive role, delimiting a sphere of
personal liberty beyond governmental control. In German law, this concept of rights
is referred to as "subjective," denoting a set of rights individuals may exercise. The
essential character of this subjective dimension corresponds to the American concept
of fundamental constitutional rights.
In contrast to the American Constitution, the German Basic Law also sets forth
certain duties citizens or government must perform. For example, Article 6(2)
provides that "the care and upbringing of children shall be a natural right of and a duty
primarily incumbent on the parents. The state shall watch over their endeavors in this
respect."' 9 Moreover, the objective value-order, as worked out by the Court, calibrates
the relationships between rights, and among rights and duties. Thus, German citizens
have both claims to subjective rights, which they may exercise, and objective rights,
which they can call on government to perform, but must also assume duties corollary
to such rights.
We can thus see that the contrast between the text and nature of the two
constitutions is striking. The German Basic Law is value-oriented and sets forth both
rights and duties, whereas the United States Constitution attempts to be value-neutral
pursuant to a scheme of negative liberties, specifically enumerating rights government
may not infringe, but not stating comparable duties citizens must assume or values
government must realize.
Constitutional interpretative techniques also differ in Germany and America.
Under American canon, one must consult, in order of importance, constitutional text
0See Eberle, Public Discourse, supra note 6, at 811. They might even be viewed as "permanent ends
of the state," not changeable even by constitutional amendment. Quint, supra note 14, at 261 (noting Art.
79(3) GG).
"Themost that might be said is that, under certain circumstances, American government cannot totally
deny a right or a benefit. Usually, such cases are decided under the Equal Protection Clause. See, e.g., Plyer
v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 230 (1982) (ruling that state may not deny free public education to illegal aliens);
Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 627, 629-31 (1969) (holding that conditioning receipt of welfare
benefits on one-year residency requirement violates right to travel and Equal Protection Clause).
" Art. 6(2) GG. In actuality, duties are only sparingly spelled out in the Basic Law, in contrast to the
1918 Weimar Constitution, which elaborated a set of duties. Thus, in contemporary Germany, "duties" arise
more from internalization of cultural norms (of how one ought to exercise rights) than from textual
enumeration. See Eberle, Public Discourse, supra note 6, at 801 n.6. For elaboration of the Basic Law's
concept of duties and how they mirror basic rights, see BODO PIEROTH & BERNHARD SCHLINK, GRUND-
RECTE STAATSRECIT I155-56 (10th ed. 1994).
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(including structure and purpose), precedent, Framers' intent, and then, perhaps,
social, economic, or philosophic perspectives prior to reaching a plausible result. By
contrast, German law places a premium on the text of the Basic Law and its
applicability to social and economic conditions. Beyond textual and structural
exegesis, German interpreters also employ historical and teleologicalanalysis, before
integrating and harmonizing the whole (praktische Konkordanz).20 Both Courts thus
employ a variety of reasoning techniques, including arguments based on text,
structure, history and natural law.21 Functionally, German case law operates like
American decisions, setting forth fundamental principles that bind other courts and
people in society.'
The most pronounced difference between the two modes of interpretation relates
to the role of Framers' intent. In Germany, the Constitutional Court treats Framers'
intent and history as auxiliary sources of interpretation. While the Court is free to
consult them, they generally lend support to a result reached through other interpreta-
tive methods, such as the textual, structural, or teleological analysis noted above.
Framers' intent is not an independent source of authority.' Instead, the Court mainly
interprets constitutional text in relationship to the conditions of modern society. This
a2Under German canon, textual analysis consists of analyzing the meaning of words or sentences. This
is usually combined with a structural or systematic analysis, where one attempts to clarify the meaning of a
word or sentence by comparing it to related language in the legal text. The interpreter strives for a unity of
the legal document interpreted. In historical analysis, the interpreter tries to divine the intent of the Framers
of the legal text. In teleological analysis, the interpreter glosses over Framers' intent and, instead, searches
for the purpose or goal behind the language. Such purposes are generally viewed from a contemporary
perspective. These four schools of interpretation constitute the classic catalogue of statutory interpretation
in Germany, and the core of constitutional interpretation as well. With the exception of teleological
interpretation, these classic methods of interpretation were established in Germany by Friedrich Carl von
Savigny in his classic eight volume treatise on Roman law, SYSTEM DES HEUTIGEN ROMISCHBN RBCHTS
(SYSTEM OF MODERN ROMAN LAW) (Scientia Verlag 1981) (1840-1851). See Winfried Brugger, Legal
Interpretation, Schools of Jurisprudence, and Anthropology: Some Remarks from a German Point of View,
42 AM. 3 COMP. L 395,396-98 (1994); see also CONSTITUrIONAL JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 8, at 48-49.
One can thus see that there is some overlap between American and German methods of textual interpretation.
A difference between German statutory and constitutional interpretation is that, in constitutional
interpretation, after employing a combination of the above four techniques, the constitutional interpreter then
tries to bring some unity to the overall interpretation. If norms are in conflict with one another, the interpreter
tries to reconcile them by interpreting their essences to the maximum extent possible, and then harmonizing
the difference. This is the technique of concordance or harmonization (praktische Konkordanz). It is easier
in theory than in practice. Consider, for example, the Constitutional Court's use of the technique in the
context of the clashes between expression and privacy interests, in the Lebach, 35 BVerfGE 202 (1973), and
Soraya, 34 BVerfGE 269 (1973), cases, discussed infra notes 337-40, 373-80 and accompanying text, and
abortion, discussed infra notes 504-07 and accompanying text. The interpreter also tries to integrate the
interpretation to achieve interparty and social cohesion. See Brugger, supra, at 398-99.
mSee CONSTITUTIONAL JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 8, at 48-49.
2In Germany, there is no formal stare decisis system as there is in America. This follows from the
civil law premise that judicial decisions serve only as a gloss on the open development of the law, which is
to be found in the rules and principles of the governing text. See id. at 48. However, in practice, German
courts strive to adhere to precedent, as do American courts. Moreover, Constitutional Court decisions
represent binding interpretations of the Basic Law.
-
3See Brugger, supra note 20, at 400; CONSTITUTIONAL JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 8, at 49. Note,
for example, these words of the Constitutional Court: "[Tihe original history ofa particular provision of the
BasicLawhas no decisive importance" in constitutional interpretation. Homosexuality Case, 6 BVerfGE 389,
431 (1957), translated in CONSTrrrIONAL JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 8, at 49.
No. 4] GERMAN CONSTITUTION 971
is perhaps most pronounced in relation to the Article 1 concept of human dignity,
where the Court has stated: "[Any decision defining human dignity in concrete terms
must be based on our present understanding of it and not on any claim to a conception
of timeless validity."
This is a far cry from American law, where text, structure, history, and Framers'
intent are thought to lend predictability and stability to the law. Some even forcefully
argue that these methods provide an additional guard against judicial activism.
Certainly the conservative reaction to the Warren Court has sought limitation of
judicial review through a search for originalism.1 Moreover, in the area of une-
numerated rights, 6 the Supreme Court has sought to anchor its decisions in timeless
concepts, like justice or natural law, to avoid the appearance of judicial bias or result-
orientation2 7 These differences show, almost by definition, that the Constitutional
Court tends to be a more activist body than the Supreme Court. They also point out,
in a sense, that the Constitutional Court is forward-looking, whereas the Supreme
Court is backward in focus.2
B. Human Dignity in Germany
Human dignity is the central value of the Basic Law. This determination reflects
the conscious intention to elevate modem Germany beyond the inhumanity of
Naziism, signaling a new constitutional order. Article 1(1) therefore states that "the
dignity of man shall be inviolable." The second paragraph of Article 1 reinforces the
centrality of human rights to the concept of human dignity: "The German people
therefore acknowledge inviolable and inalienable human rights as the basis of every
community, of peace and of justice in the world" 29
A core aspect of human dignity is the guarantee of human rights. Indeed, the
specific enumeration of basic rights in the Basic Law are themselves tangible
manifestations of human dignity. This catalogue of basic rights is systematically
ordered, making up a central aspect of the objectively determined set of values that
'-!fe !pnironment Case, 45 BVerfGE 187, 229 (1977), translated in CRuRIB, supra note 7, at 315.
ZSee e.g., ROBERTBORK, T &hMI NGoAMERICA 69-132 (1990) (examining influence ofjudges'
and public's political and moral views upon judicial decisions); Robert Bork, Neutral Principles and Some
First Amendment Problems, 47 IND. L.J. 1, 1-20 (1971) (arguing that effective theories and criteria should
be established to guide judges in interpreting American Constitution).
2By unenumerated rights, I mean the range of fundamental rights beyond those explicitly set forth in
the first eight amendments to the Constitution. In this Article, I use the term unenumerated rights
synonymously with modern substantive due process or its subset, rights of privacy.
2 Se eg., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 486 (1965) ('We deal with a right of privacy older
than the Bill of Rights:); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942) ("We are dealing here with
legislation which involves one of the basic civil rights of man [marriage and procreation]:).
2sCompare, especially, Transsexual Case, 49 BVerfGE 286 (1978) (ruling that as matter of
fundamental human dignity, person has right to live according to sex of choice), with Bowers v. Hardwick,
478 U.S. 186, 190-94 (1986) (ruling that history and traditions of country do not support recognizing
constitutional right to engage in homosexual sodomy), discussed infra notes 468-74 and accompanying text.
20CoNSrmmONAL JURJSPRUDENCE, supra note 8, at 305. The Basic Law's reliance on human dignity
is attributable to Kant. The charter might even be envisioned as an attempt to infuse Kantian morality into
the legal order. See Fletcher, supra note 9, at 178. For elaboration of the Kantian roots of the Basic Law,
particularly in Articles 1 and 2, see Ewald, supra note 10, at 2063. See also sources cited supra note 8.
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govern German society. In this way, dignity and basic rights have a mutually
nourishing effect on one another.3 ' But human dignity means more than the specific
catalogue of basic rights. Dignity is not merely a focus on individuality. As the central
value of the constitution, it infuses the whole constitutional order, obligating the state
both to protect and realize it. This includes a communitarian dimension: Requiring
respect for others' claims to dignity better assures vindication of the human dignity of
all, and fosters a community of mutual cooperation and solidarity.
The first draft of the constitutional convention, the Herrenchiemsee conference,
stated, "The dignity of man is founded upon eternal rights with which every person is
endowed by nature."'" Christian-Democrats (a Christian-inspired and generally
conservative party) sought to link the language "eternal rights" with "God-given
rights."32 But this effort was resisted by the more secular and liberal Social Democrats
(a social welfare democratic party) and Free Democrats (a nineteenth-century liberal
party). The result was the more neutral language reflected in Article 1(1). There is
general consensus that this language means that the guarantee of human dignity is
inalienable, being both prior to and a constituent part of the social contract.3 The
American Declaration of Independence seems the closest reflection of this understand-
ing.34 Human dignity is thus a constituent part of humanity, and its guarantee is the
essence of the German social order. In this sense, dignity is the highest legal value in
Germany.
The concept of human dignity in the Basic Law reflects the influence of three
main schools of thought, although it was not intended to be strictly associated with any
one of them. The three influences are Christian natural law, Kantian moral philosophy,
and more secular theories of personal autonomy and self-determination?' In the
dignitarian jurisprudence of the Constitutional Court, however, the Court has mainly
followed Kant's theory of moral autonomy. This is evident, for example, in the leading
Life Imprisonment Case, where the Court attempted to capture the essence of human
dignity:
It is contrary to human dignity to make the individual the mere tool (blosses
Objekt) of the state. The principle that "each person must always be an end in
himself' applies unreservedly to all areas of the law; the intrinsic dignity of the
person consists in acknowledging him as an independent personality.36
3See CONSTrrruIoNAL JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 8, at 305.
311d. at 308.
nld.
33For a brief description of this history, see CONSTITUrIONAL JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 8, at 308.
"See THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776) ("We hold these truths to be self-
evident.., that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that among these are Life,
Liberty, and the Pursuit of Happiness-That to secure these Rights, Governments are instituted among Men,
deriving their just Powers from the Consent of the Governed ... !).
3Under Christian natural law theories, dignity is a gift of God and, therefore, an inalienable aspect of
humanity. Under Kantian philosophy, dignity is an indispensable part of human nature. Under a more secular
theory of self-realization, the decisive aspect of human dignity is self-realization of one's identity through
exercise of one's talents and abilities. For elaboration of these theories, and their influence on human dignity,
see PMROTH & SCILINiK, supra note 19, at 90-91.
'Life Imprisonment Case, 45 BVerfGE at 228, translated in CURRIE, supra note 7, at 314.
No. 4] GERMAN CONSTITUTION 973
Still, human dignity is essentially an abstract, normative concept, albeit with a
philosophical framework. The Framers sought, and the Court has striven, to keep the
term an open one, preferring that it take on concrete meaning through case by case
determination. Thus, the main definition of dignity is the meaning given it by the Court
in its jurisprudence.
C. Human Personhood and the Polity
The dignitarian jurisprudence of the Constitutional Court is replete with
references to the nature of humankind and society?7 The Court has frequently
characterized man as a "spiritual-moral being," reflecting the Christian-natural law
influence. The Life Imprisonment Case is again a good statement of this:
The constitutional principles of the Basic Law embrace the respect and protection
of human dignity. The free human person and his dignity are the highest values of
the constitutional order. The state in all of its forms is obliged to respect and
defend it. This is based on the conception of man as a spiritual-moral being
endowed with the freedom to determine and develop himself3 s
A strongly Kantian view likewise invests the concept of personhood with rationality
and self-determination, but also emphasizes duties and moral bounds. These strands
converge to form an integrated, whole person. As envisioned in German law, human
beings are spiritual-moral beings who act freely, but their actions are bound by a sense
of moral duty. Actions, in other words, are guided by a sense of social need, personal
responsibility, and human solidarity.39
By comparison, American law has never really sought to define human dignity,
nor human personhood or personality. Certainly there have been sketches of these
concepts in American law, particularly in procedural due process," substantive due
process," and capital punishment 2 cases. Moreover, in recent times, the Warren
Court, and particularly Justices Brennan and Marshall, sought to give life to these
concepts.!3 More recently, human dignity turns up with some regularity in the Supreme
37See CONs'rurIoNAL JURISPRUDENcM, supra note 8, at 312 ("The Constitutional Court's
'dignitarian' jurisprudence contains numerous declarations about the nature of the human person and the
polity.").
mlfe/nprisonment Case, 45 BVefGE at 227, translated in CONSrIrUrONAL JURISPRUDENCE, supra
note 8, at 316.39See CONsTIrUrioNAL JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 8, at 313; Ewald, supra note 10, at 2000-03,
2059,2063-64.
4'See, e.g., Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 264-65 (1970) ("From its founding the Nation's basic
commitment has been to foster the dignity and well-being of all persons within its borders.").
4SeePlannedParenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992) (plurality opinion) ("[Decisions relating
to marriage, procreation, etc.], involving the most intimate and personal choices a person may make in a
lifetime, choices central to personal dignity and autonomy, are central to the liberty protected by the
Fourteenth Amendment.).
0 See Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238,239 (1972).43See McClesky v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 336 (1987) (Brennan, L, dissenting) ("Considering the race
of a defendant or victim in deciding if the death penalty should be imposed is completely at odds with [the]
concern that an individual be evaluated as a unique human being.'); Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436,460
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Court's discussions, particularly in the context of autonomy rights, and might even be
considered a background theme of American law." Still, American law does not
exhibit the same systematic attempt to come to basic definitional certitude as German
law.45
There is a strong link in German law between the concept of personhood and the
social community. The seminal case on artistic freedom, Mephisto, captured this
thought well: The human person is "an autonomous being developing freely within the
social community."'46 The human is not to be "an isolated and self-regarding
individual,"'47 as she so often seems to be in the American social scheme. Rather, the
human is to be "related to and bound by the community."4 The Investment Aid Case
first advanced the concept of the human as a community-bound person:
The image of man in the Basic Law is not that of an isolated, sovereign individual;
rather, the Basic Law has decided in favor of a relationship between individual and
community in the sense of a person's dependence on and commitment to the
community, without infringing upon a person's individual value.49
Once again, these statements bear the clear imprint of Kantian moral philosophy.
Thus, the community envisioned by the Basic Law is one where individuality and.
human dignity are to be guaranteed and nourished, but with a sense of social solidarity
and responsibility. Rather than being a collection of atomistic individuals, people
should be connected to one another. Thus, individual self-determination is offset by
concepts of "participation, communication and civility."'5 In short, at the root of the
German social vision is the Kantian proposition that humans are to be treated always
as ends in themselves, never as means, and that this is to be done within a moral social
construct that both empowers and guides individuals.
The Life Imprisonment Case, again, gives voice to these ideas:
(1966) ("[Tjheconstitutional foundation underlying the privilege is the respect a government... must accord
to the dignity and integrity of its citizens."); Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75, 92 (1966) (Stewart, J.,
concurring) ("The right of a man to the protection of his own reputation from unjustified invasion and
wrongful hurt reflects no more than our basic concept of the essential dignity and worth of every human
being-a concept at the root of any decent system of ordered liberty.").
44See Casey, 505 U.S. at 851 (plurality opinion); National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab,
489 U.S. 656, 681 (1989) (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("In my view the Customs Service rules are a kind of
immolation of privacy and human dignity in symbolic opposition to drug use.").
arhere are several explanations for this. First, dignity is textually mandated in Article 1 of the Basic
Law, whereas it is not mentioned in the American Constitution and, instead, must be implied from the
promise of liberty in the Due Process Clause. Second, German law reflects the civil law orientation toward
abstraction, systemization, and classification, whereas American law reflects the common law orientation
toward pragmatism and concreteness.
"'Mephisto, 30 BVerf3E 173,193 (1971), translated in CONSTrrTUrIONAL JURISPRUDENCE, supra note
8, at 428.
47Life Imprisonment Case, 45 BVerfGE at 227, translated in CONSrr ONAL JURISPRUDENCE, supra
note 8, at 316.
"Id.
InvestmentAid Case, 4 BVerfGE 7, 15-16 (1954), translated in CONSTrrONAL JURISPRUDENCE,
supra note 8, at 313; accord, Kass Case, 30 BVerfGE at 20; Conscientious Objector Case I, 12 BVerfGE
45,51 (1960).
"See CONSTIrUrIONAL JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 8, at 313.
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This freedom within the meaning of the Basic Law is not that of an isolated and
self-regarding individual but rather [that] of a person related to and bound by the
community. In the light of this community-boundedness it cannot be "in principle
unlimited." The individual must allow those limits on his freedom of action that the
legislature deems necessary in the interest of the community's social life; yet the
autonomy of the individual has to be protected. This means that [the state] must
regard every individual within society with equal worth. It is contrary to human
dignity to make persons the mere tools [blosses Objekt] of the state. The principle
that "each person must shape his own life!' applies unreservedly to all areas of law;
the intrinsic dignity of each person depends on his status as an independent
personality s l
The German social vision obviously contrasts starkly with the American one. In
the United States, we do not have consensus on core values, like Kantian morality,
around which to organize the social order. While we have fundamental agreement on
principles like individual freedom and democracy, these principles operate without
stabilizing concepts of morality or community. Instead, we as autonomous persons
ourselves determine the norms and values that infuse the social order. And these norms
and values are almost always in flux. No American principle demonstrates this more
than our concept of free speech.52 Thus, individual freedom in America is somewhat
unconnected to any one particular community, whereas in Germany it unfolds within
a more shared sense of community. This has dramatic consequences for the two social
orders, as we will see.
D. The Concrete Meaning of Human Dignity
Since human dignity is a capacious concept, it is difficult to determine precisely
what it means outside the context of a factual setting. As the driving principle of
Germanys legal order, however, and as a root of Kantian thought, it possesses a
certain fixed content. At a minimum, for example, it means that the social order must
reflect recognition of the equality of humankind. This concept is anchored in Article
3 of the Basic Law. Equality means at least that persons are entitled to "equal worth,"'53
and that, accordingly, there can be no slavery or serfdom, racial or ethnic discrimina-
tion.' Second, dignity means respect of physical identity and integrity, which is
textually specified in Article 2(2). This prohibits torture and corporal punishment, and
forbids imposing punishment without fault or levying disproportionate penalties.55
Third, dignity means respect of intellectual and spiritual identity and integrity.56 This
5 Lfe Imprisonment Case, 45 BVerfGE at 227-28, translated in CoNsrrrurIoNAL JuRisPRDENCE,
supra note 8, at 316. For elaboration, see GRUNDGESErz, KOMMENTAR 4, 6-8, 11-12 (Theodor Maunz et
al. eds., 1993).
5 Seegenerally Edward J Eberle, Hate Speech, Offensive Speech, and Public Discourse in America,
29 WAKEFORESL. REV. 1135, 1135-1213 (1994) [hereinafter Eberle, Hate Speech] (arguing that through
public discourse, we determine who we are as a people).
53See Life Imprisonment Case, 45 BVerfGE at 228.
S4See PIEROTH & Sc2LINIC supra note 19, at 93.
"
5See id.
uSee id.
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is manifested most dramatically in the protection of personality rights, specified in
Article 2 and elaborated on in this Article. Fourth, dignity means limitation of official
power. This is particularly evident in the guarantee of proportionality, which
circumscribes governmental means to legitimate ends, and of procedural due process
rights, which allow persons affected by official action to be heard and to be able to
influence proceedings which concern them. 7 Finally, dignity means guarantee of
individual and social existence. Tangibly, this is manifested in the Article 2(2) right
to life and in Germany's social welfare state, textually anchored in Article 20(1) '
The main development of dignitarian jurisprudence has occurred in conjunction
with the more concrete freedoms of Article 2, which guarantees three specific
freedoms. The first of these is the right to free development of personality. "Everyone
shall have the right to the free development of his personality insofar as he does not
violate the rights of others or offend against the constitutional order or against
morality."'9 Article 2(1) thus grants personality rights most like the American concept
of privacy rights grounded in the Due Process Clause. Personality rights include
protection of informational privacy,6' a right to have one's paternity established,6 and
a right to have official records reflect a sex change.62 Parts Im-VI will elaborate on
these personality rights.
The second of the important Article 2 freedoms is "the right to life and to
physical integrity."'" The right to life clause is the source for the Constitutional Court's
conclusion in the abortion cases64 that the state has a duty to protect life after
conception. This conclusion resulted in strict limitations on abortion. The contrasting
German and American treatment of abortion will be examined in Part VII. Apart from
abortion, the Constitutional Court has not invoked the right to life clause to place
wide-ranging duties to protect life on the state. While recognizing a duty to protect
life, in other matters, the Court has deferred to government's implementation of it.
'See id. at 94; see also Art. 19(4) GG ("Should any person's rights be violated by public authority,
recourse to the court shall be open to him.").
SSee PIEROTit & SCHLINK, supra note 19, at 94.
SArt. 2(1) GG. The notion of free development of personality is fundamentally a Kantian one. See
supra note 2 and accompanying text. Von Savigny picked up on the idea in elaborating his theory of
autonomy, which in turn influenced Otto von Gierke, and the framing of the German Civil Code. Von Gierke
emphasized the personal nature of the right of personality. See OTTO VON GIERKE, I D UTScHBs
PRIVAIfECIr 702 (1895). This history is recounted in Ewald, supra note 10, at 2000-01, 2034-36, 2045-50,
2055-60, 2063-65. See also Harry D. Krause, The Right to Privacy in Germany-Pointers for American
Legislation?, 1965 DUKE L.J. 481,485. Despite the theoretical acceptance of a general right of personality,
the right did not find a place in the German Civil Code which was codified in 1896. By contrast, the right
did find a place in the Swiss Civil Code of 1907, in Article 28. See Krause, supra, at 485 & n.13. In
Germany, it took later developments by the civil law courts for general recognition of a right of personality.
Interestingly, the main theoretical development of personality rights in Germany, by von Gierke in the 1890s,
paralleled the original development of privacy rights in America. See Samuel D. Warren & Louis D.
Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARv. L. REv. 193, 193 (1890).
"See Census Act Case, 65 BVerfGE 1, 64 (1983), discussed infra notes 241-75 and accompanying
text.
"See Right to Heritage 11, 90 BVerfGE 263, 271 (1994); Right to Heritage 1, 79 BVerfGE 256, 268
(1989), discussed infra notes 406-52 and accompanying text.
'See Transsexual Case, 49 BVerfGE at 298, discussed infra notes 460-65 and accompanying text.
"Art. 2(2) GG.
"See Abortion 11, 88 BVerfGE 203, 252 (1993); Abortion 1, 39 BVerfGE 1, 36-37 (1975).
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Accordingly, the Court refused to impose affiriative duties upon the state to prevent
kidnaping or to rescue its victims,' or to guard against threats to the environment from
army bases or nuclear plants."
The "physical integrity" clause of Article 2(2) is mainly used as a source to guide
criminal procedures, somewhat like American criminal due process jurisprudence.'
It has also been used to limit invasions of the body that would cause pain, harm,
disfigurement, or injury. For example, in the Spinal Tap Case," the Court invalidated
a court-ordered sampling of a defendant's spinal column to test his involvement in a
crime on the ground that this violated his physical integrity. The Court has also
invalidated use of polygraph tests to determine a defendant's veracity.69 Attaching a
person to a machine to force the truth, the Court reasoned, is "an inadmissible invasion
of a person's innermost self and a violation of human dignity."' Man should not be
"an object of experimentation," a manifestation by the Court of the Kantian directive
to treat people as ends only.7' Efforts to apply the physical integrity clause outside the
criminal context have not, as yet, been successful. Physical inviolability is mainly a
concern of criminal law, and therefore will not be addressed in this Article.
The last of the Article 2 freedoms provides that "[t]he liberty of the individual
shall be inviolable."72 This mainly operates in conjunction with the other Article 2(2)
freedoms. It will not be extensively considered here 3
Not surprisingly, human dignity, alone or in conjunction with the more specific
freedoms of Article 2, is a rich source of constitutional litigation, and is widely
debated on and off the court.74 Human dignity in Germany is thus most like the
American concept of modem substantive due process, particularly rights of privacy.
Both concepts are open-ended and controversial, posing difficult questions for the role
of the court within a democracy and the nature of the constitutional order. The
remaining part of this Article explores this topic as it relates to the development of
human personality in Germany and America.
'See SchleyerKidnaping Case, 46 BVerfGE 160 (1977).
aChemical Weapons Case, 77 BVerfGE 170 (1987) (holding that right to life clause does not prevent
state from approving storage of chemical weapons at army bases). In Mlheim, 53 BVerfGE 30, 57-69
(1979) and Kalkar, 49 BVerfGE 89, 140-44 (1978), the Constitutional Court recognized a state duty to
protect life in connection with the threats of a nuclear power plant, but determined that the duty could be met
in the manner the government determined.
0 See Art. 2(2) GG, translated in CONSTrTUONAL JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 8, at 343.
' 1 6 BVerfGE 194 (1963); see also Pneumoencephalography Case, 17 BVerfGE 108 (1963)
(invalidating court-ordered puncture of individual's vertebral canal for purposes of testing personal
responsiibility for crime).
'See Polygraph Case, 35 Neue Juristische Wochenschrift [hereinafter NJW] 375 (1982).
701d.71CONSrIrOIONAL JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 8, at 344.
7Art. 2 GG.
7Mainly, this freedom protects free physical movement. It is somewhat akin to the concept of habeas
corpus, protecting against arbitrary restraints on physical liberty. See PIEROTH & SCHLINK, supra note 19,
at 110-11.74See, e.g., Badura, supra note 8 (examining roots of dignity concept); Christoph Degenhart, Das
allgemeinePersonlichkeitsrecht, 5 JURISTISCHE SCULUNG (JUS) 361, 362 (1992) (examining general right
of personality); Hasso Hofmann, Die versprochene Menschenwlrde, 118 ARCHlV DBS OFFENIuCHEN
RECHTS 353 (1993) (exploring capacious concept of human dignity).
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In comparison to the relatively specific framing of human dignity and its
cognates in the Basic Law, it is striking how devoid of detail the American Constitu-
tion is. Since the Supreme Court's determination in 1873 in The Slaughter-House
Cases that the Fourteenth Amendment Privileges and Immunities Clause only protects
a narrow category of national rights,' the Privileges and Immunities Clause has
effectively been rendered a dead letter for purposes of enumerating basic rights. 6 That
leaves only two textual pieces of support for this endeavor: the Due Process Clause
and the Ninth Amendment. The Ninth Amendment was not invoked by the Court until
1965 in the famous case, Griswold v. Connecticut,' and then only to lend support to
the Court's extension of a right of privacy beyond the constitutional text. 8 Not
surprisingly, therefore, the Court has mainly relied on the Due Process Clause, which
provides that no "[s]tate [shall] ... deprive any person of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law,"79 to found basic rights.8" Through Due Process, the Court
has interpreted a range of privacy and autonomy rights which protect personal decision
making in areas relating to marriage," procreation, 2 contraception, 3 family
7 See 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 79-80 (1873) (recognizing national rights such as peaceable assembly,
petition, writ of habeas corpus, and use of navigable waters).
76Modem cases have cautiously interpreted a certain range of freedom in the Article IV Privileges and
Immunities Clause, being careful not to ground the decision in the Fourteenth Amendment Privileges and
Immunities Clause, still viewed ineffective since Slaughter-House. See, e.g., United Bldg. & Constr. Trades
Council v. Camden, 465 U.S. 208, 221-23 (1984) (protecting national citizenship against set-aside work
program imposed by municipality to protect residents); Supreme Court v. Piper, 470 U.S. 274, 282-87
(1985) (holding that rule limiting bar admission to state residents violates Privileges and Immunities Clause);
I-icklin v. Orbeck, 437 U.S. 518, 533-34 (1978) (holding that residential hiring preference violates Privileges
and Immunities Clause).
7381 U.S. 479 (1965).
71See id. at 484 (relying on Ninth Amendment and other amendments for penumbras emanating from
specific guarantees); see also id. at 493 (Goldberg, J., concurring) ("[Tihe Ninth Amendment... lends
strong support to the view that the 'liberty' protected by the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments... is not
restricted to rights specifically mentioned in the first eight amendments.").
' U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
20See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973) ("This right of privacy, whether it be founded in
the Fourteenth Amendment's concept of personal liberty . . . , as we feel it is, or . . . in the Ninth
Amendment's reservation of rights to the people, is broad enough to encompass a woman's decision whether
or not to terminate her pregnancy."). Other cognates of privacy could be found in the prohibition against
"quartering troops in any house," U.S. CONST. amend. III, and the "right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures," U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
"See Griswold, 381 U.S. at 485 (suggesting that marriage lies "within the zone of privacy created by
several fundamental constitutional guarantees").
'See Skinner, 316 U.S. at 541-43 (holding that statute requiring sterilization of habitual criminals
violates Equal Protection Clause as applied to person convicted once of stealing chickens and twice of
robbery).
'See Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 691-99 (1977) (holding blanket prohibition of
contraceptive use by minors unconstitutional); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 446-55 (1972) (holding
that statute allowing distribution of contraceptives to married but not unmarried persons violates Equal
Protection Clause); Griswold, 381 U.S. at 484-86 (holding that prohibiting contraceptive use violates right
to marital privacy found in penumbra of specific guarantees of Bill of Rights).
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relationships, 4 child rearing, and education.' 5 The movement of both Courts thus
seems very much in the same general direction, notwithstanding different textual,
historical, philosophical, and cultural settings.
m. INTRODUCTION TO GERMAN PERSONALTY RIGHTS
The German Law on the "free unfolding of personality" is comprehensive and
multifaceted. Grounded in human dignity and Kantian philosophy, the right is the only
one read in conjunction with other rights."6 In contrast to human dignity, personality
is not an objective value and therefore does not generally operate to impose
affirmative obligations on the state.
Personalityrights come into play, potentially, whenever an action is not protected
by a more specific right. Theoretically, all claims or interests have the potential to be
so protected. In this way, Article 1 human dignity and Article 2(1) rights interact to
form comprehensive protection of human personality and personhood. The Constitu-
tional Court captured the sense of these rights well in the Eppler Case:
They complement as "undefined" freedom the special ("defined") freedoms, like
freedom of conscience or expression, equally constitutive elements of personality.
Their function is, in the sense of the ultimate constitutional value, human dignity,
to preserve the narrow personal life sphere and to maintain its conditions, that are
not encompassed by traditional concrete guarantees
3 7
This "catch-all" function of personality rights is especially important in view of
"modern developments and the associated threats theypose to the protection of human
personality.""3
Textually, comprehensive rights are not clearly derivable from enumeration of
a "right to the free development of personality," although the German text is more
supportive of the effort than the American one. Still, the fundamental thrust of the
German Constitutional Court has been to enlarge the rights sought to be captured by
the language, as compared to confining itself to strict application of the language of
the text.89 German personality law is thus a creature of the Constitutional Court, as
rights of privacy are of the Supreme Court.
There are two components to German personality law: freedom of action and
guarantee of a personal sphere. Freedom of action is outward in focus. As conceived
"See Mocre v. East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 505-06 (1977) (holding that city cannot limit occupancy
of dwelling to members of same nuclear family).
"See Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534-35 (1925) (holding that state cannot mandate
public school attendance when parents desire to send children to private school); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262
U.S. 390,400-03 (1923) (holding that state cannot mandate teaching of only English in schools).
'See Interview with Dr. Bodo Pieroth, Professor of Law, University of MUnster, MUnster, Germany
(July 8, 1996).
"Eppler, 54 BVerfGE 148, 153 (1980).
"Right to Heritage 1, 79 BVerfGE 256,268 (1989).
'See Degenhart, supra note 74, at 362. In developing personality law, the Constitutional Court relied
significantly on developments by the civil law court. Some of these developments are discussed infra note
93, and notes 327-37 and accompanying text.
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in the seminal Elfes Case, freedom of action empowers one to do fundamentally what
one desires insofar as it does not interfere with others or the constraints of the social
order.90 Essentially, this aspect of personality allows one to define oneself in relation
to society.
As freedom of action is outward in focus, the personal sphere is inward in
orientation. The personal sphere delimits an essential sphere of privacy within which
one can fundamentally determine who one is and how one should relate to the world,
if at all. One may choose to engage actively in the world, and thus avail oneself of
freedom of action. Or, one may choose to withdraw from the world, retreating into
oneself and concentrating on inner development. The Constitutional Court has actively
sought to create an inner, intimate sphere so that a core of personality might be
developed and protected. The focus on interiority reflects the underlying vision of man
as a "spiritual-moral" being. 91
The personal sphere is narrower in scope than the range of freedom of action. It
protects only against incursions that aim to curtail the personal sphere. Just what this
means is better elaborated by case law than definition, although the Court has had
some difficulty in fixing the concept.' Confidentiality is protected against certain
incursions, such as the secret taping of conversations93 or the attempted use of divorce
records in a work disciplinary proceeding. 4 Similarly, inquiry into personal matters
is limited, a right developed in the census cases.95 The Court, in fact, has sought to
delineate a range of tangible rights that map out this private sphere in order to lend
structure to personality rights. These include the novel concept of informational self-
determination; rights to control presentation of oneself in society, including control
over one's words, images, portrait, and reputation; and rights of self-determination and
knowledge of one's heritage, as elaborated on more fully in Parts V and VI.
American law lacks this focus on the inner self. Our concern is much more with
rights of autonomy and self-determination in relation to the world, such as those that
relate to marriage, procreation,96 abortion,97 or child rearing." This may reflect the
American preoccupation with public life, which itself may reflect the influence of the
central role democracy (and its emphasis on public participation) plays in our society,
historically and today. It may also reflect our Constitution's preoccupation with
organizing and limiting government, leaving unspecified areas to individual choice,
without elaboration, in contrast to the German enumeration of the parameters of that
-'See Eifes, 6 BVerfGE 32, 36 (1957). For elaboration of the concept of free development of
personality, see PIEROTH & SCHLINK, supra note 19, at 96-104; Degenhart, supra note 74, at 362.
91See, e.g., Eifes, 6 BVerfGE at 36 (essence of man as spiritual-moral person). For establishment of
interiority in German law, see infra notes 186-95 and accompanying text.
"
2See Criminal Diary Case, 80 BVerfGE 367, 373-75 (1989); see also infra notes 218-40 and
accompanying text.
9'See Tape Recording Case, 34 BVerfGE 238, 245-51 (1973).
9'See Divorce Records, 27 BVerfGE 344, 351-52 (1970), discussed infra notes 290-97 and
accompanying text.
9
sSee Census Act Case, 65 BVerfGE 1, 41-42 (1983); Microcensus, 27 BVerfGE 1, 6-8 (1969),
discussed infra notes 193-95, 247-53 and accompanying text.
'See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479,485-86 (1965).
See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973).
'See Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510,536 (1925).
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choice. Contrastingly, 'the German focus on the inner life may reflect the fact that
freedom in public life was foreclosed for much of Germany's modern history, leaving
the inner realm as the stage for freedom. Certainly a German interior life has deep
intellectual and cultural roots. Cultural and artistic manifestations of the human spirit
have traditionally been prized in Germany. Before developing these thoughts,
however, we must consider the jurisprudence of the Court so that we will have an
empirical basis on which to base such observation. The next part of the Article
explores the twin inner and outer dimensions of German personality law, with
reference to American law, starting with the outer dimension as crystallized around the
concept of freedom of action.
IV. FREEDOM OF ACTION: THE OUTER WORLD
A Elfes and the General Right of Personality
German personality law began with the groundbreaking 1957 decision, Elfes.
The setting seemed an odd one in which to announce a general personality right. Elfes
was active in right-wing politics before and after World War 11, enjoying some
success, including election to Parliament as a member of the Christian Democratic
Union." In his political activities, he was a severe critic of West German defense and
reunification policies, participating in conferences and demonstrations at home and
abroad.' Seeking to continue spreading his message abroad, he requested extension
of his visa to attend a foreign political conference, but was denied on the ground that
his criticism constituted a threat to national security.
Elfes first argued that his activities were protected by Article 11, which
guarantees Germans freedom of movement. However, the Court ruled that this
' 6 BVerfGE 32 (1957). An earlier Constitutional Court case, the InvestmentAid Case, 4 BVerfGE
7 (1954), had first begun the process of attempting to fix the definition of freedom of action. See infra notes
105-09 and accompanying text. But the essential development of a right of personality occurred in
connection with the interpretation of the German Civil Code (BUrgerliches Gesetzbuch, or BGB) by its
supreme interpreter, the Federal Supreme Court (Bundesgerichtshof, or BGH). For example, in the famous
Schacht Case, 13 Entscheidungen des Bundesgerichtshofes in Zivilsachen [hereinafter BGHZ] 334 (1954),
the BGH derived a right of personality from Articles 1 and 2 of the Basic Law in protecting the contents of
aletter sent as commentary to a magazine. See i. at 338. Decisions such as these found a favorable audience
in the legal literature. See, e.g., Larenz, Das "allgemeine PersOnlichkeitsrecht" ir Recht der unerlaubten
Handlungen, 8 NJW 521 (1955); von Gamin, Zur praktischen Anwendung des allgemeinen Persdn-
lichkeitsrechts, 8 NJW 1826 (1955). These developments are traced in Degenhart, supra note 74, at 362;
Krause, supra note 59, at 488-89. See also notes 328-36 and accompanying text.
Thus, Elfes represented the Constitutional Court's approval of these developments of the BGH,
thereby constitutionalizing the doctrine of a general right to personality. Interestingly, this period of the 1950s
represented one of significant judicial creativity by the Constitutional Court, as the seminal case on freedom
of expression, Lath, 7 BVerfGE 198 (1958), was decided one year after Elfes. For elaboration of the
importance of Laith, see Eberle, Public Discourse, supra note 6, at 800-33.
100See Elfes, 6 BVerfGE at 32-33. Elfes had been a member of the central committee of the party
before 1933, police commissioner of Krefeld in 1927, and mayor of Monchen-Gladbach, among other
political activities. See id.
"'See id. at 33.
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provision applied only to travel within Germany, not foreign travel."° Thus, if Elfes
was to succeed, another argument was necessary: the Article 2 guarantee of
personality. The Court determined that, even if foreign travel was not covered by
Article 11, it might yet be part of one's personal freedom of action, protected under
Article 2(l).3 This illustrates the catch-all function of Article 2 personality rights; they
capture claims not protected by the more specific guarantees in the catalogue of basic
rights. 10
4
By freedom of action, the Court meant the right to engage in activities necessary
to the development and assertion of one's person."05 Whether traveling abroad
constituted freedom of action required resolution of a theoretical dispute regarding the
limits to this freedom. This dispute was left open in the Investment Aid Case,"° where
the Court laid out two definitions of freedom of action without choosing one over the
other:0 7 Freedom of action could mean only a "minimal amount of this freedom of
action without which an individual would not be able to develop herself as a spiritual-
moral person;' 0' 8 or, freedom of action could be interpreted "in a broad, comprehen-
sive sense."' °9
In Elfes, the Court decided that a broad interpretation better suited the text and
purpose of the Basic Law. First, it seemed inconceivable that a definition limited to
the "core area of personality" could ever result in violations of "the rights of
others . . . the constitutional order . . . or morality," the textual limitations of
personality."0 It seemed hard to envision how these textual restrictions could then
have meaning. A broader interpretation thus seemed more sensible. Second, Article
2 reflects the radiation of human dignity, the ultimate constitutional value, as do all
constitutional principles."' Thus, a broad interpretation seemed more compatible with
a view of persons as morally autonomous beings operating responsibly within the
community. Third, an expansive interpretation also seemed more consistent with the
"1See id. at 34-35. The Court noted Germanys long history of limiting, for security reasons, the right
to travel abroad. See id.
"3See id. at 41-42.
"See id. at 37 ("Insofar as specific life areas are not guaranteed through the specific protection of a
basic right, an individual can call on Article 2(1) for protection against incursions into his liberty by
officials."). Note the Court's later explanation of Article 2 freedoms in Eppler
They complement as "undefined" freedom the special ("defined") freedoms, like freedom of
conscience or expression, equally constitutive elements of personality. Their function is, in the
sense of the ultimate constitutional value, human dignity, to preserve the narrow personal life
sphere and to maintain its conditions, that are not encompassed by traditional concrete
guarantees.
Eppler, 54 BVerfGE 148, 153 (1980).
"See Elfes, 6 BVerfGE at 36 ("Seen from a legal perspective, [Article 2(1)] is an independent basic
right, that guarantees general human freedom of action.").
1064 BVerfGE7, 15 (1954).
"'See id.
"'Elfes, 6 BVerfGE at 36. This is the so-called Core Theory (Kernbereich Theorie), which connotes
protection of only a core of personality that involves the essence of individuals as spiritual-moral persons.
See id. at 37; PIEROTH & ScHLINK, supra note 19, at 96.
""Elfes, 6 BVerfGE at 36.
"
0 d.
"'See id. ("Certainly the... formulation of Article 2(1) was an emanation of seeing it in the light of
Article 1 and to derive therefrom its purpose to embody the vision of humanlind.").
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Framers, who had originally used the phrase "everyone can do or not do what he or
she likes," and had changed it for "linguistic," not legal, considerations. '12
A broad interpretation of freedom of action has important consequences for the
German constitutional order. As intended by the Court, every form of activity related
to personality, in principle, is covered by the concept. Restraints on personal freedom
will only be imposed when necessary as a condition of the "constitutional order" or
other textual limitation.' 3 This view thus endows individuals with significant personal
freedom, transforming the Basic Law into a very rights-protective charter. One might
argue it is consistent with the concept of human dignity that infuses the Basic Law,
calling on the state, as it does, "to respect and protect it.""..4 In practice, the Court has
limited the reach of this freedom to mainly economic and recreational areas, despite
the expansive reach of the concept."5 Yet; the role of Article 2 as the last preserve of
individual freedom is an important principle. It serves as a residual vessel of freedom
in a way that our Ninth Amendment, as yet, does not.' 6 Thus, future developments,
perhaps, may expand the scope of freedom of action.
Applying these principles, the Court determined that foreign travel was within
freedom of action."17 This determination did not of course, end the inquiry. Freedom
of action is guaranteed only to the extent it is within the constitutional order, and does
not violate third party rights or morality." 8 This thus provided the Court with the
occasion to interpret these textual limitations. At issue in Elfes was the constitutional
21d. at 36-37.
"'See id ('Restraints on the free development of personality come from the constitutional order.");
see also supra note 105.
MArt. I(I) GG.
'5"See CoNsTTUToNAL JRIsPRuDENcE, supra note 8, at 323. The Falconry Licensing Case, 55
BVerfGE 159 (1980), discussed infra notes 157-69 and accompanying text, is an example of how the
Court has interpreted freedom of action to apply in recreational areas. See id.; accord Rider In Woods, 80
BVerfGE 137, 164 (1989).
"
6 Our Ninth Amendment provides: "The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall
not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people." U.S. CONST. amend. IX. Despite its
seeming authorization of rights beyond those textually enumerated, the Supreme Court did not invoke the
Ninth Amendment until Griswoldv. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965). Even in Griswold, the Court noted
the status of the Ninth Amendment as the "forgotten amendment." Id. at 490 (Goldberg, J., concurring)
(citing BENNET B. PATrESON, TmFOROTrENNiNTH AMENDMENT (1955)). Since Griswold, the Ninth
Amendment has appeared only rarely in Court opinions. See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973)
("This right of privacy, whether it be founded in the Fourteenth Amendment's concept of personal
liberty .... as we feel it is, or,... in the Ninth [Amendment] ...."). The Ninth Amendment has been a
popular topic of scholarly commentary. Compare JOHN H. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 34-38 (1980)
("[t]he conclusion that the Ninth Amendment was intended to signal the existence of federal constitutional
rights beyond those specifically enumerated in the Constitution is the only conclusion its language seems
comfortably to support'), with Raoul Berger, The Ninth Amendment, 66 CORNELLL. REv. 1, 14 (1980)
("In 'retaining' the unenumerated rights, the people reserved to themselves power to add to or subtract
from the rights enumerated in the Constitution by the process of amendment... [A]ccording to Madison
the ninth amendment itself was 'inserted merely for greater caution."').
It is interesting, as a matter of comparative law, that Americans have been rather stingy with the
concept of liberty, see, e.g., Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 194-95 (1986) (theorizing end of
substantive due process), whereas the Germans have been quite expansive.
' See Elfes, 6 BVerfGE at 41-42.
"'This is in the text of Article 2, and is consistent with court interpretation of the article. See Art.
2 GG; Elfes, 6 BVerfGE at 36-37.
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order limitation, since security measures are taken to protect society. This is the most
important limitation.
Rights of others entail the rights and claims of third parties.'19 Such claims might
justifiably limit individual rights in Germany or in America. In German law, this
restriction has been employed to ban arson and trespass, for example. 2 1 In the context
of religious rights, the dignitarian rights of others were used to limit an atheist's
attempt to coerce individuals to his view through use of cigarettes as bribery.
12
'
However, third party rights are ordinarily evidenced in the legal and constitutional
order and, thus, are unlikely to act as an independent restraint.
Morality is no more self-defining in German law than American law, although
German law relies on more explicitly Christian law notions. Interestingly, for
comparative purposes, morality has been used in both Germany and America to ban
sodomy and homosexual activities." However, notably, the major German case of
1957 has been held in disrepute for some time, 4 whereas the more recent 1986
decision of Bowers v. Hardwick yet remains the law, having only recently been
questioned, and then only sub silentio." Still, morality is mainly reflected in legal
concepts, like "good morals" (guten Sitten) or "good faith" (Treu und Glauben),2 6
that make up the legal order. As such, and especially with its Kantian roots, morality
becomes an important background principle for the legal system as a whole. As a
practical matter, however, morality itself will not ordinarily restrain freedom of
action. 27 This brings us back to the "constitutional order" limitation, the construction
of which would determine the contours of freedom of action.
According to the Court, the constitutional order means the general legal order as
it conforms to the constitution. 21 One interpretation of ihis would be that any law
consistent with the constitution, at least procedurally, could limit the basic right. While
textually plausible, this would effectively render the right meaningless. 129 Since the
'See PIBROTH & SCHLINK, supra note 19, at 102.
'See CURRIE, supra note 7, at 317.
'See Tobacco Atheist Case, 12 BVerfGE 1 (1960).
mSee PIEROTH & SCnLINK, supra note 19, at 102.
'Compare Homosexuality, 6 BVerfGE 389, 433-36 (1957) (relying on Christian law notions and
other moral code limitations to find homosexual activity beyond Article 2 protection, although noting that
sexual activities are among most intimate of human acts), with Bowers, 478 U.S. at 191 (determining that
homosexual activity is not part of any protected right of privacy).
124See PEROTH & SCHLINK, supra note 19, at 103 (noting increasing acceptance of homosexuality
since 1969).
'2See Romer v. Evans, 116 S. Ct. 1620 (1996). Ironically, the majority never made mention of
Bowers, preferring to gloss over the roadblock. See id. at 1629 (Scalia, J. dissenting) ("In holding that
homosexuality cannot be singled out for disfavorable treatment, the Court contradicts a decision,
unchallenged here, pronounced only 10 years ago, see Bowers v. Hardwick, and places the prestige of this
institution behind the proposition that opposition to homosexuality is as reprehensible as racial or religious
bias.").12 6Arts. 138(1), 242, 826 BGB. These are some of the famous "general clauses" of the BGB, which
contain open language designed to bring the Code into conformity with contemporary needs, as determined
by courts and scholars. See Eberle, Public Discourse, supra note 6, at 800-03.
'See PIEROTH & SCHLINK, supra note 19, at 102.
'
2See Elfes, 6 BVerfGE at 37-38.
'See id. at 40-41. This interpretation was the one in vogue under the 1919 Weimar Constitution. But
it seemed inappropriate in view of the value-order constructed in the Basic Law. See id.
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Federal Republic was founded as a social-democratic state committed to human
dignity, this interpretation seemed inappropriate to the Efles court.
Rather, since the "Basic Law erected a value-oriented order... the independ-
ence, self-determination, responsibility and dignity of individuals must be guaranteed
in a political community.""'3 Thus, for laws to be consistent with the constitution, they
must conform to the value-order of the Basic Law. At the top of this value-order is,
of course, human dignity, the ultimate constitutional value. In this context, dignity
means, at a minimum, that the "intellectual, political and economic freedom of people
may not be limited so that the essence of personhood is impaired."'' From this it
follows "that each citizen is afforded a sphere of private development[,] . .. an
ultimate inviolable realm of personal freedom, insulated against encroachment by
public authorities.""'3 Certainly no law impinging on the "inviolable realm" could be
consistent with the Basic Law.
Laws must also conform substantively to "unwritten fundamental constitutional
principles (of the free-democratic order), as well as the fundamental decisions of the
Basic Law, especially the principles of the rule of law [Rechtsstaat] and the social
welfare principle [Sozialstaatsprinzip]."'33 Through this interpretive technique, the
Court introduced significant background, and even immanent, if not extratextual,
authority.'34 Again, this underscores the Court's proactive interpretive stance and the
rich context within which the Basic Law is to be interpreted.The Rechtsstaat principle
is especially significant in this regard. Under this principle, laws must give fair
warning and fair procedure; they must not be retroactive, and they must have a legal
basis.' Most importantly, the concept of Rechtsstaat embodies the Proportionality
Principle, which means, in essence, that laws may pursue proper ends only through
13'Id. at 40.
111d. at 41.
13id.
331d.
'
34This appears to be a deliberate choice by the Framers and interpreters of the Basic Law. Under
the Nazi regime, gross injustice was perpetrated within a state committed to an extreme version of
positivism. To avoid such injustice, the Framers sought to distance the legal order from such absolute
sovereignty, providing in Article 20(3) that "the executive and the judiciary shall be bound by law and
justice." Art. 20(3) GG. Article 20(3) "justice" operates as a free-standing concept, somewhat like natural
law. The Soraya decision, 34 BVeriGE 269,286-87 (1973), represents perhaps the farthest extension of
this principle, suggesting, as it does, that the fundamental concept ofjustice, as interpreted by the Court,
can trump parliamentary democracy. See infra notes 340-58 and accompanying text.
"35See CUiuua, supra note 7, at 318-19. By Rechtsstaat, the Germans mean a state based on reason
and the rule of law. Under this concept, state power must be exercised pursuant to previously established
principles that are themselves rational. This is to guard against arbitrary power. See supra note 10. The
Rechtsstaat principle further restricts official power by requiring that any limitation on liberty must have
a sufficient legal basis, such as a statute. See CuRuua, supra note 7, at 318. For this reason, most basic
rights provisions contain a reservation of authority to the Bundestag. The legislative preserve in Article
2(2) is typical: "Intrusion on these rights may only be made pursuant to a statute." Art. 2(2) GG. From the
standpoint of a Rechtsstaat, this assures that restrictions on liberty be openly justified as matters of
democratic deliberation. See also Art. 19(1) GG ("Statutes [restricting rights] shall apply generally and
not solely to an individual case... [and shall] name the basic right.").
The concept of Rechtsstaat can also be said to embody the concept of meaningful judicial review
of administrative action. See CuiuuE, supra note 7, at 19.
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means that are suitable and "proportional" to the ends sought." 6 The Proportionality
Principle is akin to means-end testing in American rights analysis, such as that used
in heightened scrutiny methodologies.'37 Both methodologies guard against arbitrary
government. Thus, as in America, the true impact of the Proportionality Principle is
seen in case law, where it often decides the case, as will be amply shown.
It is thus apparent that the value-oriented nature of the Basic Law influences
significantly the nature of the legal order. Laws must conform to this value-order to
be part of the "constitutional order." "Constitutional order" is thereby rendered a two-
sided limitation. While the "constitutional order" can limit personality rights, this can
occur only when laws themselves conform to the German value-order. In essence, the
Court implied a limitation from the structure of the Basic Law on the express textual
limitation of Article 2(1), itself a notable, but plausible, act of judicial activism."'
Significantly, this had the effect of transforming plain constitutional language into an
open-ended, general clause."9 Much will always depend on judicial interpretation of
Article 2(1).
In Elfes, the Court found that Elfes' interests in foreign travel were part of his
freedom of action, but that it was outweighed by the state security interests at issue.140
Certainly state security is a justifiable part of the "constitutional order" which might
be used in limitation of basic rights. However, the particular state interests at issue in
Elfes did not seem particularly well drawn or persuasive. Elfes was an elected official
in Germany. His views were well known, at home and abroad. Thus, it seems
unreasonable to find that another foreign trip would place the state in jeopardy.
Perhaps the government desired to protect its image abroad. Perhaps it yet feared for
the fragility of the new German experiment in democracy. Certainly Elfes seems to
"Proportionality is a stringent test, requiring that governmental actions be calculated to further a
legitimatepurpose, and impose no more than a reasonable burden on basic rights. The essence of a basic right
must yet be preserved. See Art. 19(2) GG. Sometimes, a least restrictive alternative prong is added. Thus,
at bottom, proportionality requires reasonableness. See CURRIn, supra note 7, at 122. When basic rights are
at issue, proportionality translates into intensive review. It has its roots in the law of Frederick the Great,
limiting the discretion of the administration. See id. at 20. Such proportionality has become standard fare in
European law too. See, e.g., Case 178/84, Commission v. Federal Republic of Germany, 1983 E.C.R. 1227,
[1987-1988 Transfer Binder] Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 14,417 (1987) (applying proportionality to
restraints on trade).
'
3See, e.g., Arkansas Writers' Project, Inc. v. Ragland, 481 U.S. 221,231 (1987). Under conventional
American doctrine, violations of fundamental individual rights trigger strict scrutiny, an inquiry requiring
government to justify its regulation as "necessary to serve a compelling state interest and ... narrowly drawn
to achieve that end." Id.
"See Elfes, 6 BVerfGE at 37-41.
" The technique of the Constitutional Court is thus quite like the techniques of civil courts in
interpreting civil codes. For example, German civil courts, operating pursuant to Article 242 (good faith) or
Article 826 (good morals) of the BGB, frequently readjust contracts to enforce concepts of fairness to
preserve the bargain. An example of this is standard form contracts, which courts invalidate as contrary to
good faith if they contain one-sided, unbargained-for terms. See the cases collected and discussed in John
P. Dawson, Unconscionable Coercion: The German Version, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1041, 1103-21 (1976).
Thus, at bottom, the techniques of the Constitutional Court reflect the civil law orientation of the German
legal order, as the jurisprudence of the Supreme Court reflects the common law orientation of our legal
system.
"See Elfes, 6 BVerfGE at 42-43.
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reflect the skittishness of cold war times. In this way, Elfes is not unlike American
cases of this genre. 4'
It is notable that the Court in Elfes did not attempt to set out any comprehensive
definition of freedom of action. In fact, there is no case where the Court has defined
"the full range of personality rights.' 1 42 Instead, the Court has preferred to work out
the specifics of what freedom of action means in concrete cases in view of current or
developing social conditions. 143 Thus, the exact reach of the zone in which individuals
may shape their lives awaits case-by-case development, similar to the evolution of
American privacy law.'"
However, Elfes did establish the methodology applied by the Court to judge the
reasonableness of governmental action seeking to limit personal interests. As applied
in Elfes, this methodology is an ad hoc balancing test designed to weigh the personal
interest against the strength of the official interest. The Court did not engage in any
comprehensive review of the lower court decision, but considered only whether the
lower court decision had a basis in law.45 Certainly the Court was concerned that it
not intrude too deeply into the domain of the ordinary courts.'" It would take later
"'See eg., Communist Party v. Subversive Activities Control Bd., 367 U.S. 1, 105 (1961) (upholding,
asconsistentwithFirstAmendment, registration requirements of Subversive Activities Control Act, requiring
registration and disclosure of comnimist activities); Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 516-17 (1951)
(ruling that government may enforce Smith Act to prohibit teaching of Marxist-Lennist doctrine); American
Communications Ass'n v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382, 415 (1950) (upholding law prohibiting labor representation
rights of union whose officers failed to certify they were not communists).
CONsruoINAL JURISPRUDENCB, supra note 8, at 328; see also Census Act Case, 65 BVerfGE
1,41 (1984).
"'See id.; PERoTH & ScHUiNK, supra note 19, at 98-99.
'"Justice Harlan well explained this dynamic of liberty, which resonates in both German and
American law:
[Tihe full scope of the liberty guaranteed by the Due Process Clause cannot be found in or
limited by the precise terms of the specific guarantees elsewhere provided in the Constitution.
This "liberty" is not a series of isolated points pricked out in terms of the taking of property;
the freedom of speech, press, and religion; the right to keep and bear arms; the freedom from
unreasonable searches and seizures; and so on. It is a rational continuum which, broadly
speaking, includes a freedom from all substantial arbitrary impositions and purposeless
restraints, and which also recognizes, what a reasonable and sensitive judgment must, that
certain interests require particularly careful scrutiny of the state needs asserted to justify their
abridgment
Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 543 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
"5See Elfes, 6 BVerfGE at 43-44 (holding that courts should not apply full-range review, but only
determine whether specific constitutional provisions have been violated).
'"1Germany, like other European countries rooted in the civil system, has a specialized court system
with different tribunals for different areas, such as civil law, and administrative and tax courts. These
specialized courts are, of course, expert in their areas. Thus, the Constitutional Court is generally hesitant to
intrude into an area in which another court is expert. Moreover, the civil law, founded on Roman law, is the
traditional field of German legal thought Because of the traditional respect and prestige of the civil law, the
Constitutional Court might be especially cautious to intervene in favor of the then relatively new
constitutional law.
The Constitutional Court, too, is a specialized court, hearing only constitutional claims. In this
capacity, the Constitutional Court is the supreme interpreter of the Basic Law. Other German courts refer
constitutional questions to the Constitutional Court.
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events before the Court would exercise a more intensive review of lower court cases
to further fundamental rights. 47
Elfes is significant in another regard. The techniques employed by the Court
illustrate how it has been able to assume its role as guardian of the Constitution and
censor of governmental action. The German Constitutional Court thus parallels the
role of the Supreme Court over matters that we call substantive due process. In the
modern era of human rights, the Supreme Court has judged the reasonableness of
official action against the opaque language of "due process of law." Both the German
and American Courts have set up legal regimes to anchor such operative terms in more
solid ground. In Germany, we have seen how personality rights have become part of
a general "freedom of action" limited only by third party rights, morality, or the
constitutional order. In the United States, the due process inquiry involves a quest for
those "basic values 'implicit in the concept of ordered liberty, '"48 which itself
involves a reasoned judgment "of respect for the liberty of the individual... [against]
the demands of organized society."49 In both countries, these decisions are ultimately
acts of judicial judgment. We will be in a better position to gauge the quality, range,
and validity of those judgments upon further comparison of German and American
law.
As in the United States, most measures challenged for violating personal
freedoms pass constitutional muster in Germany. 5 As we have seen in Elfes, national
security interests were held to justify limitations on foreign travel.' Likewise, general
freedoms of action have been limited by price regulations,'52 and the freedom of action
of a horse rider has been limited to assigned bridal paths out of deference to the rights
of hikers and bikers to pursue their activities secure from horse traffic.'53
However, the Court has also invalidated measures for violating the Proportional-
ity Principle. Thus, government cannot prevent persons from trying to arrange drivers
for interested riders."s Likewise, parents do not have unlimited power to bind their
minor children by contract. 55 One of the best examples of the Constitutional Court's
"
0 The development of German standards of review for rights analysis has occurred mainly in
connection with freedoms of expression, as in American law, which is itself notable from a comparative
perspective. See Eberle, Public Discourse, supra note 6, at 807-08 (describing evolution of levels of scrutiny
in German expression law). The standards developed in law regarding freedom of expression, then, carry
over, in most particulars, to other freedoms, such as those of Article 2. The development of intensive, hard-
look review occurred in the 1990s. See, e.g., Stern-Strauss Interview, 82 BVerfGE 272, 280 (1990). The
development of German expression law in the 1990s is covered in depth in Eberle, Public Discourse, supra
note 6, at 852-94. The intense form of scrutiny at work in a case like Stem-Strauss Interview seeped also into
Article 2 right of personality cases in the 1990s, as most explicitly illustrated in Right to Heritage 1, 90
BVerfGE 263, 271 (1994), discussed infra notes 422-52 and accompanying text.
1
4 1Griswold, 381 U.S. at 500 (Harlan, J., concurring) (quoting Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319,
325 (1937)).
"Poe, 367 U.S. at 542 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
uSee CURRIB, supra note 7, at 319.
15 See Elfes, 6 BVerfGE at 42.
"'See 8 BVerfGE 274, 327-29 (1958).
'
3
ee Rider in Woods, 80 BVerfGE at 159-60.
'See 17 BVerfGE 306, 313-18 (1964), noted in CURRIE, supra note 7, at 319 (cataloguing cases
along these lines).
usSee 72 BVerfGE 155, 170-73 (1986).
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technique in judging state actions is the Falconry Licensing Case, where the Court
found governmental regulation unreasonable in requiring those engaging in the sport
of falconry to demonstrate competence in the use of firearms.'56
B. Falconry Licensing Case
At issue in the Falconry Licensing Case was a federal hunting law which
required prowess in knowledge and operation of weapons, including guns, as a
requirement for obtaining a hunting license. The plaintiff engaged in the sport of
falconry, which involves use of a falcon to hunt and retrieve prey. Since guns are not
used in falconry, the plaintiff objected to being tested for weapon proficiency. 7
The case provides good insight into the Constitutional Court's evaluation of
governmental action circumscribing personality rights. "Article 2 guarantees everyone
a general freedom of action insofar as one does not violate the rights of others, the
moral order, or the constitutional order," the Court asserted.'5 ' The requirement of
weapon proficiency "violates in an unconstitutional manner Article 2 freedom of
action, because denial of the ability to hunt without weapon proficiency contradicts the
concept of the rule of law [Rechtsstaat]; therefore, the regulation is inconsistent with
the constitutional order."'59 Understanding why this is so requires closer examination
of the Rechtsstaat principle:
The concept of Rechtsstaat demands, when viewed in conjunction with the
presumptive zone of freedom Article 2 bestows, that citizens are protected against
unnecessary curtailment of their freedoms by official actions. For legal measures
to be indispensable, they must use means to establish a legal end that are suitable
and that do not excessively burden an individual.' 60
In this manner, the Court demonstrated again its methodology for Article 2 personality
claims.
ir'st, a person's general freedom of action is to be broadly understood, consistent
with the freedom-protective nature of the Basic Law. Second, such freedom may be
limited only by the triad of textual limitations, which themselves are limited by the
implied limitation of the "constitutional order."'16 Third, the constitutional order
includes "unwritten elementary constitutional principles," most notably the Rechtsstaat
principle, which itself embodies foundational principles like the Proportionality
Principle.' 62 Fourth, the Proportionality Principle requires careful scrutiny of freedom-
restrictive actions to assure that they are proportional to the ends they seek, that is, that
they are justifiable and not excessively onerous. According to the Falconry Licensing
"6See Falconry Licensing Case, 55 BVerfGE at 165.
UnSee id. at 163. The plaintiff was simply not interested in shooting a gun. See id.
"'id. at 165.
mid.
d'60. For elaboration of the concept of Rechtsstaat, see supra notes 10, 135-36 and accompanying
text.
"'See supra notes 138-39 and accompanying text.
0Elfes, 6 BVerfGE at 41.
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Case, proportionality requires that "the means to establish a legal end ... are
suitable... and do not excessively burden an individual."' 63
Applying this test, the Court determined in the Falconry Licensing Case that
"weapon proficiency is incongruous with the legislative goal ... [of] protection of
wildlife and prevention of abuse of hunting birds."'" These goals could be accom-
plished "through more precisely drawn measures. '""es The problem here was that "the
requirement of weapon proficiency has nothing to do with the maintenance [and
preservation] of hunting. . . . It is a violation of proportionality when weapon
proficiency is demanded ... that has no relation to the planned activity."'" Indeed,
discharge of weapons "could frighten the falcons ... and they might not return to the
falconer."'" Fortifying these conclusions was the Court's observation that few open
areas remain where people can engage in falconry. Care must therefore be taken to
preserve them.16' The Court thus carved out a sphere of protected liberty amidst the
bustle of the modern world.
In sum, Elfes and the Falconry Licensing Case evidence the broad range of
freedom of action accorded citizens under Article 2, and the care the Court takes to
evaluate restriction of that freedom. The Falconry Licensing Case, in particular,
demonstrates a considerable tightening of the scrutiny employed to incursion of
freedom. In this manner, the Court shows again how it has set itself up as a compre-
hensive censor of the reasonableness of governmental action.
C. American Law
In the United States, by comparison, there is no comprehensive constitutional
concept of a general freedom of action, entitling persons to do what they like within
the constraints of the social order. 69 This concept is more likely to be handled under
general private law concepts like tort, contract, or property, or pursuant to the criminal
law. As a whole, therefore, private American law maps out the zone for general
freedom of action. Certainly there is a significant difference, in both Germany and
America, between constitutionalizing an area, with its accompanying higher status, and
treatment pursuant to ordinary law.
70
"
0Falconry Licensing Case, 55 BVerfGE at 165.
'"Id. at 165-66.
...ld. at 166.
1661d.
67Id.
'"See id. at 168.
"The closest textual authority for such general freedom would be the Ninth Amendment, which, as
noted, the Court has refused to so broadly construe. See supra note 116.
7
'By ordinary law I mean the general law; that is, all law--civil, criminal, or administrative-other
than constitutional law. Thus, the ordinary law is the background against which constitutional law is applied.
See Eberle, Public Discourse, supra note 6, at 825 n.1 9.
Therelationship between constitutional and private law is deeply interesting, with strong roots in both
history and modern theory. Significantly, the approach in both countries has been to constitutionalize
increasingly historical areas of the private law. In Germany, this makes particular sense, since the adoption
of the Basic Law signaled a new legal order for the country. See supra notes 8-9 and accompanying text.
Pursuant to the Basic Law, all law, public and private, must conform to the value-order of the new charter.
Thus, the enactment of the Basic Law itself marks a fundamental reconception of German law. The seminal
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Moreover, at the constitutional level, the American approach under modern
substantive due process has been much more selective, focusing on identifying those
personal freedoms thought to be "fundamental,"' 1 "implicit in the concept of ordered
liberty,"'" or "deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradition,"" for example.
Under these constructs, the Court has deemed "fundamental" those activities relating
to control over one's life, such as marriage, 74 procreation,' 75 contraception, 176 or child
rearing;177 or control over one's body, such as abortion 78 or the ability to refuse
medical treatment.1 79 As are the German freedom of action cases, the American cases
seem directed outward, focusing on issues of personal autonomy and self-determina-
tion in relationship to the world. On the other hand, this aspect of American law differs
from German freedom of action in that American "fundamental" rights also partake
of an element of personal identity. Marriage, procreation, and contraception, for
example, are more personal and more revealing of identity than foreign travel"' or
riding in the woods."' In this way, the American law has a certain resonance with the
personal sphere of German law, discussed next in Part V.
A second focus of American substantive due process law has been the delineation
of a zone of privacy, particularly in shielding disclosure of personal matters. This
caseisLlth, 7 BVerfGE at 205 (holding that Basic Law's "value system, which centers upon human dignity
and free unfolding of the human personality within the social community, must be looked upon as a
fundamental constitutional decision affecting all areas of law, public and private .... Thus, basic rights
obviously influence civil law too."). For extensive treatment of this relationship, see Eberle, Public
Discourse, supra note 6, at 815-16; Quint, supra note 14, at 254-58,261-81.
In America too, the trend of the Supreme Court has been to constitutionalize private law areas, most
notably defamation law, through the landmark case, New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 283
(1964) ("[TIhe Constitution delimits a State's power to award damages for libel actions brought by public
officials against citics of their official conduct."). Note, for example, Justice White's cry: "[Ulsing [the First]
Amendment as the chosen insm mnt, the Court, in a few printed pages, has federalized major aspects of
libel law by declaring unconstitutional in important respects the prevailing defamation law in all or most of
the 50 States... Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc, 418 U.S. 323, 370 (1974) (White, J., dissenting). "These
are radical changes in the law and severe invasions of the prerogatives of the States." Id. at 376 (White, J.,
dissenting).
"Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105 (1933).
rnPalko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937).
r"Moore v. East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503 (1977) (plurality opinion).
"See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967) ("The freedom to marry has long been recognized
as one of the vital personal rights essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men.").
"See Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 544-55 (1942) (Stone, J., concurring) (holding that Due
Process Clause prevents state from imposing sterilization on repeat offenders without demonstrating that
individual's criminal tendencies are inheritable).
"6See Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 443 (1972) ("[A] prohibition on contraception per se,
violates.., the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.").
"See Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923) (holding that Fourteenth Amendment protects
right to raise children).
"See Roe, 410 U.S. at 153 ("[The] right of privacy... is broad enough to encompass a woman's
decision whether or not to terminate her pregnancy.).
"'See Cruzan v. Missouri Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261,278-79 (1990) (holding that competent
people have constitutionally protected liberty interest in refusing unwanted medical treatment).
"See Efes, 6 BVerfGE at 32; see also supra notes 115-16 and accompanying text.
"'See Rider in Woods, 80 BVerfGE at 154-55.
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explains the privacy accorded the marriage bedroom8 and the home183 in certain
contexts. However, as with American autonomy law, rather than establishing any
general or comprehensive right, this law too has evolved narrowly, in response to
discrete intrusions into individual privacy, usually amidst criminal prosecutions. At
bottom, then, American law is episodic-a judicial response to "substantial arbitrary
impositions,"' whereas German law is more systematic. Undoubtedly, this reflects
the American common law methodology, inherited from English law. German
systematization, by contrast, reflects the influence of Roman law, especially as
transformed in high German legal science (Rechtswissenschaft).1' In the broadest
sense, the differing approaches of the law evidence a cultural distinction between
common and civil law.
V. INNER FREEDOM IN GERMAN LAW: THE PERSONAL SPHERE
The flip side of freedom of action is a focus on the interior person. Here the
Constitutional Court has posited a "private sphere or ultimate domain of inviolability
in which a person is free to shape his life as he or she sees fit."" 6 This domain includes
both the right to retreat from the world, as one likes, captured as the moral-spiritual
essence of being, as well as the right to engage actively in the world, as covered by
freedom of action. There is not, of course, a clear conceptual line between the inner
and outer world. Rather, both are components of an integrated, whole person.
Nevertheless, it is notable that German law has accented the interior component of
human personality, a focus American law has not, as yet, developed."
InSee Griswold, 381 U.S. at 499 (holding that state law prohibiting use of contraceptives by married
couples violates Fourteenth Amendment).
See Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 559 (1969) ("[Mlere private possession of obscene matter
cannot constitutionally be made a crime.").
'"Poe, 367 U.S. at 543 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
[T]he full scope of the liberty guaranteed by the Due Process Clause cannot be found in or
limited by the precise terms of the specific guarantees elsewhere provided in the Constitution.
This "liberty" is not a series of isolated points picked out in terms of the taking of property; the
freedom of speech, press, and religion; the right to keep and bear arms; the freedom from
unreasonable searches and seizures; and so on. It is a rational continuum which, broadly
speaking, includes a freedom from all substantial arbitrary impositions and purposeless
restraints.
Id. (Harlan, J., dissenting).
tUnder German legal science, techniques of careful legal study and investigation were brought to
bear on Roman law, attempting to uncover the essence of a system of law, and on German customary law,
in order to discover the basis of law itself. This resulted in the drafting of the German Civil Code of 1896,
a high achievement of German legal science. Friedrich von Saviguy, one of the seminal German legal
theoreticians of the Code, described the aims of German legal science: "'[We want a national community
whose scientific endeavors focus upon one and the same object[,] ... an organically progressive legal science
which may be common to the whole nation."' Reinhard Zimmerman, An Introduction to German Legal
Culture, in INTRODUCTON TO GERMAN LAW I, 4-5 (Werner F. Ebke & Matthew W. Finkin eds., 1996).
Savigny's legal historicism became "the fulcrum for the emergence of a national community of scholars."
Id.
"86CONSTr IONAL JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 8, at 328.
"To a significant extent, German law picked up the suggestions by Warren and Brandeis, in their
important article The Right to Privacy, that there exists a general right of personality based on the notion of
"an inviolate personality," including a "more general right to be let alone," see Warren & Brandeis, supra
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A Establishment of Interiority in German Law
1. Microcensus
Focus on the interior component of human personality in German law began
comprehensively with the important Microcensus case,188 which concerned the
constitutionality of a federal questionnaire, or 'microcensus," designed to elicit a
portrait of the German population. The questionnaire sought information concerning
personal habits, including vacation practices, occupation, standard of living, and
whether mothers worked or remained home to rear children, among other topics. 89 In
this context, the Court carved out a private, personal sphere for citizens to inhabit free
from incursion.
The fact that the statistical survey sought personal information necessitated
inquiry into the domain of personal rights protected within Article 2. Here the
Constitutional Court raised the barricade of human dignity, beyond which "the state
could take no measure, or enact any law, which would violate.., or otherwise infringe
upon the essence of personal freedom as encompassed within the limits of Article
2."' 19 As should now be evident, there can be no greater thunder in the German
constellation than invocation of human dignity. The significance of this became
immediately clear: "The Basic Law thereby guarantees individual citizens an
inviolable area of personal freedom in which one can freely form one's life, the effect
of which is to remove all official power [from this realm]."'' This is the personal
sphere in which one is free to determine and structure one's life.1"
note 59, at 205, and "to the immunity of the person-the right to one's personality." Id. at 207. Such
personality rights would include "legal recognition" of "thoughts, emotions and sensations," id. at 195, and
also "some retreat from the world" in recognition "that solitude and privacy have become more essential to
theindividual" given the "intensity and complexity of life attendant upon advancing civilization." Id. at 196.
In German law, this right of personality is based on Kant and, more recently, the work of Otto von
Gierke, who suggested, during the time of the drafting of the Civil Code, that the law recognize a "general
right of personality." Otto von Gierke, 1 DEtJrsCHEs PRIVATRE HT 702 (1895) cited in Krause, supra note
59, at 485.
It is interesting, as a matter of comparative law, that this call for a general right of personality, which
occurred rather contemporaneously in Germany and America during the influential last decade of the
nineteenth century, met with great success in Germany, but with only limited success in America. See infra
note 386.
I'Microcensus, 27 BVerfGE 1 (1969).
"SSee id. at 32.
m1d. at 6.
1911d.
'See Ud. For this proposition, the Court, significantly, cited Elfes, which had theorized both this inner
realm of fieedom as well as an outer zone. See Elfes, 6 BVerfGE 32, 41 (1957). This private, personal sphere
of freedom has been developed as a separate strand of German law. See infra Part V; see also, e.g., Right to
Heritage 1, 79 BVerfGE 256, 268 (1989) ("The right to free development of personality and human dignity
guarantees everyone an autonomous area of private life formation, in which one can develop and protect
one's individuality.").
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This intimate sphere is a critical part of the human vision that lies at the root of
the Basic Law, bestowing self-worth, social value, and respect. 93 This also shows how
concepts of human dignity, humanity, and community are interlinked in German law.
Through this interaction, dignity takes on a more concrete meaning: "It would be
inconsistent with human dignity for the state to force people to register and catalogue
their whole personalities, even if done anonymously through a statistical survey,
thereby treating man as an object, which is accessible in every manner."'" Insistence
on respect for human dignity is thus instrumental to preservation of human autonomy.
With this background, the Court went on to elaborate the Inner Sphere. "Such a
[pervasive] penetration in the personal area through a comprehensive inspection of the
personal relationships of a citizen is also denied the state because individuals must
have an Inner Space [Innenraum] in which to develop freely and self-responsibly their
personalities, an Inner Space which they themselves possess and in which they can
retreat, banning all entrance to the outer world, in which one can enjoy tranquility and
a right to solitude."'95
The presence of an ascertainable Inner Space in German personality law is a
notable achievement, and a dramatic contrast with American law. It is wholly a
creation of the Constitutional Court, in pursuit of its perception of the vision
underiying the Basic Law. Textually, it is certainly not self-evident that "the dignity
of man" or "the right to the free development of his personality" would yield this
emphasis. 96 Rather, it reflects the Court's desire to preserve and protect the integrity
of human personality, especially in applying the concept of human dignity to meet
changing social conditions, such as the development and use of computer technology
in Microcensus. In this way, human autonomy and capacity are safeguarded and
nourished against the challenges posed by modern social, economic, and technological
change. The clear desire of the Constitutional Court to keep its constitution "in tune
with the times"'" contrasts with the Supreme Court, which has always sought to
anchor fundamental rights in timeless or constant principles such as natural law or
inalienable rights, or from verifiable sources like tradition or history, partly as a way
of deflecting the argument that the Court is overstepping its bounds.
Considering that law is a reflection of culture, it is interesting to decipher the
cultural traits evidenced by this German accent on the interior life. For one thing, this
focus is quite compatible with German history and culture, which has placed
extraordinary emphasis on the world of the mind and of the artist. Emphasis on culture
has predominated over public life through most of German history. This contrasts with
American law and American life, which has often emphasized public life over cultural
life, a natural outgrowth of the central role played here by our democracy. American
substantive due process law reflects this too. The thrust of American cases has either
been autonomy in the world or privacy from a prying world. But under American
'See Microcensus, 27 BVerfGE at 6 ("In the light of this image of man at root in the Basic Law, the
human achieves social value and respect in society.").
"lId. These sentiments evidence, unmistakably, the influence of Kant.
fId. The Court observed that even the presence of a neutrally devised state inspection scheme could
violate the right to personality because it would induce psychological pressure. See id. at 6--7.
'Id. at 6; see also Art. 2(1) GG.
t 7Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479,522 (1965) (Black, I., dissenting).
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privacy, the Court has not sought comprehensively to define or nourish an interior
sphere so much as to shield the outside world from invasion of that private zone.198
The German emphasis on interiority also reflects, again, Kantian thought, and its
emphasis on the autonomy of the individual and the unfolding of human capacity.
As a matter of doctrinal law, the Constitutional Court's carving out of a private,
intimate sphere has produced distinct strands of personality law. Perhaps most notable
is the general control over personal information that has resulted in a right to
informational self-determination, discussed in Section B.' Related to informational
self-determination is the right to control the portrayal of one's person, including rights
to one's own image and spoken word, and rights, in some circumstances, not to have
false interviews or statements attributed to one's person, as discussed in Section C.atu
But these are all matters meriting separate development. What is significant for our
purposes is that the German strand of interior personality has led to a distinct evolution
of personality law, one quite different from American law.
In reference to Microcensus, the question for the Court was whether this
"microcensus" so deeply impinged upon this sphere of intimacy as to violate Article
2 personality rights. Certainly "not every statistical survey of personal data violates
personal dignity ... or disturbs self-determination over the innermost [private] areas
of life." '' Characteristic of the German regime of rights, everything is a question of
balance and proportion. No one right is extended to the detriment of other rights as,
for example, in the American preferencing of free speech.2es Thus, personality
rights-even over intimate areas-are mediated in relationship to other values of the
social order. One's obligations as "community-connected and community-bound"
citizens entail a certain cooperation with officials in matters that call for state-
planning, like a census.2 3
This inquiry necessitates a closer evaluation of the case. Survey questions
principally threaten self-determination rights when they impinge upon the "personal
intimate area of life, which by nature is confidential. [For] the modem industrial state,
this is a barricade to prevent administrative-technical depersonalization: "' However,
statistical surveys inquiring only into human behavior will not generally violate the
intimate realm. This is especially so when anonymity is used, as in the Microcensus
survey, since this obscures personal connections, and hinders, if not prevents, the
cataloguing of human personality.2 5
In Microcensus, the key issue turned on inquiry into vacation and recreational
habits. While such inquiries implicate the private sphere, they do not "force disclosure
of information arising from one's intimate sphere, nor allow the state access to
'"See, e.g., id. at 485-86.
- See infra notes 241-60 and accompanying text.
=See infra notes 337-40,387-93 and accompanying text.
2lMicrocensus, 27 BVerfGE at 7.
'
2 See Eberle, Hate Speech. supra note 52, at 1213 ("[F]ree speech is the preferred right in our
constitutional structure.").
mMicrocensus, 27 BVerfGE at 7.
2NId.
'See id. Moreover, as additional precautions, the statute prohibits publication of information gathered
and binds census takers to confidentiality. See id.
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relationships that are ordinarily beyond outside scrutiny or of a confidential nature."2'
This type of information could be obtained from general sources, "although with
greater difficulty. 20 7 Thus, the inquiry did not constitute a constitutional violation.
Likewise, resort to the Rechtsstaat principle did not yield relief, since the legal norms
at issue were sufficiently definite and the measures taken satisfied the Proportionality
Principle, being suitable means to accomplish legitimate ends. 0 Microcensus
therefore illustrates the same methodology used by the Court in the outer-directed
freedom of action cases: evaluation of the intensity of the rights violation, followed
by testing of the case against Rechtsstaat principles, especially that of prop ortionality.
2. Criminal Diary Case
Determining to construct a sphere of inviolable privacy is one thing. Defining it
is another. The best recent attempt to come to grips with these existential questions is
the Criminal Diary Case, where the Court grappled with the question whether the state
could use diaries of a young man accused of murder as evidence in its case.20 9 The man
was in therapy to help resolve a lifelong problem forming relationships with women.
The therapist recommended that he write down his inner struggle in a diary. The
diaries revealed his innermost feelings and insecurities over his inability to form
relationships with women. During a search of his parents' home, where he lived, the
police discovered the diary. The diary entries bore certain similarities to the murder
the man later was accused of. Because of their relationship to the crime, the state
sought to use the diaries as circumstantial evidence in its case.2"'
The essence of the legal dispute was whether the diary entries were portals into
the innermost feelings of the defendant, protected as part of the intimate realm of
Article 2 personality. In fact, the Federal Supreme Court (Bundesgerichtshof or BGH)
believed just this-that the intimate nature of the diaries made them part of the
defendant's protected personality rights, but that their use in a criminal trial was
justified by the important public interest in solving a serious crime.2" ' Criminal Diary
thus provided the Constitutional Court with a good opportunity to bring some clarity
to the personal sphere.
216d. at 8.
2vId.
2aSee id. at 8.
OSee Criminal Diary Case, 80 BVerfGE 367 (1989).
21See id. at 368-69.
2USee id. In this respect, the BGH upheld the decision of the lower court. See id. at 368-69. On the
other hand, one could conclude, as did the quartet of Justices who found a violation of personality rights, that
the diary entries were made so many months (17 and 8) before the crime that they lacked any relevance to
proof of the crime.
In developing a general right of privacy, the BGH had long held that this right protects against
disclosure of confidential information relating to private activities, such as that contained in letters and
diaries. The private nature of the information was the key to protection under the Civil Code. Professor
Krause traces these developments. See Krause, supra note 59, at 500. In a case like Criminal Diary, the
Constitutional Courtrelied, in essence, on these developments by the BGH. Other strands of this general right
of personality were also constitutionalized by the Court, in reliance on the work of the civil courts. These
matters are discussed infra notes 327-37 and accompanying text.
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"The general personality rights anchored in Articles 1 and 2 guar-
antee... control over.. . personal details of one's life," '  the Court announced,
referring to the fundamental right of informational self-determination established in
Microcensus and secured in the Census Act Case. Yet the "protection is not absolute,"
but can be limited by "overriding public interest.' 3 This follows from individuals'
obligations to the community and its members.214
Nevertheless, "even overriding public interest" might not justify intrusion into
this most intimate sphere.2'5 On account of the human dignity anchor, the Court
postulated a certain ultimate core of personality from which all official entry is
barred." 6 Here it was unnecessary to perform any proportional means-end testing.
Certainly, only truly innermost matters would enjoy such protection.
To the extent a personal matter is not characterized as being of the innermost
"inviolable area," it might be counted as part of the personal sphere into which the
state might be allowed entry upon a showing of "significant public interest."'" Thus,
much depended on how personal matters, like the diary entries, were to be character-
ized.
The topic of an innermost personal sphere, and how to define it, has been a focus
of much controversy.2 8 Early on, the Court set forth the Sphere Theory (Sphdren-
theorie), under which human personality interests were calibrated according to the
intensity of their intimacy. Different interests were assigned different levels of
constitutional protection according to this scheme. For example, the most intimate
sphere (Intimsphidre) was the "last, inviolable area of human freedom ... from which
all public power was disseized."'5 9 Aspects of sexual determination, such as one's
sex, 0 sex education,"' or the marriage bedroomml are examples of interests held to
be within this most intimate sphere. Next in concentric order was a private or
confidential sphere (Privat or Geheimsphdire) that was subject to the textual
limitations of Article 2(1).P In this sphere, personality rights could be curtailed only
in the face of hard proof of their necessity under the Proportionality Principle.
2nCriminal Diary Case, 80 BVerfGE at 373. The development of informational self-determination
is exploed ifra notes 247-57 and accompanying text. See also Census Act Case, 65 BVerfGE 1,41 (1983).
21Crninal Diary Case, 80 BVerfGE at 373.
2 4This reflects the German vision of individuals as socially connected and bound. "Limitation of
freedom can occur when justified by overriding public interest, because individuals enter into communication
with others in the social community, and their conduct affects others and can disturb the personal sphere of
others or the interests of the community." Id.
2'See id. This follows from Article 19(2) GG, which protects the essence of a right.
2"See id. at 373 (Mhe Court has recognized a last inviolable area of private life formation from which
all public power is disseized.").2 17Whether this is so or not would depend on means-end testing pursuant to the Proportionality
Principle.
2"See PIEROTH & SCMLMIK, supra note 19, at 100; Degenhart, supra note 74, at 363-64.
29Degenhart, supranote 74, at 363-64 (citing 38 BVerfGE 312, 320 (1975); Elfes, 6 BVerfGE at 41).
2uSee Transsexual Case, 49 BVerfGE 286 (1978) (finding right to live according to chosen sex).
nlSee Sex Education Case, 47 BVerfGE 46, 71 (1977) (noting that sex is among most intimate of
human activities and, therefore, parents have right to be informed of sex education in schools).
mSee Divorce Records, 27 BVerfGE 344 (1970).
zuSee PIEROTH & SCHLUNK, supra note 19, at 100.
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Vacation and recreational habits2" were examples of interests grouped in this sphere.
The last sphere was an outer or social sphere (Sozialsphdre), comprised of interests
connected closely to society which had little intimate character. Actions could be taken
to curtail exercise of these interests under less exacting standards of proof, for
example, to gain information leading to the solution of a crime or disease, such as an
epidemic.2s
Not surprisingly, serious definitional problems arose as to the boundaries of these
spheres, and the grouping of interests within them. The spheres could not be
adequately distinguished, and people classified interests differently, leading to a
certain relativism of the theory.226 Moreover, the main criterion used by the
Constitutional Court-social connectedness-proved unworkable as a legal standard,
since legal regulation always involved a considerable social element, whether in
conduct, action, or communication. 227
For these reasons, the Court abandoned the Sphere Theory in the Census Act
Case.' Since that abandonment, however, no satisfactory replacement theory has
been forthcoming.229 In fact, the Sphere Theory continues to provide a certain structure
to this inquiry, even if as a background concept, as is evident in the Court's discussion
in Criminal Diary. This is especially pronounced in matters involving an aspect of
retreat from the world, such as the act of writing diaries in Criminal Diary. The
Court's ventures may ultimately prove to be an example of the limits of Grand Theory,
not unlike similar quests in service of the First Amendment."
This brings us back to the Criminal Diary Case, which marks the last great
attempt of the Court to define an innermost sphere~lt "Whether a matter is to be
characterized as within the core area... depends on whether it is of a highly personal
nature and the degree and intensity with which it affects the interests of others or the
community." ' 2 If this works, fine. But this standard seems no more self-defining than
the old Sphere Theory. Indeed, it seems to call for an ad hoc weighing of personality
versus social interests, thus repeating the relativism of the former theory. Because of
these difficulties, the Court has renounced Grand Theory, at least for now, preferring
ruSee Microcensus, 27 BVerfGE at 1.
'See, e.g., Criminal Diary Case, 80 BVerfGE at 375-77; Lebach, 35 BVerfGE 202,220 (1973)
(noting strong state interest in solving crime); see also 1 H. VON MANGOLDT LT AT-, DAs BONNER
GRUNDGSE1Z, Art. 2(1), § 64 (3d ed. 1985).
226See PEROTH & ScHLNK, supra note 19, at 100; Degenhart, supra note 74, at 364.
'See PIEROTH & SCHLINK, supra note 19, at 100.
2
nSee Census Act Case, 65 BVerfGE at 45. The Court ruled that the significance of information can
no longer depend on its type or nature. Equally decisive is the use and application of information gathered,
including possibilities of dissemination. In this sense, there is no unimportant information.
'See Letter from Dr. Bodo Pieroth, Professor of Law, University of Mlnster, Mlnster, Germany, to
Edward J. Eberle (Nov. 13, 1996) (on file with author)'[hereinafter Pieroth Letter].
2
'See Edward J. Eberle, Practical Reason: The Commercial Speech Paradigm, 42 CASE W. RES. L.
REV. 411, 418-25 (1992) (discussing and critiquing scholars' attempts to discover true meaning of First
Amendment through set of foundational values).
"'See Pieroth Letter, supra note 229.
2Crininal Diary Case, 80 BVerfGE at 374. This marks a renunciation of focusing solely on "social
connectedness' as the distinguishing factor. "The ordering of matters within the inviolable area... or the
area of private life... can no longer depend on the social significance or connection of the matter." Id.
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to work out what is "personar' or "intimate!' on a case-by-case basis? 3 Thus, the
extent of the inviolable sphere can only be determined by its delineation in case law.
At bottom, then, the German approach is moving in the direction of the American
one. n
4
Applying these principles proved no more satisfactory than defining them. The
Court split 4-4 on whether the diaries were part of an innermost personal spheren 5
The quartet of Justices believing the diary entries were not private enough focused on
their social connection. Because the diaries helped explain a gruesome crime, the
Justices reasoned, they bore a clear connection to societal interests and did not partake
of any intimate thought. They were written, and thus discoverable, and the acts were
alreadyperformed. 6 Moreover, use of the diaries as proof in a serious crime provided
a "significant public justification. ' 7
The four dissenting Justices, by contrast, believed the diaries to be "highly
personal," reflective of the defendant's "real personality structure... a dialogue with
the real I' Indeed, it is hard to imagine many acts more intimate than recording
one's innermost thoughts in a diary, especially when done in the context of a
confidential relationship, such as that between doctor and patient. Thus, for these
Justices, the diaries should have been protected as within the personal sphere.
Moreover, they argued, the crime had happened seventeen and eight months,
respectively, before the two diary entries most at issue? 9 Thus, any connection to the
real world was remote.
There is an unsatisfactory quality to the Court's analysis. Reliance on the ad hoc
balancing test may be too unprincipled, allowing each judge to see personality or
community interests as he or she wishes. There would seem to be particular pressure
to act on community interests, such as crime, to the detriment of individual interests.
Certainly the haphazardness of this case-by-case approach is a danger to legal security.
It will take some time before organizing principles are evident around which the law
may be structured. In the interim, however, there will be great uncertainty. Because
lower courts or other decision makers will not be sure which standards to apply, this
carries a risk of curtailing freedoms.
suSee id. at 374 ("What type and how intense a matter is... cannot be described abstractly, but can
be satisfactorily determined only upon a full consideration of all relevant factors in a particular case.").
'3See, e.g., Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 849 (1992) (plurality opinion) ("The
inescapablefact is that adjudication of substantive due process claims may call upon the Court in interpreting
the Constitution to exercise that same capacity which by tradition courts always have exercised: reasoned
judgment. Its boundaries are not susceptible of expression as a simple rule.").
2SUnder German law, a tie vote results in the lower court ruling remaining in effect. See Gesetz fiber
das Bundesverfassungsgericht (BVerfGG) § 15(3).
23 See Criminal Diary Case, 80 BVerfGE at 376-77. The Court did not find any general protection
for diaries. Therefore, much depended on the content of the diaries, and how one valued it.
mid. at 377-79.
2
sd. at 381. Accordingly, these Justices believed that the diaries should be "absolutely protected as
within the area of private life-formation." Id.
'
2 See id. at 381-82.
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B. Informational Self-Determination
The most notable manifestation of the concern for preserving an intimate realm
to life, expressed by the Court in Microcensus, is the concept of informational self-
determination. This means, fundamentally, a right to control access to and dissemina-
tion of personal data, including protection against revelation of one's private affairs.
It is rooted in a desire to preserve the integrity of human personality against the
onslaught of the technological age and of prying eyes. Thus, the Court has sought to
carve out an area of inviolable human interiority as a secure haven. In a sense, this
represents adjustment of the Kantian ideal of moral autonomy to the conditions of the
modern age.
1. Census Act Case
Building on Microcensus, the Census Act Case"10 strove to preserve the
inviolability of human personality amidst revolutionary changes in the computer
age.2t' The controversy concerned the Federal Census Act of 1983 (the "Act"), which
required the collection of comprehensive data concerning the Federal Republic's
demographic and social structure. The Act set the parameters for the country's
population count and also required rudimentary personal information, such as name,
address, gender, marital status, nature of household occupants, religious affiliation, job
occupation, and work setting.242 The Act also required citizens to fill out detailed
questions concerning their sources of income, educational background, mode of
transportation to and from work, and use of dwelling, including method of heating and
utilities.243 The Act further allowed information obtained to be transmitted to local
government, which could then use the information for purposes of planning,
environmental protection, and redistricting. Local government could even compare
information to housing registers and, if necessary, correct them.'
Over one hundred persons filed suit against the Act, complaining that the Act's
intrusiveness threatened their privacy rights.245 The Court agreed, at least temporarily,
and suspended the census until its constitutionality could be determined. The case is
thus an example of the rare instance where individuals may directly pursue claims to
the Constitutional Court without having to exhaust legal remedies because of an
immediate threat to a fundamental right.246
265 BVerfGE 1 (1983).
2"Census Act Case, 65 BVerfGE at 3.
2'See id. at 4-7, 12-13.
13See id. at 5.2
,"See id. at 7-8.
2See CONSTrrUrIONAL JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 8, at 333.
2
"Professor Schwartz records that although it was passed without controversy by the Bundestag, the
law triggered a storm of protest. Hundreds of citizen initiative groups called for a boycott of the census.
Ginter Grass, the Nobel Prize winning author, called the law a "monster." Even a high census official
admitted that the questionnaire "was written in an exceedingly authoritative style and frightfully unclear
language." See Schwartz, supra note 5, at 688.
Professor Schwartz writes that the Census Act Case, and the 1983 Federal law that gave rise to it, did
not occur in a legal vacuum. As early as 1970, state laws were enacted to provide for the transmission,
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At the heart of Microcensus and the Census Act Case is the concern that intrusive
and comprehensive surveys of the population will yield personality profiles which,
with the aid of modern computing techniques, will facilitate the state's ability to access
such information at will and use it as it sees fit. 7 From the Kantian perspective, this
carries the danger of converting human beings into mere objects of statistical survey,
depersonalizing the human element. From the standpoint of human autonomy, the
Court feared that gathering, storing, and using personal information would threaten
human liberty. The more that is known about a person, the easier the person is to
control.' 8 As the Court noted, these concerns are especially heightened with the
advance of modern computer technology and its capacity to access human habit and*
capabilities. t 9 The amount of personal information stored in and accessible by
computers is staggering, including information over credit history, taxes, social
security, and travel plans. 50
The background of German personality law provides the theoretical base for
these concerns. Since the "focus of the constitutional order.., is the value and dignity
of the person, who operates in free self-determination as a member of a free society,"
these values must be sustained "in view of modern developments and their accompa-
nying threats to human personality."' Human dignity must be adapted amidst
changing economic and social conditions if human personhood is to remain inviolate
in modem society. In this way, the Constitutional Court acknowledged that changing
social conditions require adaptation in the application of core concepts.
Just this motivation led the Constitutional Court to announce a general right of
informational self-determination. Informational self-determination means
processing, and protection of data. All states subsequently adopted legal regimes. Later laws were fashioned,
at both the federal and state levels, that granted individuals certain rights to be informed of data banks, and
to comment and ccred false information contained in them. Thus, the 1983 Federal Law arose amidst a legal
culture already well accustomed to data protection. Protests, accordingly, reacted against what were well-
focused and understood dangers associated with processing of information. See id. at 688-89.
'For example, the Court in the Census Act Case observed that modem computing techniques can
gather and store practically limitless information about people that is accessible "in seconds." Census Act
Case, 65 BVerfGE at 42. This "information . .. can produce a... personality profile, which the person
affected cannot control... and induces psychological pressure on behavior." Id.
2ASee Schwartz, supra note 5, at 676. Once information is available on computer, it could be put to
a variety of uses. Thus, control over information could result in political or social power. See id. at 678. For
example, "use of computerized criminal history records affects both the chances for employment of ex-
convicts and the balance ofpower between defense attorney and prosecution." Id. at 678 n.16.
'Since the 1969 decision Microcensus, the Court observed, the advance of computer technology and
capability has changed radically. Before, information was entered manually by keypunch and stored in
separate areas, accessible mainly by expert personnel, making it more difficult to fashion together and obtain
apersonality "putrait." Today, information is entered and retrievable electronically by almost anyone, which
facilitates instantaneous access to far-ranging information. See Census Act Case, 65 BVerfGE at 4, 17, 42.
2
sSee Schwartz, supra note'5, at 677. Professor Schwartz notes that in the United States, the world's
largest computer user, the government "has an average of fifteen files on every citizen." Id. at 677 n.12.
Germany is the second largest user of computers. See id. at 677 n. 10.
Professor Schwartz cites authority that in America, "since the federal government's entry into the
taxation and social welfare spheres, increasing quantities of information have been elicited from citizens and
recorde" Id. at 678 n.14 (citation omitted). Many hospitals' resources are "devoted to the task of recording
information about patients." Id. (citation omitted).
2lCensus Act Case, 65 BVerfGE at 41.
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the authority of the individual to decide fundamentally for herself, when and within
what limits personal data may be disclosed.... [This decisional authority requires
a special measure of protection under present and future conditions of automatic
data processing. [For example,] the technological capability of storing [highly]
personalized information concerning specific people is practically unlimited and
retrievable in seconds... without concern for distance.... [T]his information,
when connected to other data sources, . . .can produce a complete or partial
personality profile, over which the affected individual has no control, and the truth
of which he cannot confirm .... The possibilities of acquiring information and
exerting influence have increased to a degree never previously known.Y
2
This rise in technological capability poses severe threats to human personality
and human autonomy. "An individual's right to plan and make decisions freely may
be severely curtailed, if she does not know or cannot predict adequately what personal
data is known or maybe disclosed."zs' It is unhealthy for society "when citizens do not
know who knows what about them, and when they know it." 4 Not knowing others'
knowledge of their affairs may lead citizens to curtail their activities or "refrain from
exercising rights ... like associational rights," or expression, religious, or occupa-
tional freedoms. Certainly, official possession of detailed personal information carries
a serious threat of abuse, including coercion and manipulation of human autonomy.215
"This would damage an individual's personal development, and also the common
good, because self-determination is an elementary condition of a free democratic
society based on citizens' ability to act and to participate." ' Accordingly, data use
that has the potential to influence people must be strictly controlled. "[A]n individual
must be protected against unlimited collection, storage, use and transmission of
personal data . . as a consequence of the free development of personality under
modern conditions of data processing." ' 7 In essence, informational self-determination
follows from human autonomy, in the modern information age, control of information
is power. Thus, control over personal information is the power to control a measure
of one's fate. This is indispensable to the free unfolding of personality.
The right to informational self-determination, like all basic rights, is not absolute
in the carefully calibrated value-order of the Basic Law." Since persons "develop
within the social community... personal information is also a reflection of social
reality. ''s Thus, there is a social dimension to personal data too, posing a tension
between personal and social components to information. Government and other actors
in society, such as banks or companies, need information about people to plan and
2'Id. at 42. Such use could induce psychological pressure to conform, out of fear of how others might
employ such personal information. See id.
As the Court noted, the concept of informational self-determination emanated from earlier cases too,
such asLebach, 35 BVertGE at 220; Divorce Records, 27 BVerfGE 344, 350 (1970); and Microcensus, 27
BVerfGE at 36. See Census Act Case, 65 BVerfGE at 42.2
"
3Census Act Case, 65 BVerfGE at 43.
291d.
25 See id.
2id.
=d.
2
"
tSee id.
2Id. at 44.
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serve the public weal. Democracy itself depends on the free flow of information.260
"The Basic Law... has resolved the tension between individuality and society by
constituting individuals as community-bound and community-related."" 1 Therefore,
"individuals must... accept limitations on their right to informational self-determina-
tion for reasons of overriding public interest (Uberwiegenden Allgemeininterresse)." 62
Just what an "overriding public interest" is can only be determined by resort to
standard German norms. First, the law must have a (constitutional) legal basis, which
makes clear the conditions and reach of the limitations on freedom and thereby
satisfies the Rechtsstaat command that norms be clearly stated.2' Second, the law
must satisfy the Proportionality Principle, which, as we know, mandates that freedom
be limited only to the degree necessary to satisfy public interests. Because "of the
dangers of automatic data processing.., the legislature must, more than ever, adopt
organizational and procedural safeguards to diminish violations of individual personal
rights. '  Only then can one test the strength of the public interest.
Testing the Act against these principles entailed a detailed and comprehensive
analysis, filling seventy-one pages of the official reporter. First, the Court evaluated
whether the information was actually necessary by testing legislative ends.26 The
Court concluded that it was legitimate to perform a census for social and economic
planning.2  However, collection and storage of data for other purposes would be
constitutionally suspect. The Court "carefully scrutinized the nature of the information
collected, the methods of its storage and transmission, and its particular uses" in order
to assure that the stated uses properly fell within police powers and did not pose an
undue threat to human liberty.2" Protection of information thus depended on a
distinction "between personality-related information that is gathered and processed in
an individually nonanonymous manner and data that is census-related." ''6 The Court
emphasized that persons should not be treated as 'mere information-objects," because
depersonalizing people as information sources jeopardizes their essence as "spiritual-
moral" persons.269 The Court directed that protective measures be used to assure that
personality profiles of individuals could not be obtained. Cloaking information in
anonymity was the key safeguard identified by the Court.
2'-See id.
2Id.
2'Id.
mSee id.2
"Id.
2See id. at 44-46.
26See id. at 47.
247See CONSTIrUrMONAL JURIsPRU.lBNCE supra note 8, at 335. While it was necessary for state
purposes to collect information, the Court stipulated that data may be collected only when "suitable as well
as necessary." Census Act Case, 65 BVerfGE at 46. While recognizing that certain data for statistical
purposes, including that necessary for operation of the social welfare state, necessitated a stockpiling of data
for future use, limits must still be set concerning such information. Clear goals for use of such information
must be identified. See id. at 47-48. To better assure confidentiality, surveys could be returned through the
mail at government cost. Attributes identifying people were to be deleted as soon as possible and, until then,
held confidentially on a need-to-see basis. See id. at 60.
2"See Census Act Case, 65 BVerfGE at 45.
Id. at 48.
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Other protective measures suggested by the Court included confidentiality
obligations and a prohibition against employing census takers in locales where they
also lived.27 The Court ultimately sustained most of the Act, although it invalidated
several provisions, including one that allowed local officials to "compare census data
with local housing registries," on the ground that combining these statistics might
allow officials to identify particular persons, thereby violating the core of
personality.271
In the wake of the Census Act Case, it is worth observing what a remarkable act
of judicial activism the case represents." First, the Court suspended the Act until its
constitutionality could be determined, ultimately requiring the German Bundestag
(parliament) to amend certain provisions before the census could be carried out. This
delayed the census for four years at notable cost.2 Second, the Court established
concretely a right of informational self-determination from the textual authority of
Articles 1 and 2. That language, of course, does not self-evidently bestow citizens'
control over personal data. Rather, the Court extended the principle animating the
provisions to carve out this radiation of autonomy. In this way, the Constitutional
Court acted in a manner quite like the Supreme Court in Griswold v. Connecticut, in
inferring a right of privacy from the Bill of Rights.274 At the root of the Constitutional
Court's decision was the vision that human dignity and autonomy must be preserved
against the onslaught of the modern computer age. Thus, measures needed be taken
to assure that the collection, storage, and use of personal data is justifiable pursuant
to the Rechtsstaat, and that this power not be abused.275
noSee id. at 49-51, 60.
271d. at 64. Other deficiencies identified in the law were a lack of clarity in certain provisions, which
therefore failed to place citizens on adequate notice of the law; failure to specify clearly projected uses of the
information; and failure to obtain permission for transmission to authorities of certain information, such as
religious affiliation. See id. at 64-66.
suProfessor Schwartz records that since the Census Act Case, government and courts have generally
striven to meet the challenges of the case and conform the law to constitutional standards. The German
judiciary has invalidated laws that do not adequately spell out projected uses of data or grant citizens
satisfactoy inspection rights. See Schwartz, supra note 5, at 698-99. State laws have generally provided for
extensive inspection and informational rights, responding to the Constitutional Court's "call for greater
involvement of the citizen in his role as data subject." Id. at 699. The Census Act Case, not surprisingly, also
inspired an outpouring of scholarly commentary. See id. at 698 n.l 18 (citing authorities).
Yet, Professor Schwartz notes, there have been setbacks too. See id. at 700-01. Legal regulation of
data use by police and antiterrorist agencies has been lax, probably on account of the majoritarian pressure
to fight crime and terrorism. See id. at 700. German authorities responded harshly to protests of the next
census, approved by the Constitutional Court after the Census Act Case. See id. at 700-01.2 73See CONST1rUrIONAL JURsPRIUDENCH, supra note 8, at 332. After the Census Act Case, the
government decided to abandon the census. Instead, the Bundestag drafted a new census bill, which the
Constitutional Court approved. See, e.g., 42 NJW 707 (1989); 40 NJW 2805 (1987).
2 4See Grinwod, 381 U.S. at 484 ("[Slpecific guarantees in the Bill of Rights havepenumbras, formed
by emanations from those guarantees that help give them life and substance ... Various guarantees create
zones of privacy." (citation omitted)).
mInterestingly, when Germany reevaluated the Basic Law in 1993, the Constitutional Commissioners
decided not to codify explicitly informational privacy, seemingly preferring court-created law. See CURRIE,
supra note 7, at 321 n.324. In this way, the Constitutional Commissioners paralleled the course of the drafters
of the Civil Code, who decided against codification of a general right of privacy. See Krause, supra note 59,
at 485. Thus, like informational self-determination, a general right of privacy has been a court-created
doctrine, in both Germany and America. Indeed, this brings into clear relief the role of German courts as
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The American constitutional case which comes closest to addressing the German
concept of informational self-determination is Whalen v. Roe, 6 which involved a
patient-identification requirement in a statute providing for a centralized computer file
of all persons who obtained drugs, both legal and illegal, pursuant to a doctor's
prescription. Although the Supreme Court, like the Constitutional Court, recognized
that there was a "threat to privacy implicit in the accumulation of vast amounts of
personal information in computerized data banks or other massive government
files,"2  the Court nevertheless held that "neither the immediate nor the threatened
impact of the patient-identification requirements ...is sufficient to constitute an
invasion of any right or liberty protected by the Fourteenth Amendment."278 The
American Court hesitated to declare any substantive right, preferring to wait and see
whether case law would present an actual intrusion into privacy rights. In this manner,
American law, reflecting common law orientation, represents a tentativeness not
characteristic of German law.279
It is interesting to speculate why American law has not taken a turn similar to
German law, even though the growth of data and data processing in the United States
has paralleled and, indeed, eclipsed that in Germany. Thus, the threats that the
information age pose to human autonomy in America are at least equal, if not greater,
than in Germany. Textually, both the American and German Constitutions provide a
basis for recognizing such a right. The First Amendment, for example, plausibly
bestows certain rights to knowledge of how information, especially personal
information, is to be gathered or used. The Fourth Amendment confers certain rights
active participants in the creation of the law. This runs counter to the stereotype of civil courts as blindly
applying pre-determined code-law.
2"429 U.S. 589 (1977).
'71d. at 605. For example, the "collection of taxes, the distribution of welfare and social security
benefits, the supervision of public health, the direction of our Armed Forces, and the enforcement of the
cininal laws allrequire the orderly preservation of great quantities of information, much of which is personal
in character and potentially embarrassing or harmful if disclosed." Id.
271d. at 603-04. Under German concepts, "the Court should have applied the right of informational
self-determination by first asking if the State had decided what it planned to do with the data. Although New
York had recorded one hundred thousand prescriptions each month during the twenty months that the law
had been in effect, it had used this information in investigations of exactly two persons.... [P]rotection of
human autonomy... require[s] judicial inquiry into the influence on the individual of having his personal
information used in a specific system or indefinitely stored for future application." Schwartz, supra note 5,
at 684.
22
'Theposition of Justice Brennan most approximates the German one. He observes that an individual
has a privacy "'interest in avoiding disclosure of personal matters,"' and that "[b]road dissemination by state
officials of such information... would clearly implicate constitutionally protected privacy rights." Whalen,
429 U.S. at 606 (Brennan, J., concurring) (quoting the majority opinion). Justice Brennan states, moreover,
that "Ithe central storage and easy accessibility of computerized data vastly increase the potential for abuse
of that information, and I am not prepared to say that future developments will not demonstrate the necessity
ofsom curb on such tedmology." Id. at 607 (Brennan, J., concurring). However, Justice Stewart, responding
to Justice Brennan, seems to have articulated the sense of the Court in dampening any recognition of "a
general interest in freedom from disclosure of private information." Id. at 609 (Stewart, J., concurring).
25 See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113,209 (1973) (Douglas, J., concurring) (stating that "'liberty'
as used in the Fourteenth Amendment [includes] ... autonomous control over the development and
expression'of one's intellect, interests, tastes, and personality"); San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez,
411 U.S. 1, 112 (1973) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (arguing that, because education affects ability of child to
exercise First Amendment rights as receiver of information and ideas, there is intimate relationship between
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of privacy against discovery of personal information, especially that in which one has
a "reasonable expectation" of privacy.28' The Due Process Clause protects against
arbitrary intrusion into matters of personal security and liberty. 2 Human dignity also
has been a theme of the American Bill of Rights, particularly its cognates of self-
determination and autonomy.283 Together, these rights would seem to convey a certain
zone of privacy which, it might be argued, covers informational privacy. In this way,
a right to informational privacy and self-determination plausibly could exist to
safeguard human liberty and self-government in the information age.
personal interest and exercise of rights justifying constitutional protection); Griswold, 381 U.S. at 482 ("The
right of freedom of speech and press includes not only the right to utter or to print, but the right to distribute,
the right to receive, the right to read... and freedom of inquiry, freedom of thought, and freedom to
teach .... 'D.
"lSee Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 360-62 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring) (explaining that
Fourth Amendment protections are based on both subjective and socially reasonable expectations of privacy);
Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'r, 378 U.S. 52,55 (1964) (noting that Fifth Amendment privilege against self-
incrimination reflects "respect for the inviolability of the human personality').
2
'See, e.g., Casey, 505 U.S. at 851 (plurality opinion) ("Our law affords constitutional protection to
personal decisions relating to marriage, procreation, contraception, family relationships, child rearing, and
education ').
mSee e.g., id. at 851 ("These matters, involving the most intimate and personal choices a person may
make in a lifetime, choices central to personal dignity and autonomy, are central to the liberty protected by
the Fourteenth Amendment.'); National Treas. Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 681 (1989)
(Scalia, J., dissenting) ("In my view the Customs Service rules are a kind of immolation of privacy and
human dignity in symbolic opposition to drug use."); McClesky v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 336 (1987)
(Brennan, J., dissenting) ("Decisions influenced by race rest in part on a categorical assessment of the worth
of human beings according to color, insensitive to whatever qualities the individuals in question may
possess.'); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 264-65 (1970) ("From its founding the Nation's basic
commitment has been to foster the dignity and well-being of all persons within its borders."); Rosenblatt v.
Baer, 383 US. 75,92 (1966) (Stewart, J., concurring) (stating that individual's right to protection of his own
good name "reflects... our basic concept of the essential dignity and worth of every human being--a
concept at the root of any decent system of ordered liberty').
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Yet, American law has not developed along these lines." There are a number of
possible explanations for this. The Supreme Court may feel less compelled to address
changing social and economic conditions, or more restrained in declaring rights to be
fundamental in the absence of clear textual or historical support. The Court may be
limited because Whalen, like all substantive due process cases, is anchored in privacy,
not autonomy as the Census Act Case, and privacy confers less power or control than
autonomy. Similarly, our Constitution lacks an underlying philosophic base
corresponding to the influence of Kantian morality on the German Basic Law, which
results in fewer substantive protections. On the other hand, the Supreme Court may
simply believe that Congress or state courts or legislatures have sufficiently protected
these rights, leaving little need for Court activism?5 Whatever the reason, as a matter
of comparative law, the German Court is addressing this aspect of the computer age
in a more rights-protective manner than the Supreme Court.
2. Confidentiality
The concept of informational privacy in German law extends beyond data
processing. A frequent application of the doctrine has occurred in the context of
confidentiality over personal matters. Good examples of this strand of application
appear in cases concerning the confidentiality of medical files,s' general inquiries into
2Under American law, the privacy on which informational self-determination most logically could
bebased would be either a matter of constitutional law under the Due Process Clause or a matter of tort law.
Under the Due Process analysis of enforcing privacy rights, Whalen, discussed supra notes 276-79 and
accompanying text is the main case.
Under tort law, the concept would rest on privacy torts. Most states recognize an invasion of privacy
action for public disclosure of private facts, through common law or by statute. State definitions of public
disclosure torts, covering matters like AIDS, abortion, or mental illness, parallel the Restatement (Second)
ofTcgts § 652D (1977). See Jonathan B. Mintz, The Remains of Privacy's Disclosure Tort: An Exploration
of the Private Domain, 55 MD. L. REV. 425,432-36 (1996).
Some scholars have picked up the charge. See, e.g., Edward I. Bloustein, Privacy as an Aspect of
HunanDignity: AnAnswertoDeanProsser, 39 N.Y.U.L. REv. 962,1000-01 (1964) (arguing that privacy
represents freedom from public scrutiny and includes "prohibiting the disclosure of confidential information
obtained by government agencies"); Charles Fried, Privacy, 77 YAIE L.. 475, 483 (1968) (arguing that
"[privacy... is control over knowledge about oneself). But see Richard A. Posner, The Right of Privacy,
12 GA. L. REV. 393,408 (1978) ("[We have no right, by controlling the information that is known about
us[,] to manipulate the opinions that other people hold ofus.").
Recently, an emerging tort of "breach of confidence" has been the focus of scholarly attention. See,
e.g., Mntz, supra, at 465; Randall P. Bezanson, The Right to Privacy Revisited: Privacy, News, and Social
Change, 1890-1990, 80 CAL. L. REV. 1133, 1135 (1992) (defining breach of confidence as "a concept of
privacy based on the individual's control of information rather than on generalized social controls on
information, and.., an enforceable obligation of confidentiality for those possessing private information
rather than.., a duty visited on publishers").
2'nThe notion of sufficient legislative protection seems to be a basis on which Whalen was decided:
The Court noted precautions taken by the New York State Department of Health to ensure confidentiality,
such as a locked wire fence, alarm system, and storing the computer tapes in locked cabinets. 429 U.S. at
594. However, precautions are only as good as the people who implement them. See John Markoff, Used
Computer Bears Old User's Secrets, N.Y. TIMEs, Apr. 4, 1997 (late edition), at A14 (noting that resold
computer retained confidential pharmacology fies of patients, disclosing sensitive information, such as
treatment for AIDS or depression).
ndSee Medical Records, 32 BVerfGE 373, 379 (1972).
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mental and physical health, 7 and divorce records.ss These cases are grounded in the
theory of German personality law described above: People are spiritual-moral beings
who possess an inviolable core of privacy. Entry into the private sphere is barred
unless the measure is justified by overriding public need and is proportional to the end
sought. In both types of cases, the Court considered the information sought-divorce
records and patient files-to be within a person's private sphere, but not the inviolable
sphere." 9 Both sets of cases, therefore, required justification pursuant to the
Rechtsstaat principle of proportionality, but neither of them attained it.2'
Divorce Records is the more interesting case. Here the Court protected against
unauthorized disclosure of divorce records sought by officials for use in a disciplinary
hearing against the former husband. Divorce records were, the Court concluded, a
record of intimate details of a couple's life together, scrutiny of which ordinarily did
not extend beyond participants in the divorce proceeding.29' In its analysis, the Court
demonstrated the Proportionality Principles bite. "Measures taken in service to a
desired end must be necessary and suitable and not disproportionately intrusive in
curtailing rights in relationship to the objective sought." The problem was that no
adequate proof was offered as to why the documents were needed.2 3 At a minimum,
officials must demonstrate why private matters are relevant to job performance.2
Even if the divorce records proved necessary, a less intrusive measure, such as
redacted versions, would be more suitable to protection of privacy. Moreover, other
avenues of proof should be pursued prior to using the records. 25 Along similar lines,
the Court has protected as confidential unauthorized recordings of private conversa-
tions.296 Conversation, like private matters, reflects human personality, therefore, it is
not accessible unless consented to or justified on proportionality grounds.
The German focus on rights of privacy has general resonance in American law.
Confidentiality rights have historically been the subject of common law privilege (e.g.,
attorney-client privilege)-or statutory law (e.g., patient-client privacy). However, the
Supreme Court, in recent years, has announced certain confidentiality rules as a matter
of federal evidence law in a variety of settings, most notably in attorney-client
relations,297 spousal relations, 8 and psychotherapist-patient relations.2 A difference
between the laws is that American law is grounded mainly in privacy, whereas German
law is part of human personality. This has significant consequences, since American
"'See 20 Europsische Grundrechte Zeitschrift 415, 419 (1993) (BVerfGE).
2"See Divorce Records, 27 BVerfGE at 351-52.
"'See Medical Records, 32 BVerfGE at 379-80; Divorce Records, 27 BVerfGE at 351. For a
discussion of Sphere Theory, see supra notes 218-30 and accompanying text.
2mSee Medical Records, 32 BVerfGE at 379-80; Divorce Records, 27 BVerfGE at 351.
29 See Divorce Records, 27 BVerfGE at 351-52.
mSee id. at 352.
mSee id. at 353. Proof of the necessity of obtaining the documents would have required notice to and
participation by the couple. See id.
2
"See id. at 354.
.See id.
2See Tape Recording Case, 34 BVerfGE 238, 245-51 (1973).
29See Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389 (1981).
2"See Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 53 (1980).
29See Jaffee v. Redmond, 116 S. Ct. 1923, 1928-29 (1996).
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privacy protects against official attempts at discovery, whereas personality more
broadlyprotects the individual per se, so that he or she might flourish?' °
3. Reputational Interest
A more innovative aspect of informational self-determination is that it endows
individuals with the right to control the portrayal of the facts and details of their lives,
even if uncomfortable or embarrassing. This right empowers persons to shield hurtful
truths from public scrutiny in order to safeguard reputation or other personality
interests. The right also encompasses protection of personal honor as an outgrowth of
personality.3"' As such, these rights can be extended to eclipse other basic rights,
including, most notably, Article 5 expression guarantees.
(a) Drunkard Case
A good example of personal control over truthful, but harmful, information is the
Drunkard Case"°' where the Court prohibited the public announcement of persons
legally determined to be incapacitated because of drunkenness, drug addiction, being
a spendthrift, or other such disfavored status. 3 The purpose of such public
announcements was protection of the general public, who otherwise might unwittingly
transact business with such persons. However, control of the gathering and use of such
personal information, including "the act and status of being placed under legal
guardianship," is protected?' 4 "The right of informational self-determination protects
much more... than data processing .... A public announcement.., is a special form
of official transmission of data."'3es
Applying Rechtsstaat principles to the state's chosen method of communication,
the Court invalidated the publication mechanism, notwithstanding its observation that
"public access to [this] information is necessary to accomplish the statutory purpose"
of informing the public of the restoration to full contracting capacity of individuals
previously found legally incapacitated?' "Because of the anonymity of [modem] life
relations, the mobility of the population and the oversaturation of information [in
today's age]," it is doubtful that general announcements will reach the intended
audience. 7 The choice of communicative methods must be more tightly tailored to
achieve desired objectives. Thus, the means chosen failed the Proportionality test. This
3OSee Fletcher, supra note 9, at 179.
3lThere is a long history, going back to the early twentieth century, of civil court protection, through
interpretation of the Civil Code, of such privacy rights. Thus, as noted previously, the Constitutional Court
has "constitutionalized" most of these developments of the civil court. See Krause, supra note 59, at 486-87.
3' 7 8 BVerfGE77 (1978).33See id. at 78.
3Id. at 84.
3Id. (analogizing release of information about one's status to release and use of computerized
personal data (citing Census Act Case, 65 BVerfGE at 41)).
id. at 86.
371d.
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line of analysis is familiar enough to readers knowledgeable of American heightened
scrutiny methodologies.
A second aspect of the Drunkard Case distinguishes German law from
American. "[Plublic notice of being placed under guardianship on account of
alcoholism or being a spendthrift is a severe violation of [informational self-determina-
tion.]"3 ' This "severely impacts the person in her entirety... It places a negative
stamp [on reputation,] and complicates application of the Social State Principle [Soc-
ialstaatprinzip] oriented support measures [Hilfsmassnahmen] designed to assist
recovery from addiction and facilitate social reentry." ' 9 Indeed, such notification
impacts the person "at an especially critical phase in his beginning reentry into
society."3
10
Reputation and its radiation to human personality are important reflections of the
state of the human condition in modern society. Over these matters, Drunkard echoes
the essential teaching of German law: Human personality and its nurturing are core
concerns of the constitutional order. Because of the centrality of personality,
adjustments must be made to the legal order to further its facilitation, as in guardian-
ship law in Drunkard and expression law in Lebach and related cases, as discussed
next in Section C. 1' Moreover, the dignitarian radiation of the Basic Law necessitates
a reaching out and nurturing of the weaker elements of society, such as rehabilitated
criminals or troubled souls. Human dignity, as it were, calls for application of the
golden rule: How would you want to be treated if you were in that state? Moreover,
the quality of society is to be judged by how it treats its weaker members. Individuals
are not just independent contractors; they are "community-bound" and "community-
connected." Thus, the community, as a whole, has obligations to these persons, just
as individuals are to be responsible as rights-holders. Dignity, in other words, acts as
a "higher law" by which individuals and society are judged.
A brief look at American law underscores deep cultural differences over these
points. At the constitutional level, the cases most like Drunkard are Wisconsin v.
Constantineau312 and Paul v. Davis,"3 both decided under procedural due process. It
is noteworthy that public posting of a disfavored status (such as drunkenness in
Drunkard and Wisconsin, or shoplifting in Paul) is treated in American law as raising
only a procedural inquiry as to whether the person affected had adequate notice and
participatory rights in determining whether the measure was justifiable. There is no
3Id. at 87.
'Id. In this way, Drunkard is similar to the solicitude rendered weaker members of society in Lebach,
discussed infra notes 377-83 and accompanying text, where the Court was concerned about the reentry into
society of a rehabilitated felon. The Social State Principle is part of the objective norms of the Basic Law,
obligating the state to protect and promote the welfare of the people. See supra note 11 and accompanying
text. 310Drunkard Case, 78 BVerfGE at 87. Those who desire that the notification be rendered can so
choose, consistent with the idea of control over personal information. See id.
31 See infra notes 377-83 and accompanying text.
312400 U.S. 433, 437 (1971) (invalidating statute that allowed posting of sign, without notice or
hearing, forbidding sale of liquor to person because such sign impaired person's good name without fair
determination).
313424 U.S. 693, 701 (1976) (upholding dismissal of suit challenging police chiefs posting sign
identifying person as "active shoplifter," despite contrary determination in Constantineau).
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inquiry into personality rights, phrased in the American scheme as privacy rights,
despite the obvious tarnishing of reputation that occurs. This would seem to reflect the
lack of focus in American law on the centrality of personality. Certainly there is little
solicitude for weaker social members, who might seek to regain some semblance of
ordinary life. In this respect, American outcasts encounter a harsh world? 4
(b) Mephisto
Protection of honor and reputation in Germany is itself a highly valued
manifestation of human dignityS 5 No case represents this view better than the famous
3'rhe difference in treatment between German and American law is attributable also to the difference
betweenpositive and negative approaches to the Constitution. See supra notes 14-28 and accompanying text.
Because the American Constitution ordinarily lacks an objective dimension, there is no corresponding claim
to governmental action. No case better illustrates this point than the infamous DeShaney v. Wmnebago
County Department of Social Services, 489 U.S. 189 (1989), where the Court refused to require state
intervention despite the state social service department's knowledge that one of its minor clients was the
subject of such severe child abuse at the hand of the father as to ultimately render the child incapacitated. Id.
at 196-97. In DeShaney, the Court stated:
[N]othing in the language of the Due Process Clause itself requires the State to protect the life,
liberty, and property of its citizens against invasion by private actors. The Clause is phrased as
a limitation on the State's power to act, not as a guarantee of certain minimal levels of safety
and security ... Its purpose was to protect the people from the State, not to ensure that the
State protected them from each other.
Id. at 195-96.
Even under the procedural due process analysis, the treatment of reputation is inconsistent, if not
illogical. Despite the similarity of the facts and dates of Constantineau and Paul, see supra notes 312-13,
the cases are incompatible. In Constantineau, 'the Court determined that the posting of a sign of Con-
stantineau's excessive drinking injured his reputation, and was therefore unconstitutional because he was not
rendered notice and hearing rights to determine the appropriateness of this measure:
Where a person's good name, reputation, honor, or integrity is at stake because of what the
government is doing to him, notice and an opportunity to be heard are essential. "Posting"
under the Wisconsin Act may to some be merely the mark of illness, to others it is a stigma,
an official branding of a person. The label is a degrading one.... Only when the whole
proceedings leading to the pinning of an unsavory label on a person are aired can oppressive
results be prevented.
Constantineau, 400 U.S. at 437.
Paul flew in the face of this logic, which seems inexplicable, since Constantineau was decided only
five years earlier. In Paul, the Court found no reputation interest implicated in the placement of Davis's name
on a flyer sent to 800 merchants designating him an active shoplifter, even though the charges were
dismissed. The Court concluded that reputation alone was not a constitutionally protected liberty interest.
Paul 424 U.S. at 701.
The illogic between Constantineau and Paul shows, at a minimum, the confusion of American law.
By comparison, the secure anchoring in German law results in strong protection of personality.
3roteion ofhonor and reputational interests in Germany has a long pedigree. Montesquieu thought
that honor was the basis for monarchy, because "it is the nature of honor to aspire to prefernents and
distinguishing titles... and a Monarchial government supposeth ... preeminences, ranks, and likewise a
nobel descent." CHARlES DE SECONDAT MONTESQUU, THE SPIRIT OFTHE LAWS 121-22 (D. W. Carrithers
ed., 1977). Thus, honor seems particularly well suited to an aristocratic society, like Germany was for much
of its history.
Since the adoption of the German Civil Code, honor and reputation are protected as part of the general
right of personality, which is anchored in section 823 of the Civil Code. See Krause, supra note 59, at 487,
499-500.
The Civil Code reflects Roman law roots, including compensation for mental suffering arising from
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Mephisto case, a seminal case of artistic freedom, where the Court split 3-3 in
upholding an injunction against publication of Klaus Mann's novel of the same name,
on the ground that it defamed the memory of a famous deceased actor who had been
quite active in the theater during the Nazi period." 6
All basic rights, including artistic rights, must be interpreted within the value
order of the Basic Law, according to the Court. Since the Basic Law is founded on the
view "of the human person as an autonomous being developing freely within the social
community," artistic freedom must be measured against Article 1 human dignity, the
supreme value. 17 To the extent artistic or communication freedoms conflict with
human dignity, they may have to yield, depending on the concrete balancing of the
freedoms at issue. For example, in Mephisto, it might be argued that the tangible effect
of Mann's novel was to tarnish the memory of the deceased actor. Disparagement of
the dead could be thought to be inconsistent with human dignity.31 "[An artist's use
of personal data about people in his environment can affect their social rights to
violation of honor. See Warren & Brandeis, supra note 59, at 198. These roots have given rise to an extensive
body of law, protecting reputation, one's name, and a right to reply in the press, as elaborated here. See id;
see also infra notes 327-37 and accompanying text.
In America, the development was different. For a time the civic Republican emphasis on reputation
and virtue animated a strong concept of honor. But eventually the revolutionary idea of equality among all
peoples completely upturned any concept of nobility. See GORDON S. WOOD, THE RADICALISM OF THE
AMERICAN REVOLUTION 39, 207, 233, 285 (1991). Honor still persists in America as a legal concept,
primarily through state defamation laws, but only to the extent not eclipsed by the landmark case, New York
Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964), which redefined the relationship between honor, furthered in
state libel law and the First Amendment. See id. at 283.
In America today, honor might be thought of as "the personal reflection of the status which society
ascribes to [one's] social position." Robert C. Post, The Social Foundations of Defamation Law: Reputation
and the Constitution, 74 CAL. L. REV. 691,700 (1986).
3
.See Mephisto, 30 BVerfGE 173, 174 (1971). The central character of the novel was an actor named
Hendrik Hfgen, whom Klaus Mann, the son of the great German writer Thomas Mann, portrayed as having
made his name by playing the devil in Goethe's Faust during the Nazi period. While other artists were
persecuted, Hfgen "betrayed his own political convictions and cast off all ethical and humanitarian restraints
to further his career by making a pact with... [those in] power in Nazi Germany." Id. at 174. The story was
based on a real-life actor, Gustaf Grondgens, whose career paralleled the fictitious Hdfgen in important
respects. Mephisto is extensively analyzed by Quint, supra note 14, at 290-307, and by Eberle, Public
Discourse, supra note 6, at 834-41.
The suit was brought by Grdlndgens' son to protect the honor and dignity of the dead, illustrating the
extraordinary protection afforded honor in Germany.
3 Mephisto, 30 BVerlGE at 193, translated in CONSTIrIONAL JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 8, at 428.
3
.See id. at 194. "It would be inconsistent with the constitutional guarantee of the inviolability of
human dignity ... if a person's general claim to respect... could be degraded or debased even after his
death." Id. This point became important, because Grtlndgens died shortly after plans to publish the novel
were announced. His son filed the action, proceeding under § 823(1) BGB, a general tort provision, which
provides recovery for actions that "intentionally or negligently, and unlawfully, injures the life,
body.., liberty.., or any other right of another person," seeking redress for harm to the memory of his
father. Id. This interest was within the concept of dignity, according to the Court. The Court observed,
however, that this protection diminishes as memory of the deceased recedes. See id.
For discussion of rights of personality extending after death, see H. HUBMANN, DAS PERSON-
LICHKEITSRECHT 265-68, 340-48 (2d ed. 1967). American law generally refuses recovery for reputational
harm after death. See Quint, supra note 14, at 296 n.162.
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respect and esteem. 31 9 To that extent, communication freedoms may have to yield to
the superior value of dignity, as manifested in this interest in honor and reputation. In
this manner, the Court implied limits on the seemingly boundless guarantee of artistic
freedom, as it previously had implied limits to the seemingly express limitation of
personality rights in Elfes?"2 In both cases, the Court acted on behalf of its vision of
human dignity. In Mephisto, this vision acted to limit expression rights; in Elfes, it
limited restriction of freedom of action. Human dignity thus becomes the glue between
both rights-enhancing and rights-constricting interpretations. Certainly this illustrates
the Constitutional Court's powers of creative interpretation, a skill the Supreme Court
too has sometimes displayed?2
This reasoning points to a fundamental contrast with American law. Anchoring
reputational rights in the malleable concepts of human dignity, and accompanying
personality, allowed the Constitutional Court, in essence, to imply a constitutional
right to be free from defamation. This could be justified from the "objective' theory
of constitutionalism, requiring the state, as it does, to realize the norms of the value
order. 22 By contrast, American law is founded on the concept that "public" persons
are to be treated as "'men of fortitude, able to live in a hardy climate."' 3 3 Accordingly,
public men and women in America are expected to endure the insults and abuses
common to public life. Based on such thinking, the Supreme Court has widely
immunized speakers from defamation claims.31 Under American principles,
Griindgens, the actor protected in Mephisto, would qualify as a public figure subject
to these immunity rule?.3 In this way, one notices that American individuals are left
alone to confront criticism or disparagement, lacking any claim to official protection,
whereas German individuals can call on communal support. 26 Constituting community
on a core of values makes a big difference.
"Mephisto, 30 BVerfGB at 195. The Court reasoned that a work of art could harm human dignity by
misusing facts of a person's life. Whether this is so or not depends on the nature of the portrait drawn,
particularly its truth or falsity. Reputational interests must then be balanced against artistic values to see
which is weightier in the circumstance. This test involves a "weighing of all circumstances of the case,"
equivalent to an ad hoc balancing test. Id. For evaluation of this general balancing test, see Eberle, Public
Discourse, supra note 6, at 835-36, 841-42.
'See supra notes 128-39 and accompanying text.
'lSee, e.g., Griswold, 381 U.S. at483 (deriving right of privacy frompenumbras that emanatefrom
specific ights).
mSee Eberle, Public Discourse, supra note 6, at 838.
323New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254,273 (1964) (quoting Crain v. Hurney, 331 U.S.
367,376 (1947)).
-See Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 283.
'GrIndgens would likely be "an individual... [who] achieve[d] such pervasive fame or notoriety
that he [has] become [I a public figure for all purposes and in all contexts," meeting the essential test for
public figures established in Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 351 (1974).
'See Ebede, Public Discourse, supra note 6, at 838 ("German law has gone part way down the path
of American law through the latitude it accords certain polemic communicated in matters of public
significance pursuant to both the Counter-Attack Theory (Gegenschlag) [which provides that a harsh public
attack merits a reply in kind to counter its impact on the formation of public opinion], and by its assumption
that public figures must endure sharp scrutiny and critique.").
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C. Right to Honor and Rightful Portrayal of Self
Cases like Drunkard are grounded in a more general right to control presentation
of one's self in the world. This is, of course, an outgrowth of the same theory of
informational self-determination discussed in Section B above. However, it is
additionally based on a more fundamental right of self-determination over one's
position and social standing, a right "fundamentally to decide how to present oneself
to third parties or the public, whether and to what extent outsiders can have access to
one's personality."'327 In this way, both informational self-determination and this
"image self-determination" are grounded in control over one's private, intimate core
of personality.
In so interpreting Article 2 personality rights, the Constitutional Court relied
upon lines of doctrine developed by the Federal Supreme Court (Bundesgerichtshof
or BGH), the supreme interpreter of the German Civil Code (Blirgerliches Gesetzbuch
or BGB). The BGH had developed a jurisprudence of personality rights in connection
with interpretation of the BGB. First, the BGH found a general right of personality,
derived from the influence of Articles 1 and 2, that carried over into civil law, so that
everyone could enforce a certain privacy in their private legal relations?"n This
development allowed people to enforce these personality rights against infringe-
ment-by individuals as well as the state-thereby providing comprehensive
protection to personality.29 Over time, the BGH extended such rights to cover specific
emanations of personality, including control over distribution of one's own writings,
such as personal letters or diaries, or secrecy in relation to medical records, or rights
to one's spoken word, developments later confirmed by the Constitutional Court 3
sEppler, 54 BVerf'GE 148, 155 (1980).
5
'Tepath-brealdng case was Schacht-Letter, 13 BGHZ 334 (1952), where an attorney, on behalf of
his dient, Dr. Hjalmar Schacht, a former economics minister under Hitler, had written a letter to a newspaper
demanding that it correct certain statements it had previously published concerning Schacht. The newspaper
published this letter, along with other correspondence, without replying to it or correcting its earlier
publication. The attorney successfully complained that the publication of the letter falsely depicted him to
the public as making a personal stand, when he actually was acting for his client. Breaking with precedent,
the BGH found that a person's letters were protected, even in the absence of copyright, on account of this
new-found "general right of personality," rooted in § 823 BGB. See Krause, supra note 59, at 488. For an
English translation of Schacht.Letter, see BASIL S. MARKESINIS, A COMPARATIVE INTRODUCrION TO THE
GERMAN LAW OF TORT 191-95 (1986).
Therevolutionary change marked by Schacht-Letter was attributable to the change in the German legal
order marked by the value-ordered nature of the Basic Law, particularly Articles 1 and 2. Prior to the Basic
Law, the civil courts had been careful to limit claims for harms based on intangible injury, such as
presentationin a false light. See Soraya, 34 BVerfGE 269, 270-71 (1973). With Schacht-Letter, the influence
of the Basic Law as an objective statement of values on the civil law and, indeed, all law has become
prominent. Under this theory of Third Party Effect (Drittirkung), a certain content of the Basic Law affects
all legal relationships, public or private. For extensive discussion, see Eberle, Public Discourse, supra note
6, at 813-18; Quint, supra note 14, at 262-64, 278-79. A contrast is found in American law, where,
ordinarily, the Constitution does not affect private law. See Eberle, Public Discourse, supra note 6, at
814-15.
'See Schacht-Letter, 13 BGHZ at 338.
mSee, e.g., Medical Records, 32 BVerfGE 373 (1972) (protecting confidentiality of medical records);
Divorce Records, 27 BVerIGE 344 (1970) (granting protection for confidential information concerning
marriage relationships); B6ll, 54 BVerfGE 208 (1980) (establishing right.not to be misquoted). The BGH
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The next step of this development was even more revolutionary. In the famous
Herrenreiter Case of 1958, the BGH interpreted Articles 1 and 2 to command not only
a respect for human dignity and personality, but also to provide affirmative protection
of personality against incursion.3 ' Applying by analogy the German Civil Code
remedy provisions, which cover harms to tangible property and physical health,332 the
Court created a damage remedy to redress harm for intangible interests, such as
personality?33 This enabled one individual to seek redress against another individual
for a violation of personality rights. The Court's creation of this damage remedy was
somewhat startling, since the Civil Code expressly excludes damage liability for most
injuries to intangible interests, except when authorized by statute; here, there was no
enabling statute?3' Moreover, money damages are quite rare in Germany, unlike in
America; standard German relief is specific performance, not damages.
Through these innovations, the BGH provided comprehensive protection for
personality, in recognition of the core value of human dignity?35 Not surprisingly,
these developments engendered significant controversy?3"
In reliance on this work, the Constitutional Court reversed the process, recasting
the private law interests of reputation or privacy into the capacious language of human
dignity and personality, thereby constitutionalizing the doctrine. This certainly made
for a more secure anchoring of the concepts in the legal order, as the Court
recognized.337 No cases demonstrated the power and reach of these new constitutional
developments more than the famous Soraya and Lebach decisions.
widely developed these rights of personality even though codification of them through amendment of the
BGB was rejected. See generally, Krause, supra note 59, at 489, 495, 499-500.
"See Herrenreiter (Gentleman Rider), 26 BGHZ 349 (1958). In Herrenreiter, a picture was taken
of an amateur horseman shown jumping in a competition, and the picture was used to advertise a product
reputed to improve sexual potency. See id. In assessing money damages, the B-GH reasoned that the conduct
must be appropriately sanctioned to reflect the seriousness of the harm to personality. See id. at 356.
Herrenreiter thus gave rise to the doctrine of compensation for "moral" harms. For an English translation
of Herrenreiter, see MARKEsINIS, supra note 328, at 195-201. These developments are also covered in
Soraya, 34 BVerfGE at 270-73; Degenhart, supra note 74, at 362; Quint, supra note 14, at 279-80.332See § 847 BGB.
333See Herrenreiter, 26 BGHZ at 349.
3
34See CURRIB, supra note 7, at 117. Indeed, the defendant had argued that the BGH had disobeyed
a limitation of the BGB. Traditionally, relief for injuries to personality were limited to injunction or, where
aprcxiate, a right to reply based on the thought that awarding money for damages to honor cheapened such
intangible values. "[Alnyone who would sell his honor for money had no honor." Krause, supra note 59, at
511. These beliefs were codified in the BGB, and left unchanged despite attempts to the contrary. See id. at
510-12. Thus, Herrenreiterrepresents a very bold judicial step. Today, money damages for intangible harms
are more widely accepted in Germany. See id. at 515.
'A later case, Fernsehansagerin, 39 BGHZ 124 (1975), even concluded that, if human dignity was
to be the supreme value of the legal system, judges could no longer be bound by the original views of the
BGB drafters, since, in the ensuing 70 years, law and society had changed dramatically. See id. This
illustrates the dynamic, creative interpretation employed by courts under German legal science, which the
Constitutional Court too has picked up.
'See Soraya, 34 BVerfGE at 275-76.
3
"$ee id. at 282.
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1. Soraya: Right to Control Against Attribution of False Statements
In the famous Soraya case, the Court upheld an award of damages for publication
in a tabloid of a fictitious interview with the former wife of the Shah of Iran. The
fictitious interview fabricated intimate details of her private life. The award was
predicated on this newly created constitutional right of personality, derived from the
influence of objective constitutional principles on the private law. 38 Recast as
constitutional values, privacy, personality, and dignity became obligations that the
state must preserve and protect under objective constitutionalism. State organizations,
like the Constitutional Court, thereby became obligated to create the proper conditions
for their realization.
These values now moved to the very center of the legal order:
The personality and dignity of an individual, to be freely enjoyed and developed
within a societal and communal framework stand at the very center of the value
order reflected in the fundamental rights protected by the Constitution. Thus an
individual's interest in his personality and dignity must be respected, and must be
protected by all organs of the state [see Articles 1 and 2 of the Constitution]. Such
protection should be extended, above all, to a person's private sphere, i.e., the
sphere in which he desires to be left alone, to make. . . his own decisions, and to
remain free from any outside interference. Within the area of private law such
protection is provided ...by the legal rules relating to the general right of
personality.
339
This constitutional right of personality entitles a person to be left fundamentally alone,
free from unauthorized interference, whether from public or private actors, if so
desired. Moreover, this right is enforceable as a private cause of action whereby one
private individual could enforce a right to privacy against another private individual.
In Soraya, these privacy interests operated to limit the publication of the interview by
the Axel Springer publishing house, the publisher of the tabloid. "An imaginary
interview adds nothing to the formation of real public opinion. As against press
utterances of this sort, the protection of privacy takes unconditional priority."'
As novel as these results were, even more pathbreaking were the methods used
to obtain them. In constitutionalizing the innovations of the BGH discussed above, the
Constitutional Court seemed to call into question parliamentary supremacy. Naturally,
this would follow from the BGH's approach, since it created a damage remedy for
3See id. at 281.31Id.
asSoraya, 34 BVerfGE at 283-284, translated in CuRRIE, supra note 7, at 198. The reasoning of
Soraya was later picked up in Boll, where the Court determined that false quotations are not protected by
Article 5. See Boll, 54 BVerfGE at 221. For discussion of Boll, see infra notes 387-93 and accompanying
text. "The degree of care that must be expended to avoid dissemination of an imaginary interview is never
too much to expect." Soraya, 34 BVerfGE at 286, translated in CURRR, supra note 7, at 198 n.95. The
German result contrasts dramatically with American law, illustrating the extraordinary protection American
law accords speed See, e.g., Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, Inc., 501 U.S. 496, 517 (1991) (holding that
deliberate alteration of quotations did not rise to the level of actual malice falsity required by New York Tuner
Co. v. Sullivan, and was therefore protected speech).
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intangible interests despite the wording of the Civil Code, which forbade such practice
in the absence of an authorizing statute."4 Responding to this, the Constitutional Court
suggested that judges were not wholly bound by statutory law after all. 4" The Basic
Law, in Article 20(3), had altered the traditional civilian law limitation of the judge
to statutory law, rejecting a "narrow positivism." 3' "Statutes [Gesetze] and laws
[Recht] ... are not necessarily always identical.... Law is not synonymous with the
totality of written statutes." Law (Recht) can, under some circumstances, include
additional norms or concepts, derived from "the constitutional order as a whole," and
"functioning as a corrective to the written law."3 " Thus, rather than being "bound by
the strict letter of the law, the role of the judge is to realize in case law.., the values
immanent in the constitutional order, [even if] not written or clearly expressed in
written law."' 4 Judges should so fill statutory gaps based on "practical reason" and
"well-founded general community concepts ofjustice"'3 7
However, in the case at hand, there was no real statutory gap to fill, since the
Bundestag had expressly rejected a law authorizing damages for intangible harms.'
Now the Court resorted to the tools of German legal science (Rechtswissenschaft) in
authorizing this "creative jurisprudence' (schdpferischer Rechtsfindung).'" Social
conditions must often take priority over statutory text.3 50 Rather than being static,
norms reflect the context of social relations in their socio-political milieu; their content
varies under these circumstances. 5' This is especially so in the present age, which has
witnessed dramatic social and legal change over the course of the twentieth century.
In this context, a judge cannot simply consult written law and meet her obligation to
declare the law. Instead, the judge "has a free hand" to interpret law in view of
"substantive justice" and "changed social conditions"35"
The Court's interpretation comes close to authorizing judges to determine
themselves the applicability of statutory norms. Norms perceived to be outdated or
not relevant can seemingly be replaced with a judge's own view of justice. Not
surprisingly, this position engendered wide discussion in German legal circles. 53
31SeeCERR supmranote7, at 117-18. The critique is noted inSoraya, 34 BVerfGE at 276, 278. See
also supra notes 334-35 and accompanying text.
aSee Soraya, 34 BVefGE at 286.
0Id.
3
"Id. at 286-87.
3Id. at 287; see also CtRRIt, supra note 7, at 117.
30Soraya, 34 BVerfGE at 287.
301d"
3'The history is covered in Krause, supra note 59, at 488-96.
3OSee Soraya, 34 BVerfGE at 287.
'See id. Civil law is a good example of this. The BGB was adopted in 1900, but is made relevant to
current times through the collaborative work of judges and scholars, applying the methods of German legal
science. In Soraya, the Court noted these techniques, stating, "Interpretation of a statutory norm cannot
always be tied to its original meaning." Id. at 288. Judges' "freedom to develop law creatively increases" as
a codification such as the BGB grows older. Id. One must also consider what reasonable function the code
language serves at the time of its application.
351See id. at 288.
md. at 289.
353See CURRt, supra note 7, at 118 nn.90-91. The seeds of the problem lie in Article 20(3), which
binds the executive and judiciary to "law [Gesetz] and justice [Recht]." Art. 20(3) GG. Gesetz ordinarily
means statutory law. Recht means justice or the totality of law. The Court interpreted Recht as written and
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If courts are to be bound by "justice" as well as by enacted law, Article 20(3)
would seem, by this interpretation, to constitutionalize natural law as a source for
rendering decisions. 4 If so, one might argue, judges should reject unjust law?55
Alternatively, one might say outmoded or misguided law should be corrected by
judges striving for just results,3 56 as seemed the goal of the Soraya Court. Certainly
Soraya injects a degree of free judicial creativity into constitutional law not seen so
explicitly in the United States since, perhaps, Calder v. BulP57 and its famous debate
between Justices Chase and Iredell.
Nevertheless, natural law can be a perilous course, as well as an enriching one,
as American battles over the theory attest.35 Recognizing this, the Constitutional Court
has mainly sought to cabin the temptation to authorize judicial usurpation of
parliamentary supremacy. The Soraya Court, in authorizing judges to fill a gap left by
the Civil Code, was "careful to couch its reasoning in terms of statutory interpretation,
not of any right to defy the legislature.""3 9 The Court has applied this technique, in
reliance on Soraya, to other cases as well3 6 But the Court, in still other cases, has
been clear in recognizing the obligation of judges to adhere to statutory law, thereby
reigning judicial discretion.361
Contrasting this creative interpretivism with American law, it is worth observing
that American law does not resonate with the language of "creative jurisprudence," as
in German law. Our constitutional strategy is couched in the language of inter-
pretivism, even if activist results are thereby reached.3 2 Perhaps the German Court is
simply more forthright about the judicial enterprise, although we have our moments
unwritten law, and even as immanent principles. See Soraya, 34 BVerfGE at 286-87. Such immanent
principles might, for example, include the roots of Kantian idealism, a decisive influence on the Basic Law.
The binding of the executive and court to "Recht' is a reaction to the horrors caused by extreme positivism
during the Nazi period. See supra note 134.
"
4There is some basis for this, since Christian natural law was an important influence on the Basic
Law. See supra note 35 and accompanying text. However, the debates over the framing of the Basic Law do
not reflect this. See CURRIE, supra note 7, at 119.355See CURRIE, supra note 7, at 119.
mSee id.
33 U.S. (3 Dall.) 385 (1798). Compare id. at 388 (setting forth Justice Chase's natural law
foundation: "There are certain vital principles in our free republican governments."), with id. at 399 (Iredell,
J. dissenting) ("[Ilt has been the policy of all the American states ... and of the people of the United
States .... to define with precision the objects of the legislative power, and to restrain its exercise within
marked and settled boundaries.... The ideas of natural justice are regulated by no fixed standards....").
"aCompare Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905) (using notion of freedom of contract to
invalidate statuteregulating work hours), with Griswold, 381 U.S. at486 (finding "right of privacy older than
the Bill of Rights').
'CURRIE, supra note 7, at 120; see also Soraya, 34 BVerfGE at 290 Gudges could "thereby fill the
gap in codified sanctions that was evident respecting this violation of personality law').
3'See, e.g., 82 BVerfGE 6, 11-15 (1990) (applying principles of Soraya to validate, by analogy, live-
in partner's right to assume deceased partner's lease, even though law spoke only of spouses).
36See, e.g., 49 BVerfGE 304, 320 (1978), translated in CURP, supra note 7, at 120-21 ("It is not
the business of a judge who is bound by the statute and laws to cut back claims for liability that the statutes
afford .... .'). Whether natural law, or its cognates, is a justifiable measure of constitutionality is heavily
debated in the scholarly literature. See Pieroth Letter, supra note 229.
'Like the German Basic Law, our Constitution contains many vague words that lend themselves to
open interpretation. See, e.g., U.S. CONSr. art. I, § 7, cl. 18 ('necessary and proper"); id. amends. V, XIV
("due process'); id. amend. XIV ("equal protection!).
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of candor too?' Still, as a matter of comparative law, it is worth observing that
German constitutionalism advocates a degree of judicial creativity more pronounced
than the American variety.
2. Lebach. Right to Personal Honor and Control Over Presentation of One's
Self in Society
Later in the year, the Constitutional Court, in the Lebach decision, concluded that
the privacy interests recognized in Soraya outweighed any public speech interest in
publicizing an individual's role in a crime for which he had already paid the penalty.?"
In Lebach, a convicted robber was able to halt a planned television broadcast of a
documentary film depicting, accurately, his and others' participation in a notorious
armed robbery of an army munitions depot which resulted in the death of four
soldiers?' The Court grounded its decision in the felon's personality right in being let
alone, free from publicity, so that he could concentrate on his reentry into society?
This concern took precedence over even highly ranked expression freedoms, just as
personality interests had trumped expression in Soraya?63
At the heart of Lebach was the need to preserve the integrity of human
personality against the sometimes intrusive influence of the outside world. "The rights
to the free development of one's personality and human dignity secure for everyone
an autonomous sphere in which to shape one's private life by developing and
'See Casey, 505 U.S. 849 (plurality opinion) ("The inescapable fact is that adjudication of
substantive due process claims may call upon the Court in interpreting the Constitution to exercise that same
capacity which by tradition courts always have exercised: reasoned judgment.").
'See Lebach, 35 BVerIGE 202 (1973), translated in CONSrffrUrONAL JURiSPRUDBNCM supra note
8, at 414-17; Markesinis, supra note 328, at 205-13.
mSee Lebach, 35 BVerfGE at 204-05.
6See id. at 220, 233-36.
"In the 1970s,
the Constitutional Court tended to prefer [values of] human dignity and personality rights over
comumnication. [It] did so by relying on Article 5(2), which states that communication rights
expressly find their limits in "the provisions of general statutes, in statutory provisions for the
protection of youth, and in the right to respect of personal honor." Under the Reciprocal Effect
thecy [Wechselwirkung], the values of the general law influence interpretation of basic rights,
as basic rights influence interpretation of the general law. The courts of the 1970s essentially
heightened emphasis of Article 1 human dignity values and Article 2 personality interests to
justify their preference of these values over expression rights.
Eberle, Public Discourse, supra note 6, at 833-34 (footnote omitted). Mephisto, Soraya, and Lebach are
emblematic of this approach. See id. at 834-43; Quint, supra note 14, at 290-318.
Today, the Court attaches far more significance to expression rights, even in relationship to concepts
of honor. See Eberle, Public Discourse, supra note 6, at 852-69 (discussing Court's restoration of
communication as preferred value). Free expression is itself now viewed as an intrinsic element of human
dignity. See id. at 817; see, e.g., Lith 7 BVerfGE 198, 208 (1958) (noting that free expression is "the most
immedimanifeation of human personality in society'). Still, dignity places limitations on expression that
would be out of place in America. Compare Cripple, 86 BVerfGE 1 (1992) (holding that one cannot call
disabled person a "cripple"), and Horror Film Case, 87 BVerfGE 209, 217 (1992) (concluding that
presentation of violence, gruesomeness, or cruelty can be violation of human dignity), with R.A.V. v. City
of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 381 (1992) (holding that state may not proscribe "otherwise permitted speech
solely on the basis of the subjects the speech addresses'). See also Eberle, Public Discourse, supra note 6,
at 892-94.
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protecting one's individuality."36 These values are threatened by-public reporting of
the crime, which "publicizes [the criminal's] misdeeds and conveys a negative image
of his person in the eyes of the public."369 The film depicted the felon's homosexuality,
and the Court was concerned that this would resonate negatively with the public,
complicating the felon's reentry into society?7 The need to anchor personality is so
strong, it seemed to the Court, that others could be prevented from examining truthful,
but personal, events. Personality rights "include[ ] the right to remain alone, to be
oneself within this [autonomous] sphere, and to exclude the intrusion of or the
inspection by others."3"'
From here, it is not much of a step to the general right of informational self-
determination. Personality rights
also encompass[ ] the right to one's own likeness and utterances, especially the
right to decide what to do with pictures of oneself. In principle, everyone has the
right to determine for himself whether and to what extent others may make a public
account of either certain incidents from his life or his entire life story.372
Of course, these rights ran directly counter to the broadcasters' expression rights,
guaranteed in Article 53' Expression rights are highly valued in Germany, as in
America, and are themselves reflections of human dignity. Thus, the Court was faced
with resolving the conflict between the two fundamental values.
In such cases, the Court strives to achieve concordance (Konkordanz) between
the values, attempting to interpret both in a manner such that the essence of each can
be preserved and, hopefully, optimized.374 This requires a careful assessment and
application of differing values, which seems to work better in theory than in practice.
It is not always possible to achieve such harmony in the hard realities of a case. It was
not possible in Lebach.
The Court chose personality rights over expression rights. Ordinarily, the public
has a significant interest in learning of a crime. However, there is an important
difference between a crime that is ongoing and one that is past.375 If the crime is
ongoing or yet being prosecuted, the public has a real need to know of the danger it
may be in, the need to solve the crime, and the need to bring perpetrators to justice.
Such crimes constitute an "overriding" public interest, like medical epidemics 76 or
36Lebach, 35 BVerfGE at 220, translated in CONSMUTIONAL JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 8, at
414-15.
307d. at 226, translated in CoNSTIrtTrIONAL JURISPRUDENCE supra note 8, at 416.
'Because of the effect of mass media and the illusion of reality that a documentary film conveys, the
Court wo ied that the film wouldreinforce public hostility toward homosexuality. See id. at 228-31,233-35.
371M. at 220, translated in CONSTrUMONAL JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 8, at 415.
mid.
reedom of reporting is expressly guaranteed in Article 5(1), which provides: "Freedom of the press
and freedom of reporting by means of broadcasts and films shall be guaranteed. There shall be no
censorship." Art. 5(1) GG.
'See supra note 20. Concordance also follows from the objective ordering of values in the Basic Law,
which is calibrated to steer society.
"
7See Lebach, 35 BVerfGE at 220-21,223-31,233-34.
"
6See Medical Records, 32 BVerfGE at 380.
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public unrest, that may justify incursions of rights. However, in Lebach the crime was
past and the felon had paid his price. Thus, the only public interest was in publicizing
an event that had already occurred.
From the felon's point of view, his "right to be let alone" increases as the
public's interest in receiving current, vital information, decreases.3" This follows from
the Proportionality Principle. "The invasion of the personal sphere is limited to the
need to satisfy adequately the [public's] interest in receiving information, while the
harm inflicted upon the accused must be proportional to the seriousness of the offense
or to its importance otherwise for the public."37 Consequently, it is not always
permissible to "disclose the name, release a picture, or use some other means of
identifying the perpetrator." '379 Moreover, crucial to the development of the felon's
personality was his reintegration into society so that he might find himself and reach
his potential?" These factors combined to outweigh the broadcasting rights at issue.
Lebach thus illustrates how the assertion of dignitarian rights can operate to limit
other fundamental rights, even especially highly valued ones like expression freedoms.
This limiting influence that personality rights may have on other rights is mainly
foreign to American law?" Lebach further illustrates the communitarian bent of
German law. The Court's concern for reintegrating the felon into society took
precedence over individual and social interests in expression? 2 It is hard to find a
more dramatic contrast with American law; it is a contrast which illustrates the
strength of dignity and personality in German law and society. Certainly one does not
ordinarily find such solicitude for individual welfare in American law?3 On its face,
Lebach is also a remarkable act of judicial activism: The Court inferred rights from
the textual enumeration of personality rights to eclipse textually secure expression
rights.
7See Lebach, 35 BVerfGE at 233-34 ("1O]nce [a] criminal is convicted... [the] public ordinarily
has no interest in repeated invasion of a criminal's [private] sphere.").
371Id. at 232, translated in CONsTnUrIONAL JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 8, at 416.
3"Id.
uoSee id. at 235-36, translated in CONStITUrIONAL JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 8, at 417 ("The
criminal's vital interest in being reintegrated into society and the interest of the community in restoring him
to his social position must generally have precedence over the public's interest in a further discussion of the
crime... )'). This concern follows from the Social State Principle. See id.
...A notable exception under American law is trial publicity, a protected free speech activity, which
may nevertheless impugn due process. See, e.g., Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 335 (1966) (holding
that criminal defendant did not receive fair trial consistent with due process because trial judge failed to
protect defendant from "massive, pervasive, and prejudicial publicity that attended his prosecution").
'See Lebach, 35 BVerfGE at 235-36:
Not only must the reformed felon be prepared to return to free, human society, but also society
must be ready to accept him. Constitutionally this follows, self-evidently, from a society in
which human dignity stands in the center of its value order and is obligated by the principles
of the Social State. As a rights bearer of human dignity, the felon too must have a chance to
reintegrate into society.
Id.
mSee, e.g., DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 195 (holding that state has no duty to protect life, liberty, or
Ixqpcty againstinvasion by private citizens). But cf. Goldberg, 397 U.S. at 261 ("Suffice it to say that to cut
off a welfare recipient in the face of... 'brutal need' without a prior hearing of some sort is unconscionable,
unless overwhelming considerations justify it." (quoting Kelly v. Wyman, 294 F. Supp. 893, 899-900
(1968))).
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In assessing Lebach against the backdrop of American law, it is quite remarkable
how this case empowers individuals to control dissemination of truthful information
about their personal affairs?" It is astounding from our perspective to think that
accurate reporting of an event, especially one with public significance, could be
considered an invasion of personality. This goes well beyond any American action for
libel or invasion of privacy.s The Constitutional Court thus seems to be picking up
the call by Warren and Brandeis for a general right to privacy, an argument never fully
developed in America. 86 Of course, in America, the positions are reversed: Speech
values predominate over dignitarian values.
'Judge Posner captures the sense of American law well: "[Wie have no right, by controlling the
information that is known about us, to manipulate the opinions that other people hold of us." Posner, supra
note 284, at 408.
3'Under American law, expression interests would probably predominate in a case like Lebach. See,
e.g.,FloridaStarv. BJ.F., 491 U.S. 524, 541 (1989) (refusing to allow state to impose liability on newspaper
fur publishing rape victim's name); Cox Broad. Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 491 (1975) (holding that state
may not sanction accurate publication of victim's name listed in public records). But see Briscoe v. Reader's
Digest Ass'n, 483 P.2d 34,43-44 (Cal. 1971) (remanding for determination whether publication of plaintiff's
name in connection with criminal activity 11 years after plaintiff's involvement violated right of privacy);
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 652D cmt. k (tentative draft no. 22, 1976) (suggesting that lapse of time
since event making individual public figure is factor in determining whether publicity unreasonably reveals
facts about person who has resumed private and lawful life).
"' eking up the call by Professor Cooley for a right "to be let alone," THOMAS M. COOLEY, TREATISE
ON THE LAW OF TORTS 29 (2d ed. 1888), Warren and Brandeis argued for a fully developed right to
inviolability of personality in their seminal article. See Warren & Brandeis, supra note 59, at 193,205, 207.
Other prominent scholars have, from time to time, furthered this call. See Roscoe Pound, The Interests of
Personality, 28 HARV. L. REV. 445,445-46 (1915) (discussing individual interest in honor and reputation).
Despite these strong calls, American privacy law never fully developed as German law has. In
significant part, this may be due to conceptual confusion as to what privacy is. As Professor Keeton observes,
"To date the law of privacy comprises four distinct kinds of invasion of four different interests of the plaintiff
[appropriation of, for example, one's name or likeness; unreasonable intrusion; public disclosure of private
facts; and false light in the public eye], which are tied together by the common name, but otherwise have
almost nothing in common except that each represents an interference with the right of the plaintiff 'to be
left alone."' W. PAGE KEErON Er AL., PROSSER AND KE TON ON THE LAW OF TORTS 851 (5th ed. 1984).
Conceptually, such privacy is grounded in a mix of concepts: property (appropriation), confidentiality
(unreasonable intrusion and public disclosure of private facts), and harm to feelings (false light). In
comparison to German law, American privacy lacks an architectonic concept, such as human dignity or
personality, which may have facilitated its natural growth.
Today, moreover, First Amendment considerations have eclipsed the tort rights of public disclosure
and false light. The tort of appropriation is grounded in the market economy, protecting against unauthorized
use for money or profit. Thus, it exists as property, not a personality emanation. That leaves only
unreasonable intrusion as a sound protection of the person.
Little remains, therefore, of Warren and Brandeis' original aim. See Harry Kalven, Privacy in Tort
Law-Were Warren and Brandeis Wrong?, 31 LAW & CONTEMP. PROnS. 326, 333-39 (1966) (criticizing tort
ofprivacy as vague on basis of liability, theory of damages, and basis for prima facie case); Mintz, supra note
284, at 427 (asserting that right to be let alone "is so vague and so broad that it probably does more
jurisprudential and philosophical harm than good"); Diane L. Zimmerman, Requiemfor a Heavyweight. A
Farewell to Warren and Brandeis's Privacy Tort, 68 CORNELL L. REv. 291, 362-65 (1983) (arguing that tort
of privacy should not be preserved because it encourages litigation and does not identify exchanges of
information that deserve protection).
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3. B6ll: Right to Personal Honor and One's Own Words-Right Not to be
Misquoted
In B6114" a television commentator criticized the Nobel-prize winning author
Heinrich B5ll for allegedly making statements that aided terrorism, which was, and to
an extent still is, an acute problem for Germany?" In making his charge, the
commentator misquoted Heinrich B511. B611 asserted that the misquote invaded his
sphere of personality. A state supreme court agreed with B611, but the Federal
Supreme Court dismissed the action." 9
Breaking new ground, the Constitutional Court determined that the dismissal of
the suit violated Bll's personality rights because an individual has a constitutional
interest in not being misquoted. A misquote
impair[s a person's] constitutionally guaranteed general right to an intimate sphere.
Among other things this right includes personal honor and the right to one's own
words; it also protects the bearer of these rights against having statements
attributed to him which he did not make and which impair his self-defined claim
to social recognition.3
The Court went on to say:. "The use of a direct quotation as proof of a critical
evaluation is . . . a particularly sharp weapon in the battle of opinions and very
effective in undermining the personality right of the person being criticized."39' In
essence, a speaker becomes a "witness against himself' in the contest for public
opinions?' 2 These wounds were particularly grievous because the personal attack was
made on television, assuring broad dissemination 93
The contrast with American law governing the use of false quotations is
dramatic. In the recent Supreme Court case, Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, Inc.,
the Court determined that the use of deliberately altered quotations in a published
interview was protected speech because such conduct did not rise to the standard of
proscribable actual malice falsity" established in the landmark case New York Times
Co. v. Sullivan?'5 In the absence of such malice, free speech and the social interest in
3 5 4 BVerfGE 208 (1980).
"The connentator stated: "Heinrich Boll characterized the lieral state [Rechtsstaat]-against which
the [terrorists'] violence was directed-as a 'pile of dung', and said that he saw only 'the remnants of
decaying power, which are defended with ratlike rage.' He accused the state of pursuing the terrorists 'in a
pitiless hunt.' Id. at 209, translated in Quint, supra note 14, at 332 n.265. There have also been recent
terrorist attacks in Germany. For example, Alfred Herrhausen, head of Germany's largest bank, Deutsche
Bank, was assassinated in 1989. Detlev Rohwedder, leader of the Treuhandanstalt, the agency set up to
privatize assets of former East Germany following reunification in 1990, suffered the same fate. See Timothy
Aeppel, Murder Heightens Eastern German Crisis, WALL ST. 3., Apr. 3,1991, at A17.3
nSee B61l, 54 BVerfGE at 211-13.
39ld. at 217, translated in CONsT1ruFoNAL JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 8, at 419.
"'Id.
31d. at 218.
v3See id. at 216.
3'See 501 U.S. at 517.
53 7 6 U.S. 254 (1964).
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"uninhibited, robust and wide-open" '396 public discourse were found more important
than privacy.
The contrast between B6ll and Masson thus further illuminates the differing
value structures of the two countries. In Germany, at least in the 1970s and early
1980s, personal honor, rooted in Article 1 human dignity and accompanying Article
2 personality rights, outweighed expression rights in certain circumstances? 9 In
America, by contrast, such personality interests never outweigh public discourse
unless one can prove the speech fits the narrow category of actual malice falsity, or
other such enumerated exceptions to protected speech. In this way, human dignity, and
its particular radiation of personal honor, seems the ultimate value of the German legal
order, whereas free speech seems to enjoy this status in America.
Another aspect of B6ll illustrates a further contrast with American law. The
violation of Bll's personality rights arose from a court's nonaction in foreclosing
B6ll's right to redress, as compared to the more conventional official action which
invades the right. In German law, this could be justified from the positive dimension
of rights, which obligates the state to create the conditions in which rights can
thrive-here B611's right to the integrity of his personality. Lacking this positive
conception of rights, American law is unlikely to yield an outcome as in B6ll, where
the Constitutional Court found that there was no Article 5 protection for false
statements, such as the misquote. Thus, B11's personality rights, protected in
Germany,39 would not have found protection in America.
VI. IDENTITY, SELF-DETERMINATION, AND AUTONOMY
A final strand of German personality law relates to attributes of identity and
personal self-definition. This strand is also grounded in the innermost reach of
personhood, as are those other strands emanating from the personal sphere discussed
in Part IV. These areas also help define who one is in relationship to the world. They
thus entail an element of self-determination and autonomy, as in American law. In
fact, this strand of German law has the greatest overlap with American law.
Accordingly, German law will be discussed closely against the backdrop of American
law, illuminating points of convergence and divergence.
As in American law, there are many themes in German autonomy law. These
include the right to know one's parenthood and heritage;399 the right to determine one's
m1d. at 270.
'See Eberle, Public Discourse, supra note 6, at 807-08, 833-41.
3"See BIL 54 BVerfGE at 217-218; Quint, supra note 14, at 333-34.
Eppler, an important case for the theory and reach of the personal sphere, see supra note 104, provides
an interesting contrast with BOl, which was decided on the same day. "Eppler, a well-known politician,
sought an injunction prohibiting opponents from repeating their charge that Eppler... desire[d] to 'test the
endurance of the economy' through his social policies." Quint, supra note 14, at 334 n.273. "IThe
statement... implied that Eppler was willing to take undue risks with the economy." Id. Accordingly, Eppler
viewed the statements as an attack on his constitutional right of personality. As in Boll, a lower court
dismissed the suit. Unlike B6ll, however, the Constitutional Court found that the remarks did not violate his
"private, secret, or intimate sphere," Eppler, 54 BVerfGE at 154, and, therefore, were not an infringement
of Eppler's constitutional right of personality. See id. at 154.
"'See Right to Heritage 11, 90 BVerfGE 263 (1994); Right to Heritage 1, 79 BVerfGE 256 (1989).
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sexual identity,4 including having official records changed to reflect one's chosen
gender; and certain rights to choose one's name.40' Some of these same themes
resonate in American law. For example, rights to know one's heritage4' and sexual
autonomy"3 have been major themes in American law. However, the American cases
proceed from an assumption of privacy, rather than from dignity or personality, and
reach conclusions different from the German cases. Other American privacy themes,
such as decisions relating to marriage, procreation, and contraception, 4 are absent
from German law. From the German standpoint, however, this may simply reflect the
Constitutional Court's lack of opportunity to enumerate these rights. Certainly the
Basic Law and case law seem to offer sufficient textual and precedential authority to
support this endeavor.40 5 These points are best brought out through a comparative look
at the two laws, through the lens of German law.
A Right to Know One's Heritage
The right of a person to know her heritage, including the identity of her
biological parents, has been an important theme of German law. Two major cases of
the Constitutional Court have addressed this topic, the recent Right to Heritage I1,40'
and its predecessor, Right to Heritage V.4O7 Both cases are important. Right to Heritage
I adds to the range of substantive personality rights by holding that knowledge of one's
heritage is integral to healthy personality development and self-identity. Right to
Heritage IIis noteworthy in a number of ways. First, it is among the most recent of the
Court's pronouncements on substantive personality rights, confirming the Court's
conclusions in Right to Heritage L Second, the Court employed a new methodology
in the case to protect substantive personality rights: a tightened means/end analysis
under the Proportionality Principle. Right to Heritage H1, therefore, cements the
heightened scrutiny methodology employed by the Court to protect freedom of
expression rights in the 1990s." Third, the case lays out the proper role of the Court
within a constitutional democracy. Although the Court should strive to respect the
legitimate decisions of the majoritarian process, it must intervene to protect important
values of the constitutional order.
"See Transsexual Case, 49 BVerfGE 286 (1978).
"'
1See Name Change Case, 78 BVerfGE 38 (1988).
Cf. Midhel -L v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 113 (1989) (plurality opinion) (holding that dueprocess
does not require recognition of right of natural father to challenge legitimacy where state statute created
presumption that mother's husband was child's father).
'Compare Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 190-96 (1986) (refusing to recognize fundamental
right of homosexuals to engage in consensual sodomy), with Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438,443 (1972)
(extending fundamental right to use contraceptives to single persons).
'See authorities discussed supra notes 173-78 and accompanying text.
'See supra notes 53-74 and accompanying text.
'See Right to Heritage 11, 90 BVerfGE 263 (1994).
*nSee Right to Heritage 1, 79 BVerfGE 256 (1989).
4
"See Eberle, Public Discourse, supra note 6, at 852-59. This heightened scrutiny review is now
generally applied in rights analysis.
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At issue in both cases were provisions of the family law, book four of the
German Civil Code.4 9 The concern in Right to Heritage I was that these provisions
did not allow a child who had recently acquired majority status to pursue judicially
a declaration of her legitimacy or illegitimacy so that she could determine her heritage,
except when her parents had been divorced or separated for three years 4. ° Because
these circumstances might not be present, the ability of young people to ascertain their
identity might be foreclosed. This constricted their personality rights too severely.
Right to Heritage II dealt with another part of the family law-a two-year statute
of limitation period in which to seek a judicial declaration of (il)legitimacy.41 If
judicial process was not sought within this period (perhaps because the young person
was not aware of her background or because her legal guardian pursued no process),
the young person might lose any opportunity to learn of her origin.
1. Right to Heritage I
In this context, the Court announced a substantive right to learn one's heritage.
"It is a violation of general personality rights ... to limit a majority age child's ability
to determine her heritage to the statutorily enumerated circumstance."4 2 Relying on
the sphere of interiority established in Microcensus, the Court observed: "The right
to free development of personality and human dignity guarantees all individuals an
autonomous area of private life formation in which they can develop and protect their
individuality."4 3 Yet, "knowledge and development of individuality are closely bound
with certain constitutive facts. Among these is included one's heritage."4 4 Knowledge
of heritage is decisive because it reveals genetic origin and is central to individual
identity. It is a "key factor for individual self-discovery and self-understanding."4 5 "As
an individual character trait, ethnicity and knowledge of heritage offer indi-
viduals ... important connections to understanding and development of their own
4See §§ 1593-96, 1598 BGB.41
°See Right to Heritage 1, 79 BVerfGE at 257. Under German law, such (il)legitimacy can only be
determnined mrsuant to judicial proceedings, as in American law. See § 1593 BGB. Cf. LI. Gen. Laws § 33-
1-8 (1995).4QSee Right to Heritage I, 90 BVerfGE at 265; § 1598 BGB.402Rightto Heritage 1, 79 BVerfGE at 268. Note that questions concerning the determination of one's
heritage implicates other constitutional guarantees. Equal protection provides that "[no one may be
disadvantaged or favored because of his... parentage, his race ... his homeland and origin." Art. 3(3) GG,
translated in CuumiB, supra note 7, at 344. Article 6 provides for certain marital, family, and parental rights,
including parental control of child rearing, see Art. 6(2) GG, translated in CURRiE, supra note 7, at 345, and
also that "[illegitimate children shall be provided by legislation with the same opportunities for their physical
and mental development and for their place in society as are enjoyed by legitimate children." Art. 6(5) GG,
translated in CURRIE, supra note 7, at 345.
The Basic Law thus provides explicitly what the Supreme Court has inferred from the Constitution.
See, e.g., Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 499 (1977) (plurality opinion) (holding that
fundamental freedoms inhere in marriage and family relationships); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S.
510, 534 (1925) (finding liberty of parents to direct upbringing and education of children).
40Right to Heritage 1, 79 BVerfGE at 268.
4 41 d.
a5d. at 269. The Court noted that biological origin is not the only determinant of personality. More
"significant are multiple [life] events and experiences." Id.
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individuality. Therefore, personality rights include knowledge of one's heritage."4 6
Yet, because there still might be cases where it would be impossible to determine
biological origin, the Court held that "Article 2 in conjunction with Article 1, confers
no right to obtain knowledge of one's heritage, rather they protect against the
withholding of attainable information."417 The substantive right recognized by the
Court, therefore, was an informational right-a right to obtain all relevant accessible
information.
Measured against these requirements, the Court held the family law provisions
untenable. The law had been constructed to facilitate family peace, a concern
grounded in the Article 6 guarantee of marriage and family, which claims the state's
"special protection " ' Certainly a harmonious familyis important, and in cases where
a marriage would be destroyed or seriously harmed, children's process rights might
justifiably be limited.41 9 However, the Bundesrat had drawn the measure with too
much emphasis on the interest in family peace, overshadowing the interests of the
children.420 It was easy to envision cases in which determination of paternity would not
disrupt family peace, particularly when children have reached majority status. For
example, both children and their mothers or stepfathers might want to establish
paternity. Or the children may already have established relations with their biological
fathers, and now want to have this legally determined. For these reasons, the Court
ruled that the legislature must craft a solution which would have a less restrictive
(durch mildere, aber gleich wirksame Mittel) impact on young adults' personality
right. 21
2. Right to Heritage HI
In the second case, Right to Heritage II, the Court invalidated the two-year
statute of limitations period in which adults newly of age could seek judicial
declaration of their biological origin. Since discovery of one's heritage could occur,
in most cases, only if a child or her legal guardian (usually the mother) pursued legal
process within the relevant time frame, the law might operate to foreclose any
possibility for young people to discover their heritage. Out of concern for family
tranquility, legal guardians might not act, or might not inform their children that they
are illegitimate. Certainly the statute created a conflict between the child's best
interests and the family's.422 If children did not know of their status, they could not
know they had the option to pursue legal process. In this way, they might lose all
opportunity to learn of their heritage. 2 "The impossibility of clarifying one's own
'Id. The Court saw significance in knowledge of heritage for individual self-discovery beyond what
is documented empirically. See id.
41'Id.
4"Id. at 270; see also supra note 412 and accompanying text.
QgSee Right to Heritage 1, 79 BVerfGE at 270.
'See id.
Q'See id. at 271-74.
-See id. at 273.
4See id. at 272-73.
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heritage can be a considerable burden and can undercut one's [inner] security."'424 In
view of this, the Court held that the law must be changed, consistent with personality
rights, so that a child might learn her identity.
While these conclusions are important, the significance of Right to Heritage I
lies in the methodology the Court used to reach them. The case evidences a noticeable
tightening of the scrutiny employed by the Court to test incursion of personality rights.
The Court stated that a law curtailing personality rights is "permissible only when it
serves to protect a weighty end, is necessary, and when the end is so significant that
it justifies intrusion on personality rights."'4 Such heightened scrutiny represents a
distinct tightening of the relationship between means and end, and strikes general
resonance with American heightened scrutiny review. In German law, this tightened
methodology can be traced to developments in rights analysis generally, particularly
free expression rights.426 It represents a more rights-protective approach, as compared
to earlier more deferential methodologies, such as that employed in Elfes,4" or the
Deutschland-Magazin variable standard of review of the 1970s, employed in cases
like Lebach or Bll.42
Applying the methodology demonstrates the bite of tightened proportionality.
The statute of limitations provisions at issue in Right to Heritage II "serve legal
security ... [which] is an important goal. Certainly it is a considerable burden when
those interested must consider who legally is the father of a child. It also serves the
public interest" to bring clarity to this.429 However, the Court found it "questionable
whether it is necessary to tie a young adult's possibility of clarifying his origin to this
concern for legal security."43 Less restrictive alternatives could be employed. For
example, the Bundestag could arrange for a young adult "to clarify his her-
itage ... without effect on his relatives.""43 Perhaps young people could learn this in
secret or in camera, thereby saving their relatives from disruption. Alternatively,
children's knowledge of their status could become the tolling event for the statute.432
Certainly the legislature had to structure a closer fit between the means and the end.
As written, however, the law "considerably limits the right to know one's own
heritage."433 Consistent with the Proportionality Principle, therefore, "the interest in
legal security does not carry so much weight that it can justify this severe incursion of
personality rights."' Thus, at bottom, there was no justification for so curtailing
personality interests.
"Nd. at 271.
'Id.
'See supra notes 147,408 and accompanying text.
'See supra notes 142-47 and accompanying text.
4-'See supra notes 364-83, 387-98 and accompanying text. Under Deutschland-Magazin, 42
BVe3fGE 143 (1976), the Court applied a variable intermediate standard of review. The degree of protection
varied with the severity of the rights incursion. See id. This led to inconsistency in application. See Eberle,
Public Discourse, supra note 6, at 843-52.
"'Right to Heritage Ai, 90 BVerfGE at 271.
43Id. at 272.
"'Id.
4-'See id. at 276.
43 d. at 272.
4"Id. at 273.
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It is interesting to observe that announcement of this heightened methodology
parallels the development of American law. In American law we can trace heightened
scrutiny in rights analysis to the early free speech cases43 and, formally, to the 1942
Korematsu v. United States436 case, if not the famous Carolene Products437 footnote
of 1938. Since the 1950s, strict scrutiny has become a standard part of the American
legal landscape.433
However, in Germany the path has been more circuitous. In Germany, as in
America, the origins of heightened scrutiny lie in free expression law. The watershed
1958 L1th439 case, for example, evidences the Constitutional Court's independent
analysis. However, after Lath, expression cases went through several metamorpho-
ses-from a low-level deferential approach of the 1970s, to a variable standard of
review in Deutschland-Magazin"0 in the 1980s, to, finally, the intensive approach of
today.4 1 The Court has given personality preference as a seminal value of the legal
order since Microcensus"2 in 1969, and especially in the 1970s, starting with
Mephisto, and then Soraya, where the Court valued personality rights even over
expression rights." 3 Still more intensive scrutiny of personality rights is evident in the
1983 Census Act Case4' and the 1989 Right to Heritage I" case, for example.
Finally, Right to Heritage 1144 sets forth a formal statement of "strict" scrutiny, similar
to that expressed in America in the 1942 Korematsu case. Thus, both Courts have
devised similar rationales and methodologies for rights analysis. This is certainly an
American export to German soil, even if as by an invisible hand.
These concerns led the Court, in Right to Heritage II, to confront more generally
its role with respect to the legislature. Certainly the Court must strive to respect the
legislature.m " Where possible, laws should be interpreted in a "constitutionally-
conforming" manner.4 " But there are limits to such deference, where, for example,
"the text and intent of the legislature are in contradiction," as they were in Right to
43uSee, e.g., Lovell v. Griffin, 303 U.S. 444,452 (1938) (invalidating ordinance limiting distribution
of leaflets); Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 707-08 (1931) (invalidating as prior restraint statute regulating
speech as public nuisance).
436323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944) (upholding internment of American citizens of Japanese descent during
World War II).
'United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938) (listing categories for which
heightened sautiny might be appropriate).
4aSee, e.g., Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971) (free expression); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381
U.S. 479 (1965) (right of privacy); Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (equal protection).
'7 BVerfGE 198 (1958); see Eberle, Public Discourse, supra note 6, at 808-27 (comprehensively
examining Lath).
4042 BVerfGE 143 (1976).
44 See Eberle, Public Discourse, supra note 6, at 807-08.
427 BVerfGE 1 (1969); see supra notes 188-208 and accompanying text.
"3See supra notes 315-26, 338-40 and accompanying text.
'465 BVerfGE 1, 44-51, 64-66 (1983); see supra notes 260-71 and accompanying text.
4479 BVerfGE 174 at 270-73; see supra notes 412-21 and accompanying text.
490 BVerfGE at 271.
4See id. at 275.
441ld. This is an example of striving to conform legislation to the higher law of the Basic Law. This
involves aprocess of actualization (aktualisiert) of the values of the BasicLaw. See Brugger, supra note 20,
at 398; see also supra note 20.
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Heritage II."49 In such circumstances, "[r]espect for the democratically legitimate
legislature forbids" the Court from rewriting the statute.45 . However, "norms
inconsistent with the Basic Law are invalid." '' The Court thus has no choice: the law
must be invalidated, and the Bundestag must remedy the defect, in this case, "by the
next legislative session." '452 Such posture mirrors the role of the Supreme Court in our
constitutional scheme. Both Courts, it seems, have staked out positions as last
preserves of individual liberties, even if the majoritarian process must be supplanted.
The closest American Supreme Court case to the two Right to Heritage cases is
Michael H. v. Gerald D., 53 which also dealt with the right to determine legitimacy.
The issue in the American case was the biological father's rights, rather than the rights
of the child, who sought to maintain a relationship with her biological father.4s In
comparison to the solicitude given children by the German Court, Victoria D. got short
shrift: The law gave her no chance to establish her origin, and the Supreme Court was
wholly unconcerned with this state of affairs.
Rather than establishing a child's right to know her heritage or a natural parent's
right to maintain a relationship with his child, the Court valued more highly "the
integrity of the marriage union," and the concern that the state might have to
"recognize multiple fatherhood [which] has no support in the history or traditions of
this country."456 Viewed from the perspective of the Germans, Michael H., in reaching
an opposite outcome, seems to have sacrificed children's welfare for the sake of
judicial restraint.4 7 In this way, history and tradition operate to straitjacket personality,
whereas in Germany personality is free to develop in view of modern conditions.
B. Sex, Sexuality, and Identity
Sex and sexuality are major topics in both German and American law. In German
law, sex is viewed as integral to personal self-definition and identity, like other
"
9Right to Heritage 1, 90 BVerfGE at 275. Means/end testing pursuant to the Proportionality
Principle will usually uncover this.
41Id.
4'Id. at 276.
"Id. at 276-77.
413491 U.S. 110 (1989) (plurality opinion).
'See id. at 113-15.
4See id. at 130-31. Michael H. was trying to rebut the presumption of legitimacy that attaches to a
child of a married couple and vests parental rights in the married man. See id. at 113. Michael H. was the
biological father, Victoria D. the product of an adulterous affair. See id. at 113-14. Michael H. wished to
establish his paternity of Victoria D. See id. at 115. Victoria D. also wished to maintain a relationship with
her biological father. See id.
-m1d. at 131.
See id. at 121-23 (explaining that judicial restraint is needed in interpreting reach of substantive due
process).
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personality rights.458 In America, sex is conceived as part of privacy, not personality., s9
Thus, acts like procreation, contraception, and abortion are conceptualized as part of
autonomy rights.
1. Transsexual Case
Perhaps no German case voices these themes better than the Transsexual Case, °
which, as its name implies, concerned an individual who was born male but desired
to live as a female. The plaintiff underwent a sex change operation, which transformed
him into a female as far as biologically possible. However, after the sex change,
German records still listed her as male. Consequently, she sought official recognition
of her acquired sex.
The question of sexual identity "belongs to the most intimate areas of personal-
ity, where all official power is removed," the Court observed. Only the most
compelling public interest would justify intrusion therein. "Human dignity... and free
development of personality require ... that one be allowed to determine what sex one
belongs to, according to one's psychological and physical constitution."' Physical
traits, legal regulation of gender, or sexuality itself is not decisive.46 Rather, the Court
ruled that "the "striving toward unity of psyche and body" is decisive. These
concerns outweigh any moral or legal limitation of such self-realization,' and for
these reasons, the Court held that a person is entitled to have his or her chosen sex
registered in official records.
2. Transsexual Equal Protection
Based on the Transsexual Case, in Transsexual Equal Protection,' the Court
invalidated a requirement that an individual must be twenty-five years old before sex
-See Sex Education, 47 BVerfGE 46,73 (1977) ("The Basic Law has placed the intimate and sexual
domain of human activity under the constitutional protection of Article 2(1) in conjunction with Article 1 (1).
These provisions of the Basic Law guarantee to individuals the right to determine their own view of
sexuality.);Homosexualily, 6 BVerfGE 389, 432 (1957) ("This right [of personality] comprises also the free
sexual activity of persons.").
459See Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 685, 688-89 (1977) (describing reach of
protection of sexuality under right of privacy). But see Bowers, 478 U.S. at 191 (refusing to recognize right
to engage in homosexual sodomy).
'49 BVezfGE 286 (1978). The plaintiff had married, but the marriage ended in divorce after 11 years.
A child came from the marriage, although the plaintiff later learned the child was not his. The plaintiff started
to feel increasingly like a woman. These feelings were accelerated when one of his testicles was removed due
to an accident; later the other testicle was amputated too. See id. at 290.
4 Id. at 298.
Id.
44'The Court canvassed the latest scientific research on sex and identity before settling on the human
spirit as the decisive factor.
4'Transsexual Case, 49 BVerfGE at 299. Viewed in this way, the sex change operation would be the
"realization of this goal." Id.
4'Even a future marriage to a male would not violate the morality limitation of Article 2(1). See id.
at300.
4660 BVerfGE 123 (1982).
1032 UTAH LAW REVIEW [1997: 963
changes could officially be registered. The Court held that this violated equal
protection, since the requirement unjustifiably treated adults under twenty-five
differently than older adults. The decisive event was the operation, according to the
Court, not the age.4
3. American Law
These cases on transsexuality contrast, again dramatically, with American law.
The closest American case is Bowers v. Hardwick' which, of course, dealt with
consensual homosexual activity in the privacy of the home. Bowers is notable, in the
time before Planned Parenthood v. Casey, as the second death of substantive due
process.46 9 Relying again on tradition, as in Michael H., the Court asserted that
"[p]roscriptions against ... [sodomy] have ancient roots;""47 therefore, homosexual
acts could receive no constitutional protection as privacy rights. Chief Justice Burger
put the moral point starkly. "Condemnation of ... [homosexual conduct] is firmly
rooted in Judeao-Christian moral and ethical standards. 4
The role of morality and tradition as a constraint on personality rights thus
reveals itself to be a defining trait in both legal orders. American morality seems to be
grounded more in convention and mores; German morality reflects deep roots in
Kantian idealism: dignity, self-determination, equal worth, and respect. The fate of the
1957 Homosexuality case fortifies this conclusion. Here the Constitutional Court
applied moral convention to find. homosexuality outside morality and, therefore,
beyond personality protection. Homosexuality thus seems in accord with Bowers.
However, whereas Bowers has only recently been questioned,4 7 Homosexuality4  has
been held in disrepute for some time.474 This would seem to underscore the difference
in culture. One might say America is backward looking in its tethering of liberty to
tradition and convention, whereas Germany seems forward looking, embracing
modem social attitudes insofar as they fit concepts of moral autonomy.
467See id. at 133. Under the Article 3 equal protection guarantee, the Constitutional Court has
endeavored to achieve more substantive equality than has the Supreme Court under the Fourteenth
Amendment. See CuRRiE, supra note 7, at 322-28.
a478 U.S. 186 (1986).
469Compare Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 848 (1992) (plurality opinion) ('n]either
the Bill of Rights nor the specific practices of States at the time of the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment
marks the outer limits of the substantive sphere of liberty which the Fourteenth Amendment protects"), with
Bowers, 478 U.S. at 194 ("The Court is most vulnerable and comes nearest to illegitimacy when it deals with
judge-made constitutional law having little or no cognizable roots in the language or design of the
Constitution.').
"7'Bowers, 478 U.S. at 192.
"'Id. at 196 (Burger, CJ., concurring).
4nSee generally Romer v. Evans, 116 S. Ct. 1620 (1996) (holding that state constitutional amendment
forbidding protection of homosexuals from discrimination violates Fourteenth Amendment).
4736 BVerfGE 389 (1957).
74Professors Pieroth and Schiink observe that Homosexuality's proscription has been invalid since
1969. See PIEROTH & SCHLINK, supra note 19, at 103. The Transsexual Case's reconsideration of the
morality limitation concerning sexual attitudes is further proof of this. See Transsexual Case, 49 BVerfGE
at 299-300.
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C. Identity: Right to One's Own Name
In a fashion similar to the transsexuality cases, the Constitutional Court has also
determined that a person has a right to choose his or her name as a reflection of
personality. This conclusion arose in the Name Change Case,47 in which a German
national wished to keep his birth name rather than be registered under his Austrian
wife's maiden name.476 The Court recognized that "[a] name protects against
anonymity and dissolution of personality in mass, modem industrial society."4r It is
thus part of one's personality rights. However, the Court conversely pointed out that,
while personality rights must be respected, such rights are not unlimited, but must be
measured within community constraints. Thus, strangely, the Constitutional Court
upheld the German customary requirement reflected in the Civil Code that married
couples must maintain a common family name, which usually was the husband's.478
Yet, while that family name must be used for "official" purposes, the Court ruled that
a person was free to use the name of her choice in personal settings.479 One can thus
have two names, one for official and one for personal use-certainly an uneasy
compromise between freedom and social order.
D. American Law
The direction of American law with respect to identity, self-determination, and
autonomy has been quite different than German law. In American law, the root
construct for these rights has been privacy, not dignity as in German law. From the
privacy construct, the Supreme Court has afforded constitutional protection to a range
of personal decisions relating to marriage, procreation, contraception, abortion, and
family relationships, among others.4t0 Yet, these decisions, being grounded in privacy,
facilitate individual freedom from state interference. Thus, their concern is freedom
as an individual right, not the particular quality of the choice resulting from that
freedom, nor the well-being of the right holder. Unlike German law, there is no real
focus on the quality of human personality. Instead, the American focus is on "the right
-$7 8 BVerfGE 38 (1988).
"'Under German customary law, as codified in section 1355 of the BGB, a married couple must
maintain a common family name. The name chosen for the family can be either the husband's or the wife's.
This German customary requirement is not consistent with international practice. See id. at 40. In this case,
the Austrian wife registered her family name in Austria so that she could preserve it under Austrian Law.
German authorities interpreted this to mean that the couple had chosen the wife's name as the common
family name. The suit concerned the couple's right to maintain their own names, at least officially.
4 Theright tobear and control one's name has deep roots in German law. See §§ 12, 823, 1004 BGB.
4*See Name Change Case, 78 BVerfGE at 38-39,49 (interpreting § 1355 BGB).
rhe Court determined that a common family name was a highly valued legal interest, constituting
an impotant public law relationship, and guaranteeing the "unity of the family," which has constitutional
dimension under Article 6. Families are a unit, not a collection of individual members, revealing again the
communitarian bent of German law. See id. at 49. Thus, the German customary norm satisfied the
Proportionality Principle. See id. at 49-50. Still, since use and choice of name lies within the protection of
personality rights, one is free to choose the name used in personal or business relations. See id. at 50-52.
4wSee supra notes 171-79 and accompanying text.
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to be let alone."'' 1 These privacy rights thus map out how we can be free to be let
alone from official interference. As autonomous individuals, Americans are then free
to choose the values with which to constitute and govern themselves. These "choices
[are] central to personal dignity and autonomy." 482
However, the two legal orders differ fundamentally on the conception of dignity
in this regard. For Americans dignity means the right to choose. Worth and stature
follow from respect for choices. Germans share this aspect of self-determination; the
difference lies in how self-determination unfolds. In America, personal autonomy is
simply the right to choose. Personal autonomy is thus the value itself, an integral part
of one's rights. In Germany, by contrast, personal autonomy is an aspect of human
dignity. Dignity imposes obligations as well as endows freedom. Thus, personal
autonomy is relevant to shaping one's character and personality, but that shaping is to
occur, not in isolation, but within a social and moral community. True autonomy, in
the German view, is to unfold in a manner consistent with moral obligations, which
themselves are reflected in the Basic Law as individual and social duties. The state,
official actors like the Constitutional Court, and society are all responsible partners
working cooperatively with individuals to achieve this moral vision. One might say the
difference between the two cultures is between American "rights-talk ' and German
Kantian philosopher-kings. Put another way, the difference is over the conception of
autonomy, with (German) and without (American) the limiting construct of a workable
definition of morality.
VII. ABORTION
No discussion of dignity, privacy, and personality in German and American law
would be complete without an evaluation of abortion law. This is particularly the case
because abortion has been the subject of heated debate in both countries for over thirty
years,484 starting with the original abortion decisions, issued within two years of each
other: The Supreme Court decided Roe v. Wade48 in 1973; the Constitutional Court
decided Abortion P86 in 1975. In the 1990s, moreover, both Courts fundamentally
rethought both decisions: the Supreme Court in 1992, in Planned Parenthood v.
Casey;487 and the Constitutional Court, in 1993, in Abortion II. Thus, abortion is
a unique opportunity to compare and contrast the constitutional visions of two leading
constitutional courts in two important western democracies.
4 1Ohnstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (discussing Fifth
Amendment protection against use of evidence gained in violation of Fourth Amendment rights).
ecCasey, 505 U.S. at 851 (plurality opinion).
"MARY ANN GLENDON, RIGHTS TALKpassin (1991).
4%ven the Courts recognized this. See Abortion 1, 88 BVerfGE 203, 214 (1993); Planned Parenthood
v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 844 (1992) (plurality opinion) (recognizing criticism of right to abortion found in
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973)).
4u410 U.S. 113 (1973).
'39BVerfGE1 (1975).
-505 U.S. 833 (1992) (plurality opinion).
4AbortionH, 88 BVerfGE 203 (1993).
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Yet, abortion law has been so extensively discussed in both Germany"89 and
America'" that there is little need to discuss its particulars again here. Instead, I shall
focus on the conflict between a woman's right of self-determination and a fetus' right
to life as specific manifestations of dignity and personality, and as illustrations of the
balances drawn between liberty and community in the two legal orders.
The most fascinating phenomenon in this regard has been the recent convergence
of the two laws, in Casey and Abortion II, despite the very different legal premises of
the two constitutions. In both cases, the Courts recognized a woman's right to choose
concerning abortion, provided that she evaluate the consequences of the act from the
perspectives of the fetus, others affected (such as the father, family, or attending
medical personnel), and the community-interests made manifest in counseling,
waiting periods, and related regulations. Thus, both in Germany and America, society
is justified in circumscribing abortion to address these concerns, reflecting balance
between individual liberty and community.
A The Different Premises of German and American Abortion Law
Perhaps the best way to understand abortion in Germany and America is, first,
by considering the very different premises of the two constitutions, and then moving
to the similarities and differences of the two laws.
1. Germany
In Germany, the explicit textual enumeration of human dignity once again
provides the starting point. "Developing life also partakes of the protection of human
dignity," the Court asserted in Abortion I, since "where human life exists, human
dignity attaches" 49' Human dignity thus does not depend "on birth or a developed
personality."' "Everyone shall have the right to life" echoes the text of Article 2(2),
and this guarantee extends to "developing life in the mother's womb" according to the
Court 93 "Everyone" thus includes the yet unborn person; a fetus has a right to life.
"Life in the sense of individual existence . . .begins according to undisputed
biological and physiological knowledge... fourteen days after conception." ' Once
begun, life is "a continuous event, which knows no sharp phases and does not contain
d49See, e.g., PIEROTH & SCHLNK, supra note 19, at 108-10; Winfried Brugger, Abtreibung-ein
Grundrecht oder ein Verbrechen?, 1986 NJW 896; R. Stfirner, Die Unverfagbarkeit ungeborenen
menschlichen Lebens und die mensCiliche SelbstbestbnUmg, 1990 JUR!STICUB ZEIrUNG (JZ) 709; L
Zippelius, An den Grenzen des Rechts aufLeben, 1983 JURSMcHE SCHULUNG (JuS) 659.
'OSee MARYANN GI.ENDON, ABORTION AND DIVORCE IN WESTERN LAW (1987); John Hart Ely, The
Wages of Crying Wo A Corment on Roe v. Wade, 82 YAM LJ. 920 (1973).
"
1Abortion 1, 39 BVerfGE at 41.4 2Aborion f, 88 BVerfGE at251.
enAbortion I, 39 BVerfGE at 41, 46.
'Id. at 37; see also Abortion ll, 88 BVerfGE at 251 ('The Basic Law obligates the state to protect
human life. The unborn belong to human life. Therefore, they also receive the protection of the state.').
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distinct boundaries between the different stages of development."'4 By this reasoning,
the Court established that an unborn person is entitled to human dignity, and that the
Article 2 guarantee of a right to life is an independent legal value.
In the next step of the development, the Court transformed these provisions,
through objective constitutionalism, into positive commands of the German
constitutional order; the state became positively charged with the duty to protect life
(Schutzpflict). "This duty of protection has its basis in Article 1 (1),,496 which, after all,
calls on the state "to respect and protect" human dignity as "the duty of all state
authority." "The object and scope of this duty is more specifically determined by
Article 2(2)," the right to life guarantee.4 Thus, German protection of fetal life
derives from the radiation of human dignity, as reflected in the right to life clause,
which then is transformed into a positive command of the state to protect. Certainly
this follows both from the Nazi experience, particularly the Holocaust and the Federal
Republic's reaction against it, and from the Christian natural law tradition, as made
manifest in the Basic Law. Owing to this unique crystallization of values, Germany,
as a matter of comparative law, can view with plausible skepticism the experiences of
other lands with abortion, especially the United Kingdom and the United States,
countries then and now with more liberal abortion schemes.498
The duty to protect life is all-encompassing. "The duty to protect the unborn is
owed each individual, not just to human life in general."4" This duty is imposed on all
levels of state authority, especially the legislature, which makes the laws °
Accordingly, "the legal order must guarantee the appropriate legal foundation for the
development of the unborn in relation to its own right to life."50' How to do this is a
matter of legislative discretion. However, the Court directed that, at a minimum, the
Bundestag must declare abortion to be illegal, and must require that women carry the
unborn to term.0 2 For these reasons, government has the duty to intervene against
forces or people who would terminate life, and to create the proper social and
economic conditions for life to thrive. Finally, government must raise public
consciousness that the unborn have a right to life, through education, informational
campaigns, or other means.5 3 Such certainly constitutes a remarkable assertion of
proactive governmental power.
4
"SAbortion I, 39 BVerfGE at 37; see also Abortion Hl, 88 BVerfGE at 244 ("From a biological
perspective, life is a continuum that begins with the joining of egg and semen and ends with the death of the
person.').
49Abortion 11, 88 BVerfGE at 203.
4I1d.
4
'In Abortion I, the Court observed that Germany would not be unduly influenced by the abortion
experiences of other countries on account of the uniqueness of the German value-order and the country's
history with Naziism. See Abortion l, 39 BVerfGE at 60.
41Abortion H, 88 BVerfGE at 203, 252.
50See id. at 252.
1d. at 203.
sSee id. at 203, 253 ("The fundamental prohibition of abortion and the fundamental duty to carry a
child to term are two indispensable, inseparable elements of the constitutionally commanded protection.").
503See id. at 261. "The state also had to reinforce the general public's consciousness of the claim of
the unborn to protection-this duty obliged the schools, public information and counseling offices, and both
public and private broadcasting." Gerald L. Neuman, Casey in the Mirror: Abortion, Abuse and the Right
to Protection in the United States and Germany, 43 AM. J. COMP. L. 273,281 (1995).
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Yet, Germany is also a country committed to basic human rights, including
substantial protection of privacy and personality, as we have seen. Thus, right to life
guarantees cannot be applied in isolation.0 4 Countering their exercise are a pregnant
woman's rights. Her right of human dignity, as radiated in her personality rights,
protects her decisional autonomy. Her right to life protects her against undue risk in
the pregnancy. And her right to physical integrity, guaranteed also in Article 2(2),
safeguards her bodily integrity. Thus, under the German Basic Law, abortion triggers
an epic conflict among these foundational values, one certainly not easy to resolve.
In German law, this conflict among constitutional values triggers application of
the fundamental principle of Concordance (Konkordanz), an attempt to maximize
realization of the values at issue.5° We have seen this before in, for example, the
conflict between personality and expression rights, particularly in the 1970s in cases
like Soraya and Lebach.l Resolution of the conflict in these cases was difficult at
best. In the abortion cases, the conflict is even more severe. Attempting to achieve
balance between rights to life and to choose seems theoretically impossible. One
cannot honor a woman's choice and yet sustain a fetus' life in all cases. Such was the
essential conclusion of the Constitutional Court. In both abortion cases, accordingly,
the Court recognized that fetal life must prevail over women's self-determination as
a matter of valuation.50 7 Therefore, abortion must be treated as wrong, a violation of
the values of the legal order. In both cases, however, the Court recognized that respect
for the woman's dignity and related Article 2 guarantees necessitated that the duty to
bring a fetus to term be excused in certain circumscribed circumstances, such as
danger to the mother's life or health, as described more fully below.508 This balance
resulted in women's access to abortion upon justification in Germany.
2. America
Abortion in America proceeds from different premises. A woman's right to
choose is grounded in the right to privacy, rooted in Fourteenth Amendment liberty
established by the Supreme Court in Griswold v. Connecticut. "This right of privacy,
whether it be founded in the Fourteenth Amendment's concept of personal
liberty ... as we feel it is, or... in the Ninth Amendment's reservation of rights to the
people, is broad enough to encompass a woman's decision whether or not to terminate
her pregnancy."5 9 As a constitutional right, the right to choose is entitled to significant
constitutional protection. Under the rights methodology prevailing at the time of Roe,
"See Abortion 1I, 88 BVerfGE at 253-54 ("Protection of life is not absolutely commanded in the
sense that it will take precedence without exception over other legal values; the language of Article 2(2)
demonstrates this. The obligation to protect does not mean that any measure can be taken in its service.
Instead, the idea is that the range of protection is to be determined in view of the importance and need for
protection of the underlying legal value-here the unborn human life-in comparison to the legal values in
conflict.).
'sFor a description of Concordance, see supra note 20 and accompanying text.
-See supra notes 338-40, 364-80 and accompanying text.
'See Abortion 1, 39 BVerfGE at 42-43;Abortion 1, 88 BVerfGE at 252-55.
'"See Abortion I, 39 BVerfGE at 49-50; Abortion 1, 88 BVerfGE at 255-58. The justifications for
abortion are considered infra notes 522-27, 532-34 and accompanying text.
s5eRoe, 410 U.S. at 153.
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measures limiting abortion rights were subject to judicial "strict scrutiny."" 0 Under
this tough standard of review, the Court invalidated numerous state regulations,
including requiring abortions to be performed in hospitals, written informed consent
provisions, twenty-four-hour waiting periods, and regulations requiring physicians to
inform women of the risks attendant in the abortion procedure.5 n
Yet, abortion is not just a matter of exercise of individual liberty, as with other
American fundamental rights. There is something "unique" or "sui generis" about
abortion, as the Casey Court recognized:
Itis an act fraught with consequences for others: for the woman who must live with
the implications of her decision; for the persons who perform and assist in the
procedure; for the spouse, family, and society which must confront the knowledge
that these procedures exist, procedures some deem nothing short of an act of
violence against innocent human life; and, depending on one's beliefs, for the life
or potential life that is aborted5 12
Yet, unlike in Germany, there is no American fetal right to life after conception, nor
is there any state duty to protect life, although the state may act to protect life after the
point of viability51 3 Rather, there is a "potentiality of human life" that the state is
justified in protecting."1 4 Under Roe this "grows in substantiality as the woman
approaches term and, at a point during pregnancy.., becomes 'compelling.""'5 Thus,
in Roe, the Court balanced the compelling points of abortion rights against the
developing fetal rights. Even in Roe, the Court recognized that "[t]he pregnant woman
cannot be isolated in her privacy. She carries an embryo and, later, a fetus."' 6 The
Court fixed this balance pursuant to the trimester scheme: "[T]he abortion decision
and its effectuation must be left to the medical judgment of the pregnant woman's
attending physician" in the first trimester; in the second trimester "the State
[can] . . . regulate the abortion procedure in ways that are reasonably related to
maternal health," and, finally, the state can "regulate, and even proscribe, abortion
except where it is necessary, in appropriate medical judgment, for the preservation of
the life or health of the mother" in the third trimester.51 7
While the Casey Court dispensed with Roe's trimester scheme, the Court drew
the line circumscribing a woman's autonomy at the same point of fetal viability as the
Roe Court had, although medical developments, in the ensuing twenty years had
510 d. at 155. "Where certain 'fundamental rights' are involved, the Court has held that regulation
limiting these rights may be justified only by a 'compelling state interest,' ... and that legislative enactments
must be narrowly drawn to express only the legitimate state interests at stake." Id. Strict scrutiny is, of course,
still the prevailing methodology for rights-analysis, although there have been notable departures from it, such
as in Casey. See infra notes 547-50 and accompanying text.
"'See City of Akron v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, Inc., 462 U.S. 416,438-50 (1983).51 Casey, 505 U.S. at 852 (plurality opinion). Even in Roe, the Court recognized that abortion was
different than other situations involving rights. See Roe, 410 U.S. at 159.
-tLrhe Roe Court considered carefully and rejected the notion of a fetal right to life, stating that "the
unborn have never been recognized in the law as persons in the whole sense." 410 U.S. at 162.
5
"
4Id. at 164.
5
'Id. at 162-63.
.
161d. at 159.
5171d. at 164-65.
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pushed this point back four weeks. 518 Thus, in America, there is only one constitutional
right at issue, a woman's autonomy right, as compared to the constellation of rights at
stake in Germany. Against autonomy rights is balanced the strength of the interest in
fetal life, as exercised by the state pursuant to the trimester scheme of Roe, or its
replacement, the undue burden standard of Casey.519 The Court in Casey was more
solicitous of fetal interests than was the Roe Court 20 A closer look at the German and
American decisions illustrates how they balanced dignity, personality, and privacy in
abortion law.
B. The Abortion Decisions
1. Germany
(a) Abortion I
The 1975 Abortion I decision of the Constitutional Court, a long and complicated
decision filling ninety-five pages of the official reporter, invalidated a federal statute
that would have decriminalized abortion in the first trimester, provided the woman
received counseling and medical advice, and the procedure was performed by a
licensed physician52' After the first trimester, abortion would have been permitted "if
the pregnancy threatened the life of the woman or serious damage to her health, and
within twenty-two weeks if it appeared that the child would be born with severe birth
defects.:
'52
The federal statute was a product of the center-left coalition between the Social
Democrats and Free Democrats. 5 Acting pursuant to the procedure for abstract
judicial review, the conservative Christian Democrats in the Bundestag and several
Lander challenged the statute 2 4 The Court held that decriminalization of abortion
mSee Casey, 505 U.S. at 870 (plurality opinion). "We conclude the line should be drawn at viability,
so that before that time the women has a right to choose to terminate her pregnancy." Id.
"tSee Casey, 505 U.S. at 877 (plurality opinion). "A finding of an undue burden is a shorthand for
the conclusion that a state regulation has the purpose or effect of placing a substantial obstacle in the path
of a woman seeking an abortion of a nonviable fetus." Id.
52 See id. at 869. '"The woman's liberty is not so unlimited, however, that from the outset the State
cannot haow its concern for the life of the unborn, and at a later point in fetal development the State's interest
in life has sufficient force so that the right of the woman to terminate the pregnancy can be restricted." Id.
511
ee Neuman, supra note 503, at 274 (citing Fanftes Gesetz zur Refonn des Strafrechts, 1974 BGB1.
I S.1297; Donald P. Kommers, The Constitutional Law of Abortion in Gennany: Should Americans Pay
Attention?, 10 . CONMEMP.IEALTHL &POL'Y, 1, 6 (1994) (noting that German justices, particularly Justice
Ernst Benda, were quite familiar with Roe and American constitutionalism, because Justice Benda had been
student at University of Wisconsin in the 1950s).
'Neuman, supra note 503, at 274-75.
-
2See id. at 274.
'
2 The Constitutional Court may decide questions concerning the interpretation or compatibility of
federal or state law with the Basic Law in the "abstract," meaning outside the context ofa real legal dispute,
at the request of the federal or state government or of one-third of the members of the Bundestag. See Art.
93(1) GG. In this case, the Lander of Bavaria, Baden-Wflrttemberg, Rheinland-Pflaz, Saarland and
Schleswig-Holstein filed suit. See Abortion 1, 39 BVerfGE at 18. Abstract judicial review is thus most like
the notion of an advisory opinion in American law, which, since the founding of the Republic, the Supreme
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during the first trimester violated the state duty to protect the life of the fetus
(Schutzpflict), as guaranteed by human dignity and the right to life.5 The Christian
Democrats were thus able to accomplish judicially what they were unable to
accomplish politically. As in America, commitment to independent constitutional
review necessitates occasional supplanting of the majoritarian process.
According to the Court, the state must apply criminal sanctions to protect fetal
life in order to realize the value structure of the Basic Law, at least in the absence of
suitable alternative protective measures 26 Nevertheless, certain exceptional
circumstances demanded too much from pregnant women who, after all, also had
certain dignitarian and personality rights. In reaching this balance, therefore, the Court
approved certain of the "indications" for legal abortion provided for in the statute:
threats to women's health or life and severe birth defects. The Court also declared an
indication for pregnancy resulting from sex crimes, such as incest or rape, and more
broadly, for a "general situation of need" indication when "continuation of the
pregnancy would impose extreme hardship on the woman comparable in intensity to
the other indications."527 Otherwise, abortion must be made a crime. "The constitution-
ally commanded legal disapproval of abortion must clearly be reflected in the legal
order. ' 528
The Bundestag passed a new law that implemented these teachings. In practice,
most women could obtain an abortion if they desired under one of the indications,
especially the general situation of need. This state of affairs led supporters of Abortion
I to argue that new, stricter legislation was required. Supporters of abortion rights, by
contrast, argued that the resulting legislation was too restrictive of abortion rights 29
Thus, one might plausibly conclude that Abortion I did not settle the abortion
controversy in West Germany.
Court has refused to issue, preferring instead to rule only in the context of a real dispute between parties.
Fromthe German standpoint, the Court's interpretation of the Basic Law in abstract judicial review facilitates
its integration into society. The Court's concern is to assign an objective meaning to the constitutional rule
at issue, in keeping with the objective hiature of German constitutionalism, as compared to settling the legal
dispute between the parties. For elaboration of these points in the context of Abortion I, see Kommers, supra
note 521, at 5-6.
S'2 See Abortion I, 39 BVerfGE at 42-43.
mSee id. at 45-47. The Court noted that how to protect unborn life was fundamentally a decision for
the legislature. See id. at 44. However, in the case of abortion, the value of life itself was implicated, a
premier value of the legal order, and, therefore, the state must protect it through criminal measures. Abortion
is an "act of killing" that the legal order must condemn in strong terms as a way of educating the nation on
the value of life. Id. at 46.
Szid. at 49-50.
S3Id. at 53.
55See Neuman, supra note 503, at 276. The implementation of the abortion law also varied by region,
"leading women to travel within Germany, as well as to the Netherlands, for abortions." Id. In the context
of further abortion litigation, the "Court has held that payment for abortion by public medical insurance
carriers does not violate any right of fellow beneficiaries, and that the requirement of wage continuation for
employees undergoing abortions does not violate the property rights of employers." Id. at 276-77 (citations
omitted). This contrasts with the American experience. See Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 326-27 (1980)
(upholding Hyde amendment, which prohibited use of federal Medicaid funds for abortion unless life of
mother was in danger); Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 469-70 (1977) (holding that state regulation may deny
funding for nontherapeutic abortions).
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(b) Abortion II
The Constitutional Court was presented with a wholly different problem in 1993,
when it was asked again to review the constitutionality of abortion as provided in the
Pregnancy and Family Assistance Act (1992 Abortion Reform Act)53 With the
unification of the two Germanies came the necessity of reconciling the more restrictive
West German abortion law with the more liberal East German one. 3 The 1992
Abortion Reform Act was the product of compromise between the Social Democrats
and Christian Democrats of the West and the parties of the East. The new law
eliminated the requirement of third-party determination of indications during the first
trimester of pregnancy 32 Abortion, instead, would be "not unlawful" (nichts
rechtswidrig) if the woman chose to terminate her pregnancy after mandatory
counseling designed to induce her to "make her own decision of conscience with
awareness of responsibility," and after a three-day waiting period designed to reinforce
the importance of choice 33 After the first trimester, indications excusing the
unlawfulness of abortion could only be met upon third-party determination of a serious
birth defect or a threat to the woman's own life. Abortion due to birth defects also
required counseling, and was not permissible after twenty-two weeks. In essence,
the 1992 Abortion Reform Act had converted the criminal provisions of the 1975 Act
into mandatory counseling provisions, substituting persuasion for the sanction of the
criminal law. Moreover, the 1992 Abortion Reform Act spoke to abortion in the
context of broad-ranging social protection of women and children, including
provisions providing for day care, vocational training and placement for primary care
parents, housing and rent control, and increased welfare benefits for pregnant women
and single parents, all measures designed to encourage women to bring their
pregnancies to term.535
In a 6-2 decision filling 164 pages of the official reporter, the Constitutional
Court reaffirmed the essential core of its 1975 Abortion L "Dignity attaches to the
physical existence of every human being.., before as well as after birth.... Unborn
life is a constitutional value that the state is obligated to protect that attaches to each
human life, not life generally."536 In keeping with this holding, the Court found that the
nIheformal name of the Act was a mouthful: Act for the Protection of Prenatal-Developing Life, for
thProm tionof aMore Child-Friendly Society, for Assistance in Pregnancy Conflicts and for the Regulation
oftlTemination ofPregnancy (1992 Abortion ReformAct), 1992 (BGB1. I S.1398) (amending §§ 218-19
of the German Criminal Code or Strafgesetzbuch [StGB]). These amended sections constitute the 1992
Abortion Reform Act.
.
31The law of East Germany granted women the right to have an abortion during the first trimester.
The Unification Treaty made special provision for abortion, permitting East German law to remain in effect
in the East until new, unified German legislation could be worked out. See Kommers, supra note 521, at
10-11; Neuman, supra note 503, at 277. Many expected that the East German law would provide the basis
for compromise.
5nSee 1992 Abortion Reform Act (codified as amended at § 218(a)(2) StGB).
5Id. (codified as amended at § 219(1) StGB); see also Abortion I, 88 BVerfGE at 299.
' See 1992 Abortion ReformAct (codified as amended at §§ 218a(2)-(3) StGB). Theprovisions are
discussed in Kommers, supra note 521, at 13-14, and Neuman, supra note 503, at 277-78.
s3sSee 1992 Abortion Reform Act, arts. 1-16.
SmAborfion I, 88 BVerfGE at 252.
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provisions of the 1992 Abortion Reform Act making all abortions legal during the first
trimester were unconstitutional. Consistent with Abortion I, the Court further held that
the statute must make clear that "as a matter of general principle abortion is, in fact,
illegal, and that the pregnant woman has a legal duty, again as a matter of principle,
to carry the child to term. The fundamental prohibition of abortion and the fundamen-
tal duty to carry the child to term are two inseparably bound elements of the
constitutionally commanded duty of protection."53
The major change in Abortion II was that the state, in fulfilling its duty to protect
life (Schutzpflict), did not have to criminalize all illegal abortions. Therefore, an
abortion, while "illegal," might nevertheless be available, although only upon
justification, such as pursuant to the medical, eugenic, or criminal indications.
Moreover, an abortion, under what had been the social indication, could be obtained
without punishment if the state created a comprehensive counseling system with the
goal of convincing the pregnant woman to carry the child to tern. The criminal-
based system of Abortion I had proved ineffectual, creating antagonism among
women; the state felt a counseling system would be more effective, appealing to
women's sense of responsibility and trust5 39 Thus, the counseling system represented
an adjustment of the law to meet changed social conditions. In the ensuing twenty
years since Abortion I, women had become more assertive and self-deterministic; the
law recognized this changed reality.e0
From an American perspective, this counseling system constituted content-based
advocacy, questionable from a First Amendment view, designed to educate women
about their maternal responsibilities&41 Yet, these counseling provisions had the
significant effect of recognizing, for the first time in Germany, that a woman could
have an abortion during the first trimester of her pregnancy for any reason without fear
of criminal punishment:
[T]he state may validly conclude that in view of the reality of abortion in modem
society, the more effective solution to the problem of unwanted pregnancy is to
stay the hand of would-be prosecutors, to make an ally and friend of the woman in
distress, to forswear threats of punishment, and to induce her to cooperate
voluntarily with the state without any fear of retribution or loss of personal
integrity
42
"'Id. at 253.
s'See id. at 257. To be effective, counseling must be backed up with social support measures designed
to encourage women to decide against abortion. See id. at 258.
sSee Neuman, supra note 503, at 282. This had been the position of Justice Rupp von Brinneck in
her dissent in Abortion I, 39 BVerfGE at 76, 85-86.54 See Kommers, supra note 521, at 19 (noting that social context had changed radically since 1975,
evidenced by 1990 opinion polls indicating that most Germans supported easing restrictions on abortion).
5'The Court noted that counseling could be effective only if the end result remained open. The Court
stated that the counseling must be designed to help the woman to resolve her dilemma whether to have the
child or not. Yet, "the counseling ... must necessarily be directed to the protection of unborn life." Abortion
I, 88 BVe&IGE at 282. "The counseling should encourage, not frighten; enhance understanding, not instruct;
reinforce responsibility, not patronize." Id. at 283.
5'2Kommers, supra note 521, at 20 (citing Abortion I, 88 BVerfGE at 282).
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The Court then scrutinized the counseling provisions to assure that they were
sufficiently attentive of the fetus' right to life. Several of the provisions were struck
as being insufficient. These provisions were held insufficient because they did not
adequately proclaim and protect the right of the fetus to live; they did not describe
adequately the social welfare and public support measures that would encourage a
woman to bring the fetus to term; they did not guarantee with enough clarity the right
of the woman to return to her job after the pregnancy, they did not encourage
sufficiently the woman to state her reasons, resolve her conflict, and preserve
anonymity, and the provisions did not sufficiently provide for support, or protect
against outside pressures of family or friends supporting or militating against
pregnancy' 3 Moreover, the counselor, not the woman, had to certify when the
counseling was complete.5" For these reasons, the Court ordered the Bundestag to
rework the counseling provisions.
2. America
Fromits start, Roe was a controversial decision?'5 The ensuing twenty years have
done nothing to lessen the controversy.' 6 Casey, like Abortion II, provided the
occasion for the Supreme Court to rethink fundamentally its original decision on
abortion, which the Court did in a long and complicated opinion of ninety-four pages,
echoing the length, if not the complexity, of the German cases. To the surprise of
many, the Casey Court confirmed the essential holding of Roe:
[1] a recognition of [a woman's right] to choose to have an abortion before
viability and to obtain it without undue interference from the State . . . [2]
confirmation of the State's power to restrict abortions after fetal viability, if the law
contains exceptions for pregnancies which endanger the woman's life or
health ... [and 3] the principle that the State has legitimate interests from the
outset of the pregnancy in protecting the health of the woman and the life of the
fetus that may become a child. 47
Yet, the Court also redefined the balance between women's autonomy rights and fetal
rights, as struck by the state. The Court replaced Roe's trimester framework with an
'See Abortion , 88 BVerfGE at 301-09. For detailed discussion of these provisions, see Neuman,
supra note 503, at 282-84.
The state's obligation to protect unborn life also required it to take measures that prevented situations
which wouldplaceundue burdens on pregnant women. Thus, the state should protect against educational and
job discrimination, compensate through social security law long periods of uncompensated childrearing, and
provide family subsidies as a means of preventing abortion, among other measures. In short, the state needed
to creat a "child-friendly" society. SeeAbortion A1 88 BVerfGE at 258-61; see also Neuman, supra note
503, at 280-81.
SUSee Abortion , 88 BVerfGE at 286.
'See, eg., Ely, supra note 490, at 927 (stating that "difficult questions yield controversial answers").
Like the German abortion cases, Roe was long, filling 65 pages in United States Reports.
'"See Casey, 505 US. at 844 (plurality opinion) ("Liberty finds no refuge in ajurisprudence of doubt.
Yetnineteen years afler our holding that the Constitution protects a woman's right to terminate her pregnancy
in its early stages,... that definition of liberty is still questioned.").
'Id. at 846.
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"undue burden" test, by which the Court would evaluate interference with women's
autonomy to determine if it placed "a substantial obstacle in the path of a woman
seeking an abortion of a nonviable fetus." 48
The Court invented the "undue burden" test for Casey, uncannily similar to the
"unreasonable burden" (unzumutbar Belastungen) standard of the Constitutional
Court,' 9 lending support to the sui generis55 aspect of abortion, just as the Constitu-
tional Court had invented a state duty of protection of life in the abortion cases.
Perhaps abortion is indeed a unique act, or perhaps it is an issue over which it is
difficult to think objectively and apply standard rights methodologies. As with the
abortion cases, elaboration of the right or rights would depend on their application in
concrete circumstances. In Casey, this called for application of the undue burden
standard.
Applying the undue burden test to the Pennsylvania law at issue, the Court
invalidated a spousal notification requirement, but upheld the other four provisions:
informed consent, twenty-four hour waiting period, reporting, and parental consent
requirements. 5 1 Of these provisions, informed consent and the twenty-four hour
waiting period are noteworthy, since they provide both the most graphic contrast with
the Roe approach, and the greatest similarity with Abortion I.552
The informed consent provision requires the physician performing the abortion
to inform the woman of the nature of the procedure, the attendant health risks, the
gestational age of the fetus; and the availability of state information concerning social
welfare programs, such as "information about child support from the father, and a list
of agencies which provide adoption and other services as alternatives to abortion. 553
This provision bears an uncanny resemblance to the mandatory counseling provision
validated in Abortion IV5  Like that provision, the informed consent requirement in
Casey is not value-neutral, but is "'designed to influence the woman's informed choice
between abortion or childbirth."'5 5 As such, under American free speech principles,
it could quite plausibly be considered content-based and, therefore, subject to heavy
justification under strict scrutiny analysis. Likewise, if the choice over abortion were
"Id. at 877.
"he Court described the test as follows: "Unreasonableness can, to be sure, not arise out of
circumstances that remain within the realm of normal pregnancy. Rather, burdens must exist that demand
a measure of sacrifice of one's own life values that are not to be expected from women." Abortion AI, 88
BVerfGE at 257.
SSee Casey, 505 U.S. at 857 (plurality opinion) ("Finally, one could classify Roe as sui generis.:).
55 See id. at 879-900. The spousal notification requirement was invalidated on the basis of equality
between the sexes and the belief that its implementation would lead to domestic violence and abuse. See id.
at 891-98.
'See Akron, 462 U.S. at 449-51 (invalidating informed consent, 24-hour waiting periods, and other
provisions as imposing excessive burdens on access to abortion).
553CaSey, 505 U.S. at 881 (plurality opinion).
n$SeeAbortion I, 88 BVerfGE at 257-59, 282-84; see also supra notes 536-44 and accompanying
text.
5Z Casey, 505 U.S. at 881 (plurality opinion) (quoting Akron, 462 U.S. at 444). Under the provision,
the physician "must inform the woman of the availability of printed materials published by the State
describing the fetus and providing information about medical assistance for childbirth, information about
child support from the father, and a list of agencies which provide adoption and other services as alternatives
to abortion." Id.
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.considered a fundamental right, the provision would ordinarily be subject to strict
scrutiny for that reason as well. This, in fact, had been the Supreme Court's conclusion
under the Roe regime.-
A similar analysis applies to the twenty-four hour waiting period. This provision,
too, bears striking resemblance to the three-day waiting period validated in Abortion
IV" Significantly, both waiting periods are designed to force the woman to reflect
carefully about the consequences of her choice. Combined with the laws' mandatory
counseling provisions, the requirements are designed to influence the woman to carry
the fetus to term, if at all possible. As was the informed consent provision, waiting
periods were previously infirm under the Roe approach.555
3. Convergence and Divergence in Abortion Law
In assessing modern abortion law in both countries, what seems most remarkable
is the growing convergence of the two laws, notwithstanding different constitutional
premises and different initial judicial approaches. Both countries provide for qualified
access to abortion during the first trimester, if desired, provided that the pregnant
woman undergoes mandatory counseling designed to convince her to have the child,
apd provided that she consider this possibility for a specified period prior to
undergoing the abortion procedure. This is a remarkable degree of convergence over
abortion.
This seems especially so considering the very different precedents the two Courts
confronted in the 1990s. Abortion I was a very autonomy-rights restrictive, pro-life
protective decision; Roe was the opposite. The contrast between Abortion I and Roe
was itself quite fascinating: Both Courts acted quite countermajoritarian in achieving
opposite outcomes; they regulated with precision the extent of abortion "rights" and
"duties" in a manner that plausibly left them open to attack for overstepping separation
of powers by acting "legislatively."5 9 Starting from these precedents, the Constitu-
tional Court in Abortion II ameliorated some of the harshness of Abortion I from the
woman's perspective by decriminalizing abortion, and thereby allowing women, for
the first time, to have abortions during the first trimester provided they followed the
statutory requirements.5 In Casey, the Supreme Court restructured the equation set
in Roe to address more fully state and community interests in protection of fetal life,
similar to the German abortion cases. It might be said that Casey thereby recognized
'$See id. at 929-30 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); accord Thornburgh v.
American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747, 760 (1986) (invalidating statuteprosaibing abortion because it subordinated constitutional privacy interests);Akron, 462 U.S. at 442-49.
SSSee Abortion H, 88 BVerfGE at 227, 299-300 (construing § 218(a) StGB).
SSSee, e.g., Akron, 462 U.S. at 450.
'See Webster v. Reproductive Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490, 518 (1989) (plurality opinion) (noting
"rigid Roe framework is hardly consistent with the notion of a Constitution cast in general terms"); Doe v.
Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 222 (1973) (White, 3., dissenting) (deploring "exercise of rawjudicial power'). The
German dissenters echoed these thoughts. See Abortion 1, 39 BVerfGE at 70 (Rupp von Branneck & Simon,
JJ., dissenting) ("The Court must not .. assume [legislative functions] ... and thereby endanger
constitutional review.).
anSee Abortion H, 88 BVerfGE at 227. In this way, the Constitutional Court moved in the direction
of Roe. See Roe, 410 U.S. at 164.
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the magnitude of a fetal claim to life, and the community's interest therein, for the first
time, as the Constitutional Court had done in 1975 in Abortion L In essence, the two
Courts split the distance between them 61
There are deeper similarities and differences in the two laws. The differences in
treatment of abortion illustrates the different rights regimes at issue. In Germany, a
constellation of rights apply, and these rights are coupled with duties. On behalf of the
fetus, human dignity and the right to life combine to impose on the state an obligation
to protect life. This exists in counterpoise to the woman's autonomy rights, as derived
from her guarantee of human dignity, and her rights to personality and bodily integrity.
Especially when coupled with the affirmative state duty to protect and nurture life,
these rights and duties illustrate the twin positive and negative dimensions of German
constitutional guarantees. In America, the equation seems simpler: There exists a
constitutional right of privacy which confers limited decisional autonomy, and is
balanced against the potentiality of life.
The most notable difference in the enumerated values of the two constitutions is
the right to life. In Germany this is explicitly enumerated in Article 2(2). The
Constitutional Court interpreted this protection, in conjunction with human dignity,
to encompass fetal life.56 By contrast, the American Constitution is silent regarding
a right to life generally, including that of a fetus. Moreover, through textual exegesis,
the Court in Roe determined that rights apply only postnatallys
Germany's pro-life focus is a product, preeminently, of its recent Nazi history,
which drove Germans deep into their tradition, notably Kantian morality:" For this
reason, abortion must be "wrong" in the eyes of society, even though it might be
allowed in certain limited circumstances. By contrast, it is simply legal in the United
States. In this way, there is more of an educational, or hortatory value to German law,
561It would seem the two Courts had their eyes on each other. American constitutional law is well
known in Germany. Justice Benda, in particular, was quite cognizant of Roe in structuring Abortion L See
supra note 521 and accompanying text. On the current Court, Justice Dr. Dieter Grimm is well versed in
American law, especially free speech law. See Dieter Grimm, Die Meinungsfreiheit in der Rechtsprechung
des Bundesverfassungsrericht, 48 NJW 1697 (1995). Likewise, Justice Dr. Paul Kirchhof is knowledgeable
of American law. See PAUL KIRCHHOP & DONALD P. KOMMERS, GERMANY AND ITS BASIC LAW: PAST,
PRESENT AND FUURE--A GERMAN-AMERICAN SYMPOSIUM (1993). It is not uncommon for the
Constitutional Court to cite to American cases. See, e.g., Lath, 7 BVerfGE 198 (1958) (citing Palko v.
Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 327 (1937)).
By contrast, the Supreme Court almost never consults the work of another country's jurisprudence,
although recent cases may signal otherwise. See, e.g., Printz v. United States, 117 S. Ct. 2365, 2404-05
(1997) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (analyzing extensive inventory of comparable federal systems, including those
of Switznland, Germany, and the European Union, in seeking illumination of the proper relationship between
the American federal and state governments); Washington v. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. 2258, 2266-67 (1997)
(reviewing other countries' treatment of assisted suicide, especially the Dutch experience, in rejecting
constitutional right to die). But see Printz, 117 S. Ct. at 2377n.11 (opinion by Scalia, J.) ("We think such
comparative analysis inappropriate to the task of interpreting a constitution, though it was of course quite
relevant to the task of writing one.").
5
'2See Abortion 1, 39 BVerfGE at 36-37.
'See Roe, 410 U.S. at 157-58.
'"See Abortion 1, 39 BVerfGE at 36 ("The express inclusion in the Basic Law of a self-evident right
to life-different as compared to the Weimar Constitution--is explainable primarily as a reaction against the
'annihilation of life valued unworthy,' of a 'final solution' and 'liquidation' that was pursued as official
policy by the Nazi regime.").
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than to American law. Consistent with this pro-life stance, the Basic Law also outlaws
capital punishment!'
Moreover, Article 1 obligates the state "to respect and protect" human dignity.
Thus, the essence of the value-order is a commitment to the value of life. Kantian
idealism, with its emphasis on the value of each life, fortifies this concept. In this light
also is radiated the pro-family and pro-child social welfare provisions coupled around
abortion regulation. The 1992 Abortion Reform Act reflects the social state directive
and, of course, the pragmatic desire to influence the choice over abortion.!' Germany
thus reveals itself to be consistently pro-life, and deliberately child-friendly.
Another distinguishing trait of the two countries is the objective constitutionalism
of German law. Under Article 1, the German state is obligated to respect and protect"
human dignity. In combination with the right to life, the Constitutional Court, for the
first time in Abortion I, implied a positive obligation of the state to protect life,
anchoring a fetus' right to life. As a matter of interpretation, the implication of this
positive state duty represents a stunning act of judicial activism, justifying, presum-
ably, far-reaching state intrusion into society, even if in contravention of majoritarian
determination.
A comparative evaluation of other right to life cases puts this activism into bold
relief. Apart from abortion, the Constitutional Court has not invoked Article 1 to
impose duties on government to protect life. The Court rejected this argument in
relation to the prevention of kidnaping or the rescuing of its victims in the Schleyer
Kidnaping Case.l The Court also rejected the argument in relation to an asserted
need to guard against threats posed by the storage and transportation of chemical
weapons,568 nuclear reactors, 69 and aircraft noise and highway noise 70 In these cases,
the Constitutional Court seemed quite cautious about extending any claim to
governmental obligation to ensure safety or life as a matter of constitutional law, a
caution certainly echoed in the American regime. Accordingly, the Court deferred
substantially to legislative determinations, in bold contrast to its intensive scrutiny of
the parliamentary determinations at issue in the abortion cases.57 The inconsistent
treatment of this duty to protect life might suggest a factual differentiation among
these cases, or it may indicate preferred treatment based on the value of fetal life. In
view of the Casey Court's use of a newly-minted undue burden standard, there is
evidence of exaggerated treatment of abortion, from the perspective of rights-
methodologies, in both countries. Perhaps this is because of the value of life, including
fetal life.
anSee Art. 102 GG.
5
"See supra notes 541-43 and accompanying text.
' 46 BVerfGE 160 (1977) (imposing no duty on state to prevent and solve kidnaping cases).
...See Chemical Weapons Case, 77 BVerfGE 170 (1987) (rejecting any constitutional claim that
storage and transportation of chemical weapons violated Basic Law).
'See Millheim-Karlich Nuclear Reactor, 53 BVerfGE 30, 57-60 (1979).
'See 56 BVezIGE 54 (1981) (rejecting neighbors' complaint against aircraft noise); 79 BVerfGE 174
(1988) (rejecting complaint that zoning plan insufficiently protected against highway noise).
"See Neuman, supra note 503, at 300.
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Considering the American concern for limited government and rejection of
affirmative state. obligations,572 it is hard to envision how we could find any positive
duty of government to act. The difference in state powers is thus a distinguishing trait
in the two legal orders. In our abortion cases, the state acts on behalf of the potentiality
of life as part of its police powers. Thus, fetal claims exist as an interest of the social
order, not as a constitutional right, as in Germany.
It is worth pointing out, however, that the positive German state obligations help
facilitate the communitarian bent of German law, as illustrated in the abortion cases.
Rights are not just a matter of individual exercise in the German scheme, but are to
unfold in a manner consistent with the value-order of the Basic Law. Rights are thus
coupled with responsibilities. By contrast, the American Constitution is silent about
these mattersYP Rights, seemingly, can be exercised outside the context of a value-
order or, even, a sense of responsibility, except for the responsibility one chooses to
recognize voluntarily. Certainly the two legal orders differ on the concept of
community. Germany and America also differ over individuality. From the standpoint
of women's autonomy, the German cases seem distrustful and disrespectful of their
decisional authority, whereas the American cases are premised on women's self-
determination.
VIII. COMPARATIVE OBSERVATIONS
Having evaluated human dignity, personality, and privacy in German and
American constitutional law, the similarities and differences in the countries'
constitutional visions, doctrines, and techniques become evident. Certainly there is
much the two laws have in common. Both developed formatively in the period after
World War II, evidencing the emerging phenomenon of human rights, particularly in
western legal culture.5 74 Both accord broad freedom to individuals to shape their
destiny, while balancing individual aspiration against the demands of maintaining
social order. Both laws rely on an activist high court to shape these freedoms against
the clutches of majoritarian control.
'See DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dept. of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189 (1989), discussed supra
note 314. If DeShaney were decided according to German law, it is probable that the Constitutional Court
would value quite highly the young boy's right to life, especially since the state had notice of the abuse he
was suffering. Therefore, the Court would likely impose affirmative obligations on the government to
scrutinize with care any asserted state interests in juxtaposition to the right to life, as the Court had done in
the abortion cases.
s
731n this light, the Court's discussion in Casey of the consequences of the abortion act, injecting a
communitarian dimension, stands in contrast to much of American law. See supra note 512 and
accompanying text.
574In Germany, personality rights have a long lineage in the private law. See Krause, supra note 59,
at 485-88. However, the modem cases, staking with Elfes, 6 BVerfGE 32 (1957), mark the essential
development. In the United States, cases like Meyer v. Nebraska and Skinner v. Oklahoma might be thought
of as originating an emphasis on autonomy. See Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390,401-02 (1923) (holding
unconstitutional prchibition of teaching German in schools); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942)
(holding unconstitutional sterilization of habitual criminals). But Griswold v. Connecticut is the essential case
for this development of American law. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479,485 (1965) (recognizing
that use of contraceptives is individual liberty protected by constitution).
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Notwithstanding. these similarities, a closer look at the two laws reveals more
difference than similarity. First, and foremost, the countries differ over the nature of
their constitutional vision, as set out in the text of their basic charters and as amplified
by the two high courts. The German vision, set out with reasonable clarity and
reflecting the systematization of German legal science, centers around the human
person and her dignity-a "spiritual-moral" individual with the ability to realize her
potential and with the desire for personal satisfaction. Human values are thus the focal
point of the legal order.
By comparison, the American constitutional vision is simpler, if not sketchier.
Our focus is preeminently on outlining the limits of government, reflecting our original
republican revolution, and securing a basis for the pursuit of liberty and happiness. In
keeping with this defensive focus, the American charter does not set forth a
comprehensive vision of how liberty or happiness are to be pursued. This is mainly left
to individual discretion, in contrast to the circumscription of that choice in the German
scheme. Certainly we do not have the core consensus on value structure that the
Germans have.
The countries' contrasting value structures may be attributable, in part, to the
differing complexion of the populations. America is extremely heterogenous;
Germany, by contrast, is relatively homogenous. It stands to reason that the more
homogenous the population, the greater possibility there is for consensus. Since
America is so pluralistic, it is difficult for the population to agree on core values.
Hence, it makes sense to leave value choices to individuals.
However, America's population at the time of the Constitution's framing was,
like Germany's, relatively homogenous. Thus, the difference may have more to do
with the Courts' approach to interpretation of the basic charters than any original
intent. The difference in population complexion would seem to be a significant factor
during the last fifty years, the formative period of judicial interpretation of the two
laws.
Second, enumeration of rights and responsibilities in the two legal orders follows
from these contrasting visions. The German value-order, grounded in the underlying
philosophic thought of Kant, reflects a careful calibration of rights and responsibilities,
interpreted by the Constitutional Court as an "objective value-order," one that must
apply generally in society, affecting all legal relationships. Since human dignity is the
apex of this value structure, it naturally radiates throughout the legal system, in both
public and private law. An essential part of human dignity are basic rights, and their
corresponding obligations.
While basic rights are mainly defensive or subjective in function, connoting a
personal sphere of liberty, only rarely is such subjective liberty a matter of complete
discretion. Instead, personal liberty is subject to limitation by the constitutional order,
textually secured through express reservation or by necessary implication 75 In this
sense, rights are limited by obligations to others, as made manifest through the law.
Yet, limitations of liberty are themselves not a matter of parliamentarian discretion or
social control. Rather, liberty may be restrained only upon justification pursuant to the
'75See, e.g., Art. 2, 5 GG.
1050 UTAH LAW REVIEW [1997: 963
value order."7 6 In this sense, dignitarian morality acts as the "higher law" of German
constitutionalism.5 7
German rights also contain an objective or positive dimension, obligating
government to effectuate their command. Human dignity makes decisive claims to
official action along these lines. Notable examples of this include the Constitutional
Court's implication of a zone of privacy to protect individuals from a prying public in
the context of fabricated, sensationalistic reporting in Soraya, or accurate, but
negative, reporting in Lebach.7s The Court's implication of a positive duty.to protect
fetal life in the abortion cases, even against the dignitarian rights of women to
determine their fate, is another notable example of the far-reaching claim to
governmental action that can result from such objectivismY 71
By contrast, Americans share the concept of negative liberties with the Germans,
but do not have a corresponding principle of positive rights or duties. Thus, we have
little claim to governmental action, even over matters of human dignity.5 0 American
rights, like privacy, are instead mainly spheres of personal autonomy. Unlike German
negative liberties, American rights are not coupled with responsibilities, either through
textual reservation or by implication, except those that can be reasonably ferreted out
of the legal system itself. Not surprisingly, lacking the context of an underlying
philosophic base, American rights have more of an absolutist quality to them; there are
few textual or philosophical restraints on individual freedom.
Third, the contrasting visions of the two laws have dramatic consequences for
their concepts of human dignity, personality, and privacy. German concepts are
reasonably well thought out, constituting an integrated whole, reflecting again the
classification and comprehensiveness of German legal science. There is an inner
dimension, focusing on humanity's "moral-spiritual" essence, and there is a
corresponding outer dimension, reflecting activity in the world.581 Both dimensions,
of course, radiate from the same source of human dignity.
American law, by contrast, mainly reflects a search for personal identity and self-
realization. These themes fit uneasily into an inner/outer dichotomy. Personal decision
making over topics like procreation, contraception, or child rearing certainly partakes
of self-realization in relation to the world, but also bespeaks inner identity.5 These
American rights mainly reflect personal autonomy, pursuant to the negative concept
of liberties.
A closer review of the specific enumeration of American privacy and German
personality rights illuminates these points. German personality law reflects the broad
"
6In all cases, the essence of the right must be preserved. See Art. 19(2) GG.
"By higher law, I mean that all actions must be judged for conformity with dignity, as the dispositive
norm of the Basic Law's value order. Note, for example, the contrasting effect of human dignity in E/fes and
Mephisto.See E/fes, 6 BVerfGE 32 (1957); Mephisto, 30 BVerfGE 173 (1971); see also supra note 306 and
accompanying text.
"'See supra notes 338-40, 364-83 and accompanying text.
'
1See supra notes 496-508 and accompanying text.
'On occasion, dignitarian interests can support a claim for governmental action. See, e.g., Goldberg
v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 264 (1970) (holding that procedural due process requires an evidentiary hearing
before revocation of financial aid benefits).
...See supra notes 90-97 and accompanying text.
'See supra notes 96-98, 172-81 and accompanying text.
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themes of German law: human dignity and its cognates, including valuation of life as
an end in itself, worth and equal worth, and freedom to act within the constraints of
the value-order. This accounts for some of its sharpest departures from American law.
Foremost among these is the focus on the interior component of human personality,
an emanation of the inner striving for freedom. Through its jurisprudence, the
Constitutional Court has attempted to capture and preserve the essence of human
personhood an'd personality, and safeguard it amidst the challenges of modern society.
Hence, the Constitutional Court seeks to identify and fortify an Inner Space, "in which
to develop freely and self-responsibly... personalities ... [into] which [people] can
retreat, barring all entrance to the outer world, in which one can enjoy tranquility and
a right to solitude." ' The census cases, by limiting official use of personal
information on account of human autonomy, show how such nurturing of human
personhood can make a difference with respect to modem social and economic
developments.
While the census cases are the most dramatic illustrations of this strand of
interiority, the Constitutional Court has carved out related emanations of human
personality, limiting political and social forces in service of the inner person. Most
notable here is the right to control personal information, crystallized into a general
right of informational self-determination. Intimate information reflects human
personality, according to the Court, because it is an important component of both the
inner person and the public persona. Accordingly, the person participating in this
aspect of "life-formation" should have a measure of control over these matters. Based
on this reasoning, the Court has extended degrees of protection over personal data,ss
honor, and rights to one's good name;5 6 portrayal of self,5 7 image,-"' and spoken
word. 89
These doctrines are simply not part of American constitutional law. This maybe
because the textual support in our constitution is scant as compared to the German
constitution. It may be because we lack the certitude of a vision corresponding to the
German focus on the centrality of personality. Perhaps this explains why the Supreme
Court takes a more cautious approach than the Constitutional Court.
The Supreme Court's cautiousness may also be out of regard for state sover-
eignty, the value underlying federalism. Most American substantive due process cases
involve a second-guessing of state actions, which the Court is hesitant to do.' By
anMicrocensus, 27 BVerfGE 1, 6 (1969).
5LSee supra notes 195-97, 239-42, 251-56 and accompanying text. Lebach, with its concern for
rehabilitation clan individual, evidences this too. See Lebach, 35 BVerfGE 202 (1973); see also supra notes
377-82 and accompanying text.
s"See, e.g., Census Act Case, 65 BVerfGE 1 (1983).
'See, e.g., Mephisto, 30 BVerfGE 173 (1971).
51See, e.g., Soraya, 34 BVerfGE 269 (1973).
'"See, e.g., Lebach, 35 BVerfGE 202 (1973).
suSee, e.g., B6ll, 54 BVerIGE 208 (1980).
'Note, for example, Justice Harlan's famous formulation:
Judicial self-restraint... will be achieved in this area, as in other constitutional areas, only by
continual insistence upon respect for the teachings of history, solid recognition of the basic
values that underlie our society, and wise appreciation of the great roles that the doctrines of
federalism and separation of powers have played in establishing and preserving American
1051No. 4]
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contrast, in Germany, a different federal state,59" ' personality cases mainly involve
federal law. Hence, any second-guessing is at least with respect to a coordinate branch
of government. On such level field, the full steering effect of the Constitutional Court
can be exercised, perhaps without the inhibition that faces the Supreme Court. Still,
with the integrated German court system, many German cases require the Constitu-
tional Court to second-guess the ordinary courts, which the Court too is hesitant to
do.59 Thus, at bottom, the two Courts are cautious for different reasons attributable
to the different federal structures.
The difference in constitutional doctrine may also be because our private law,
unlike German law, did not develop these concepts comprehensively, and, thus, unlike
German constitutional law, American law had no ready base to stand on.593 Moreover,
American private law does not connect to constitutional law in the more seamless way
that it does in Germany. Lacking grounding in personality, other values, most notably
free speech, can be exercised without the braking influence of dignitarian concerns.
Even in the area of greatest overlap between the two laws-issues relating to
identity, self-determination and autonomy-these differences are still evident. German
law is grounded in the philosophy of human capacity and dignity, "factors constitutive
for individual self-discovery and self-understanding. '594 These desires yield a "striving
toward unity of psyche and body."'59 American autonomy decisions, such as those
over contraception or procreation, by contrast, are grounded in privacy rights and self-
realization, not dignity and its elevated cognates, like human inviolability.5 96 American
rights thus do not couple freedom with a concomitant concern for well-being, as do
German rights.
These differences in the concept of personality reflect differences in the two legal
cultures. The German vision reflects careful ordering of the characteristics of human
personhood to facilitate well-being, especially those characteristics called upon in
social intercourse. Freedom to develop human capacity is sought, indeed encouraged,
to the maximum extent compatible with the freedom of everybody else. Thus, moral
freedoms.
Griswold, 381 U.S. at 501 (Harlan, J., concurring).
591The German federalist structure differs from the American. The German federal government
contains most legislative powers, including all those exercised in the United States. In addition, the German
federal government has power over private law, such as contract, tort, or criminal law, areas that in America
are traditionally left to the states. Some powers are exclusively federal in Germany; others are shared with
the Lander. By contrast, federal legislation, interestingly, is mainly carried out by the Lander. CURRIE, supra
note 7, at 34. For description of the nuances of German federalism, see id. at 33-101; CoNsTrrurIONAL
JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 8, at 69-120.
592See supra note 146 and accompanying text.
'Despite strong arguments for a law based on the notion of an "inviolate personality," see, e.g.,
Warren & Brandeis, supra note 59, at 205-07; Pound, supra note 386, at 445, which may have mirrored the
German law, American personality law never fully developed. See supra note 386. In part, this is due to the
serious conceptual difficulty in American law of private causes of action ordinarily lacking enforcement
through the state or through constitutional actions. See Quint, supra note 14, at 279 n.106. Moreover, since
the rise of First Amendment law, signaled most dramatically by New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S.
254 (1964), interests of personality, especially honor and reputation, have been eclipsed by free speech
interests.
"wRight to Heritage 1, 79 BVerfGE 236, 264 (1989).
5 Transsexual Case, 49 BVerfGE286, 299 (1978).
See supra notes 174-78 and accompanying text.
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obligation and respect for others requires that freedom be exercised within the bounds -
of community. In this view, freedom can truly exist only with provision for well-being,
mutual toleration, and respect. It is in this sense that the "human person is an
autonomous being developing freely within the social community."' She is not
"isolated and self-regarding," but "related to and bound by-the community."598 Thus,
individual self-determination is offset byresponsibility, civility, and participation.
By contrast, American law places tremendous faith on the individual's ability to
choose and realize choice. Our root value is personal liberty, more than any moral
concept, like dignity. Choosing our fortunes is integral to our system of self-
government. In this sense, freedom is more complete in America than in Germany,
unbounded by any value constraining liberty, except those that we determine
ourselves.
Viewed in this light, the German vision of constitutional democracy serves as an
alternative strategy to organize society, one that reflects the benefits, perhaps, of added
perspective and experience. There are obvious indigenous influences that led to the
erection and make-up of the German value-order, especially values that empower and
guide personal decision making. Kantian philosophy and nineteenth century German
legal science are decisive theoretical influences. The German experience with anarchy
during the Weimar Republic, and the dehumanization during the Nazi period,
including severe limitation of human personality and capacity, and even annihilation
of life itself, are crucial histories. The erection of the German value-order may, in fact,
reflect a desire to channel human behavior out of fear of the evil that might arise
(again) from unchained human passion.
Alternatively, however, German constitutionalism might reflect the added
wisdom of comparative experiences. For example, much would seem to have been
learned from the lessons of more unrestrained majoritarianism, as in FrTance 59 9 or even
England,6 " and its tendency to limit human capacity. Other lessons might be learned
from more unbounded liberty, as in America, and its tendency to encourage excessive
mwMephisto, 30 BVerfGE at 193.
mLzife Imprisonment Case, 45 BVerfGE 187, 227 (1977).
5'5ThlFrench Revolution was a pivotal event for Germany and Europe generally. Under the influence
of the philosophy of Rousseau, the leaders of the Revolution tried to ascertain the true common good of the
political community. Hence, liberty lay with the people as a whole, unrestrained by notions of fundamental
rights. This led to significant abuses and horrors.
6'Since the Puritan Revolution of 1642, England has been ruled by Parliament. With the Glorious
Revolution of 1689, the monarchy was restored, but on Parliament's terms. Thus, the rule of Parliament,
representing the will of the people, is supreme, unbounded by a written, strong guarantee of fundamental
rights.
Even in England today, there is no strong, enforceable set of rights inherent in the people. See, e.g.,
Sunday Times Case, 38 Eur. CL H.R. (ser. A) (1980) (finding UK in violation of European Convention on
Human Rights for prior restraint on press reports concerning thalidomide disaster); Attorney General v.
Guardian Newspapers, Ltd., 3 All E.R. 316, 343 (1987) (upholding prior restraint on publication of book,
Spycatcher, which discussed memoirs of former officer of British Secret Service, MIS). The book at issue
revealed intimate secrets of British intelligence. The book was widely available outside England, but not in
England. Ironically, rights in Britain, to a certain extent, rely on enforcement by outside institutions, such as
the European Court of Human Rights, as in Spycatcher, or the Court of Justice of the European Community.
See, e.g., Case 61/81, Commission v. United Kingdom, 1982 E.C.R. 2601, [1981-1983 Transfer Binder]
Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8853 (1982) (applying principle of comparative worth, equal pay for equal
work of men and women).
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passion or unleash unbridled social or economic power that might overshadow
personal dignity. Against these histories and experiences, emphasis on the inviolability
of human personhood becomes a final check against power, official or private, that
might operate arbitrarily. That is an important contribution to public philosophy.
The countries' contrasting constitutional visions might explain the different
stances of the two constitutional Courts. Both Courts are countermajoritarian
institutions, asserting the values of the constitutional order against the excesses of
majoritarian rule. As a matter of comparative law, this is itself notable: It is worth
recognizing that, outside our borders, the Supreme Court is not the only activist
judiciary. In fact, the Constitutional Court is aggressively activist in a way that our
Supreme Court is not. The Constitutional Court actively sets out to realize in society
the values of the Basic Law, attempting to coordinate constitutional text with social
reality. The wholesale rewrite of legislation in the census cases and the abortion cases
attests to this. The Constitutional Court thus acts somewhat more like our Supreme
Court did in the first third of this century under substantive due process, censoring
governmental actions for reasonableness when necessary.
By contrast, the Supreme Court today mainly rules when it must to enforce a
limitation of government. It is hard to imagine the Supreme Court creating claims to
governmental action to protect constitutional values, as the Constitutional Court did
in implying a right to protection of life in the abortion cases or in facilitating redress
of privacy and personality claims in Mephisto, Soraya, or Lebach. In this way, the
Basic Law, as interpreted by the Constitutional Court, acts like a blueprint for society,
whereas the American Constitution is more like an outline of government.
The approaches of the two Courts mirror their different missions. The German
Court places a premium on the text of the Basic Law, its structure and purpose, and
its applicability to current social and economic conditions. By comparison, the
Supreme Court focuses on text, Framers' intent, and precedent. The Constitutional
Court openly makes use of background principles not always clearly set out in
constitutional text, such as the rule of law, the Social State Principle, and, of course,
the capacious concept of "human dignity." In some cases, most notably in Soraya, the
Constitutional Court even openly acknowledged that it would employ its perceived
notions of justice to rectify wrongs in the written law.6 1 The Supreme Court, by
contrast, is uncomfortable using extra-textual sources, such as natural law, reflecting
its desire to adhere to a stable rule of law founded on a defensible basis.6 s The
Constitutional Court actively attempts to maintain the essence of constitutional
concepts while keeping constitutional text "in tune with the times." 3 Recall, for
example, the Constitutional Court's attempts to preserve the principle of human
dignity amidst a changing world in the census cases, in relation to changing computer
technology, or the transsexuality cases, in relation to evolving medical and moral
60"See supra notes 341-63 and accompanying text; see also Elfes, 6 BVerfGE at 41.
'See, e.g., Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 194-95 (1986) (looking to history and tradition to
limit sexual self-determination).
(mGriswo/d, 381 US. at 522 (Black, J., dissenting) (arguing that privacy is not fundamental right, and
that states may therefore constitutionally proscribe contraceptive use).
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developments.6  By contrast, the Supreme Court generally makes adjustments to
changing social and economic conditions only gradually, and often amidst great
anguish and controversy.' American constitutionalism thus seems tied to the past in
a way that German law is not. In these ways, the Constitutional Court is forward in
focus, whereas the Supreme Court looks backward. 60
From these differences in constitutional vision, technique, and doctrine, we can
extrapolate deeper differences in legal culture. The German prioritization of human
dignity raises moral autonomy to the forefront of society, it is the higher law of
German constitutionalism. Thus, persons have expansive freedom to act and to
develop human ability, but that freedom is coupled with a concern for well-being,
including solidifying the inner realm of personality. Moral autonomy, moreover, is not
a one-way street; it involves responsibility too, including responsibility to others which
individuals must recognize, even if through enforcement of the moral order.
Accordingly, freedom is to unfold within the social community, which can both
empower and limit human activity, depending on resolution of the conflict between
individual and social claims.6" Rights are thus exercised within a framework of duties
and responsibilities, mediated ultimately by the Constitutional Court's interpretation
of this higher law.
In American law, by contrast, the focus is on freedom to pursue one's vision of
liberty or happiness, unbounded by a strong sense of moral order. We thus tend to
exercise rights without a sense of duty or responsibility, except when we have been
persuaded to accept duties and responsibilities by influences other than the sanction
of the law. Naturally, our rights are more individualistic and absolutist in orientation.
Through examination of these contrasting constitutional visions, we discover
alternative conceptions of humanity, personality, and community, as outlined in public
law, conceptions that can be enriching, ennobling, or both. Perhaps this is the central
purpose of comparative law: We learn, by looking at others, important truths about
ourselves, truths which can then be reevaluated or reaffirmed. Certainly there is much
to learn about the two laws, much' the two laws can learn from each other. For
example, the census cases demonstrate a sensible way to preserve the inviolability of
personhood and human freedom amidst dramatic technological change. American law
might profitably develop similar rights of informational self-determination, a logical
evolution of First Amendment law. In addition, if Americans want to pursue a more
coherent vision of community, the German method of coupling rights with duties,
individually and socially, points the way toward introducing communal values into the
social order. Through attempting to secure human dignity for all, we would perhaps
6"See supra notes 246-56,460-65 and accompanying text.
"See, e.g., Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483,495 (1954) (signaling end of separate but equal
doctrine); West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379,392-94 (1937) (signaling demise of Lochner-era
substantive due process).
6 Compare, e.g., Transsexual Case, 49 BVerfGE at 299 (rooting sexual identity to sense of well-
being), with Bowers, 478 U.S. at 194 (relying on history and tradition in declining to recognize fundamental
liberty to engage in consensual homosexual sodomy).
6Compare, e.g., Mephisto, 30 BVerfGE 173 (1971) (stating that human dignity may constrain free
expression), with Transsexual Case, 49 BVerfGE 286 (1978) (reasoning that human dignity empowers sexual
self-identity).
1056 UTAH LAW REVIEW [1997: 963
be less preoccupied with securing our own claims. In this way, we might escape our
obsession with "rights-talk" and learn to appreciate the value of human solidarity.
Conversely, if dignitarian rights are justifiably viewed as indispensable to
German law, then the Constitutional Court might profitably transplant certain of the
techniques employed by the Supreme Court to preserve fundamental rights. For
example, importation of strict scrutiny analysis would lend a degree of clarity and
precision to German rights analysis. To an extent, this already has occurred, 8
evidencing the transplantation of concepts across cultures, albeit with some
adjustment. Perhaps pursuit of a mutual cultural influence is not so far off after all.
'0See Right to Heritage 11, 90 BVerfGE 263, 271 (1994) (applying heightened, intensive scrutiny).
